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Examining funded relationships of three disaster relief and development INGOs 
through the resource dependence and public policy tool choice frameworks, this research 
explores the relationship between funding and INGO autonomy, with a primary emphasis 
on government funding. The study adapts Verhoest, Peters et al.‟s (2004) 
conceptualization of organizational autonomy as the extent of an organization‟s decision 
making capacity in matters concerning human and financial resource management, and 
agency operations.  
This research therefore finds evidence to suggest that relative to other funding 
sources, government funding disproportionately constrains INGOs‟ operational and 
managerial autonomy. This is largely accomplished through various ex ante and ex post 
constraints such as, inputs, evaluation and performance controls, audit requirements and 
various rules, regulations and conditionalities attached to government funding.  
Notwithstanding government influence on INGOs‟ decision making and 
activities, this research also finds evidence to suggest that relief and assistance INGOs 
that receive USG funding are able to exert influence on USG funding agencies through a 
number of strategies. These strategies include influencing program and implementation 
designs, the art of contract negotiation, revenue diversification, due diligence, and simply 
walking away from funding sources that constrain their autonomy.   
And consistent with Salamon (2002a), this research finds that the funding tools 
utilized by government to finance INGO‟s activities influence INGOs‟ autonomy in 










The nonprofit literature cites the influence of government funding on nonprofit 
governance (O'Regan and Oster 2002), and increased nonprofit bureaucratization 
(Goyder 1994; Commins 1997). In addition, government funding is observed to leave 
enduring effects on organizational culture and the nature of the services that international 
non-governmental organizations (INGOs) provide (Smith 1993; Smith 2006; Kerlin 
2006a). There is also anecdotal evidence to suggest that government funding influences 
nonprofit organizational autonomy. For instance, in 2000, in order to increase its freedom 
“by relying on less exacting funding sources,” Oxfam America turned down government 
funding (Brown and Moore 2001).  And according to its President and CEO, Direct 
Relief International turned down USAID funding because of the “new requirement that 
all aid be branded as “From the American People” (Crea 2006). The CEO stated that, 
“when we [INGOs] get together we love to say we are NGOs, with an emphasis on the 
„N,‟ but all we end up doing is talking about USAID” (Crea 2006).  
Furthermore, following a decision by CARE to phase out federal funds for food 
aid, a CARE employee interviewed for the New York Times went on to state that 
“[W]hat has happened to humanitarian organizations over the years is that a lot of us 
have become contractors on behalf of the government….It compromised our ability to 
speak up when things went wrong” (Dugger 2007).  
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Despite such examples, very little research has been done to measure or 
understand the concept of “organizational autonomy” in the nonprofit sector. In turn, very 
little has been done to empirically explore the relationship between government funding 
and INGOs‟ autonomy. In order to understand organizational autonomy in the context of 
international NGOs, this research adapts Verhoest, Peters, et al.‟s (2004) 
conceptualization of organizational autonomy, as well as the autonomy dimensions 
developed in the Public Management Institute at Leuven University in Belgium.  
Using resource dependence theory, this paper explores the relationship between 
the degree of INGO dependency on particular funding streams, especially dependence on 
U.S. government funding (USG), and the effect such dependencies have on 
organizational autonomy. The study also employs a policy tool choice framework 
embodied in the „new governance‟ framework (Salamon 2002a) to explore the 
relationship between different forms of government financial transfers and their 
implications for international NGO autonomy  
The government-INGO exchange relationship is embedded in a U.S. foreign 
policy environment in which direct relief and development INGOs operate. Historically, 
U.S. foreign aid policies have tended to be characterized by tension between “diplomatic” 
and “altruistic or developmental” purposes (Stoddard 2002a; Lancaster 2007). For 
instance, the threat of Communism during the Cold War elevated the significance of 
diplomatic ends over developmental ones, such that even when “developmental” aid was 
provided, the “diplomatic” objective was to prevent the spread of Communism in the 
poorer parts of the world (Stoddard 2002a; Lancaster 2007). Following September 11, 
2001, the fear of Communism was replaced by Terrorism, ushering in drastic shifts in the 
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U.S. foreign aid policies. As noted by Kerlin (2006a), “…the National Security Strategy 
introduced by President Bush in September 2002 underscores that, although poverty, 
poor health and lack of economic opportunity do not lead directly to unrest and terrorism; 
they can be their precursors.”   
INGOs as the official implementing partners of government are therefore affected 
by such shifts. A danger exists that such a policy environment may translate into 
institutional environments where exchange relationships between government and INGOs 
are primarily based on fulfilling national interests-oriented goals at the expense of the 
altruistic goals and objectives of INGOs. As noted by Cho and Gillespie (2006), 
institutional variations (e.g., changes in policies) and shifts in the political environments 
(e.g., shifts in priorities) can influence the decision choices available not only to 
politicians but also to nonprofit decision-makers. As a result, government policies may 
negatively impact INGOs decisions, as long as INGOs receive government funding. This 
is not to say that government cannot influence INGO behavior in the absence of a 
funding exchange relationship.  
In light of the policy environments within which INGOs are embedded and the 
practical concerns that INGOs like CARE and Direct Relief International have expressed, 
this research sets out to address the broad issue of whether the funding relationships in 
which INGOs engage, in exchange for resources, have any negative impact their ability 
to make mission-focused or need-based decisions. This is especially crucial given that, 
INGOs at times find themselves unable to meet the emergent needs of the populations 
they serve due to the specifications and constrictions of their grant or contract agreements 
(Smith 1993; Smith 2006).  
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The existence of the nonprofit sector has been explained by theories of 
government and market failure (Weisbrod 1977; Hansmann 1980; Fama and Jensen 
1983). Traditionally therefore, nonprofits have been viewed as entities that fall outside 
the immediate domains of government and markets (Ware 1989; Lancaster 2007). From a 
de Tocquevilleian perspective, this idealistic distinction and separation of sectors 
represents a critical advancement for democracy characterized by citizen participation 
through nonprofit organizations (Gidron, Kramer et al. 1992; Smith 2006; Lancaster 
2007). However, in lieu of a three-sector economy with distinct differences between 
nonprofit organizations, the government and the private sector, others have described a 
“mixed economy” characterized by blurring sectoral differences (Young 1984; Smith 
2006), especially when the ideological independence of nonprofit organizations is 
threatened by the third sector‟s fiscal dependence on government and corporations 
(Kramer 1985).  
Within this context, government funding remains controversial. While some 
authors have emphasized the dysfunctional dependency of INGOs on government funds 
and thus recommend scaling them back, others have advocated for greater use of INGOs 
as public service providers and as official implementing partners of government policies 
and programs (Salamon 2003; Smith 2006).  
This research draws on two theoretical frameworks, resource dependence and tool 
choice approaches. While a policy tool approach suggests that different funding 
instruments are selected on the basis of the kinds of behaviors they intend to induce 
(Schneider and Ingram 1990; Salamon 2002a), resource dependence theory suggests that 
INGOs adapt themselves to the providers of the particular resources they seek. The 
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behavior of organizations is therefore explained not only as a function of the critical 
resources that the organization needs in order to function and survive, but also as a 
function of the different instruments used to transfer these critical resources.  
Concerns for INGO autonomy therefore arise from the particular ways in which 
the relationship between government and nonprofits institutions is manifested. Coston 
(1998) points out that this relationship exists in an environment where government enjoys 
greater power at the expense of and a resource advantage over the INGOs.  As applied 
here, resource dependence theory seeks to explain the funded relationship between 
INGOs and their financial benefactors through resource exchange and the power 
asymmetry associated with the exchange process (Oliver 1991; Pfeffer and Salancik 
2003). In addition, different funding sources exhibit different institutional patterns, which 
result in different management requirements on the part of recipient INGOs (Gronbjerg 
1993). As such, this theory helps us examine different funding structures (at least from 
the INGO perspective) since they provide the contexts within which INGO decision-
making occurs (Gronbjerg 1993). 
 
 
1.1.1 Research Questions 
 
Najam‟s (2000) foundational theory of strategic institutional interests asserts that 
the nature of the relationship between government and INGOs is based on the 
convergence or divergence of their institutional interests and preferences. However, the 
theory fails to identify how these interests and preferences are articulated. This research 
therefore draws the assumption that different funders such as the U.S. government 
(USG), foundations and corporations articulate their development interests and 
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preferences through the rules, regulations and conditions attached to funding. And with 
respect to USG funding in particular, using Salamon‟s tool choice framework which 
assumes that different tools such as grants, contracts, cooperative agreements, generate 
specific kinds of behaviors from people and organizations, this paper posits that 
government articulates its institutional interests and priorities by use of these funding 
mechanisms. As such this research addresses two primary questions: -  
1) How does government funding influence INGO autonomy?  
2) What strategies do INGOs employ to preserve their autonomy?  
 
The first question allows one to understand how INGOs have experienced USG 
funding relative to foundation or corporate funding, with respect to their autonomy. As a 
result, one gains an understanding of the behavior of different funding sources and their 
impact on INGO autonomy. Based on the assumption that autonomy loss is taking place, 
the second research question seeks to understand the strategies that INGOs employ to 
militate against this loss. 
 
1.2 International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs)   
 
Nonprofit organizations are private, self-governing, non-profit seeking or 
distributing, voluntary entities that are organized separately from government (Salamon 
and Anheier 1996). Such organizations are eligible for federal tax-exempt status. This 
sector has also been referred to as the “third sector,” a term widely used in Europe and in 
the United States to describe those entities that lie between the market and the state, or 
those organizations that are constitutionally separate from government agencies and the 
private enterprise (Smith and Lipsky 1993; Boli 2006).  
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This research focuses on a subset of nonprofit organizations known as 
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) or private voluntary organizations 
in the United States.  These are “nonprofit organizations that make significant operating 
expenditures across national borders and do not identify themselves as domestic actors” 
(Anheier and Themudo 2004). Using the U.S. Agency for International Development‟s 
(USAID) definition, INGOs are tax-exempt international private voluntary organizations 
(PVOs) working in international development, receiving some portion of their annual 
revenue support from the private sector, as well as voluntary contributions from the 
general public.  
The scope of INGO activities ranges from advocacy, education, and research, to 
international relief and development assistance. Given this diversity, this research focuses 
only on disaster relief and assistance INGOs, whose primary activities include economic 
development activities such as long-term poverty reduction through education and micro 
credit initiatives, as well as humanitarian assistance initiatives such as responding to 
natural disasters (Forman and Stoddard 2003).   
INGOs have also been described as part of a “global” third sector, one that 
operates outside of the global economy – dominated by transnational corporations and 
international organizations such as the Bretton Woods Institutions, and the global 
interstate system – centered on the United Nations (Boli 2006). International NGOs 
therefore, are operational organizations typically headquartered in developed countries 
and carry out operations in more than one developing country
1
.”   






Another defining feature of INGOs is that they have come to play a significant 
role in the international arena of relief and humanitarian assistance (Forman and Stoddard 
2003; Lancaster 2007). According to an annual report from the Office of U.S. Foreign 
Disaster Assistance (OFDA), over 70 percent of U.S. foreign disaster relief aid was 
channeled through INGOs in 2000. And in 2008, 55 percent of all OFDA funding went to 
INGOs, with 57 percent in 2007 and 2006, and 60 percent in 2004
2
. A significant share of 
OFDA funding is also channeled through UN agencies, the USAID and other USG 
agencies. It is quite possible that some of these organizations ultimately channel some of 
this money through INGOs. As a result, in addition to undertaking independent charitable 
endeavors, INGOs also serve as the official operational arms of government, and 
multilateral assistance agencies such as the World Bank, and IMF (Forman and Stoddard 
2003; Lancaster 2007).  
This heightened visibility of, and demand for, INGOs in the international public 
policy arena has been attributed to a number of factors including the post-Cold War 
proliferation of complex humanitarian emergencies, the failures of government-to-
government aid, and the ineffectiveness and waste associated with multilateral 
organizations such as the UN and the Bretton Woods Institutions (Stoddard 2002a; 
Stoddard 2002b; Forman and Stoddard 2003; Grossrieder 2003). As organizations that lie 
between the state and market, INGOs have historically been regarded as apolitical 
entities, though their roles have had significant political implications for both 
international and domestic politics (Ahmed and Potter 2006).  




 Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2006, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).  
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The concept of the third sector is also consistent with the de Tocquevilleian view 
of democratic participation in that ordinary citizens voluntarily organize into self-
governing, private associations that are seen to be separate from government, in order to 
participate in the political economy. In this regard, INGOs are widely recognized as “the 
chief representatives of and spokespersons for global civil society, and play an important 
role in the global governance” (Boli 2006). In other words, INGOs are viewed as the 
principal instruments or mechanisms through which “world citizens” act collectively, to 
organize, shape, and express world opinion in the global public sphere, as well as foster a 
global civic culture (Boli 2006).  
The work of INGOs therefore, is seen to influence and shape the policy decisions 
of nations, international organizations and transnational corporations. Consequently, 
INGOs have come to be regarded as vehicles for „democratization‟ and hence, a critical 
component of a flourishing „civil society.‟ Normatively speaking, INGOs are expected to 
act as a counterbalance to state power by encouraging participative notions of democracy 
and promoting pluralism. In other words, INGOs are viewed as distinctive institutions 
that exhibit motivations and structural preferences distinct from government or the 
private sector.  
Another unique feature of INGOs is that they are funded through a variety of 
mechanisms – some with a few funders and others with many, some with restrictive 
contracts, and others with more flexibility. For example, in 2003, 71 percent of the U.S. 
INGOs‟ revenue came from private contributions, 20 percent from government grants, 6 
percent from program services and 3 percent was labeled as „other‟ (National Center for 
Charitable Statistics as cited in Kerlin 2006). In 2005, based on the 496 U.S. based 
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INGOs registered with the USAID, 80 percent of INGOs‟ total support and revenue came 
from private support i.e., in-kind, and private contributions and private revenue, 10 
percent from the USAID (which include freight, donated food, grants and contracts) and 
another 10 percent from other support i.e., other U.S. government contracts, grants, other 
governments and international organizations (USAID 2007).  
The exchange relationships between INGOs and government have been 
characterized by increasing bilateralization, that is, more and more funds being channeled 
for specific countries and for specific purposes and less as unrestricted grants (Randel 
and German 2002; Forman and Stoddard 2003; Lancaster 2007). As such, the concern 
remains that government funders can “choose to dictate where and how their 
contributions are spent” thus undermining INGOs‟ operational autonomy. The same can 
be said about foundation and corporate donors as well. Such resource and power 
asymmetry may adversely affect the flexibility of INGOs and their ability to distribute 
resources according to their own conceptualizations of need (Randel and German 2002).  
The impact of the delicate dance with government, especially on the autonomy of 
INGOs is one that is not well understood. Much of the debate surrounding government-
INGO interaction has largely consisted of an ideological discussion about the ideal role 
of government in responding to society‟s economic and social needs. Advocates of a 
minimal government role in such matters have called for strict severance between 
government and nonprofit organizations, thus championing the nonprofit sector as the 
ideal mechanism for responding to social and economic needs. Proponents of a large 
government presence champion the role of the welfare state, while downplaying the 
significance of nonprofit organizations. As Gronbjerg and Salamon (2003) point out, 
 11 
neither side shows interest in the realities of government-nonprofit collaboration on the 
ground.  
The empirical side of government-nonprofit interaction is also fraught with its 
own confusion and misconceptions given the range of arenas such interactions can occur 
(Gronbjerg and Salamon 2003).  For instance, the government spending arena is one 
where its spending decisions indirectly affect nonprofit organizations by affecting the 
need for nonprofit services, and directly – since government is a significant source of 
nonprofit revenue. Other arenas include, direct and indirect influences through taxation 
policies, government regulations and the broader policies that government pursues such 
as the USG foreign policy (Gronbjerg and Salamon 2003).  
Thus a research focus on the influence of government funding on INGO 
autonomy can contribute to the debate surrounding this “conflict that has long existed 
between the ideological or normative perception of government-nonprofit relations and 
the empirical or factual perception” (Gronbjerg and Salamon 2003). Such a focus 
provides some insight on the direct impact of government spending decisions on INGO 
autonomy. 
 
1.3 Dimensions of Organizational Autonomy  
 
While the questions of INGO autonomy are not new, the nonprofit sector 
literature fails to provide a concise definition of what organizational autonomy is. This is 
not to say that the literature does not suggest potential descriptors or measures of 
organizational autonomy. To cite one example, Smith (1993) states that inherent 
government funding restrictions reduce the autonomy INGOs have in setting their own 
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agenda, as well as affect their operations, especially with regard to the services they 
provide and the clients they serve. This observation actually refers to what Verhoest, 
Peters et al. (2004) have labeled operational autonomy.  
The two-tier conceptualization of organizational autonomy postulated by 
Verhoest, Peters et al. (2004), regards “organizational autonomy” first as, the extent of an 
organization‟s decision-making competencies. This encompasses: -  
1) Managerial autonomy: This refers to the degree to which an agency‟s 
decision making competencies about the choice and use of inputs are 
delegated from a centralized location. In the case of INGOs, this research 
considers the funding sources as the centralized location. Managerial 
autonomy comes in two forms, that is, with respect to: -  
a. Financial management – making changes to budgets 
b. Human resources – making employees selection decisions 
2) Operational or policy autonomy: This pertains to the extent to which an 
organization can take decisions about processes, procedures, policy 
instruments, target groups and societal objectives and outcomes.  
 
Organizational autonomy is also defined in terms of the constraints that may 
impede the implementation of an organization‟s decision making competencies 
(Verhoest, Peters et al. 2004; Braadbaart, Van-Eybergen et al. 2007). According to 
Verhoest, Peters et al. (2004), autonomy is also defined as the “exemption of constraints 
on the actual use of decision making competencies. This formulation comprises four 
types of autonomy: -   
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1) Financial autonomy: The degree of an INGO‟s financial dependence on its 
funders (e.g., the share of government, corporate, or foundation funding)  
2) Structural autonomy: The degree to which an organization is shielded from 
influence from funding sources through lines of hierarchy and accountability 
or the board structure. 
3) Legal autonomy: The extent to which agencies are legally protected from 
government interference. 
4) Interventional autonomy: The extent to which an agency is free from ex post 
accountability requirements, and threats of sanctions.  
 
Constraints therefore include ex ante controls such as the formulation of rules, 
instructions, conditions or standards that provide direction for INGOs thus steering them 
toward the desired policy goals of the funders. Such controls influence how the provided 
financial inputs are to be utilized. Constraints also consist of ex post controls, which take 
the form of accountability demands placed on INGOs to verify whether the a priori preset 
goals were achieved. The existence of ex ante and ex post controls therefore provides the 
thread used to trace whether INGOs fulfilled preset donor goals. 
The above observations also highlight a key underlying character of the concept 
of organizational autonomy which I believe is critical to this research. Similar to 
measuring concepts such as “quality of life,” “organizational morale,” or “extraordinary 
intelligence” (Borsboom, Mellenbergh et al. 2003), the concept of “organizational 
autonomy” needs to be regarded as a latent variable, one that is unobserved but can only 
be inferred from observing other variables or indicators that are observable and can be 
directly measured.  
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In this case, the presence of observable ex ante budget rules and regulations or the 
fact that an INGO is 95 percent dependent on a single funding source, could all be 
perceived as indicators of an INGO‟s loss of autonomy. As a result, a causal relationship 
is assumed to exist between an observable variable or concept (e.g., ex ante rules and 
requirements on the expenditure of federal funding) and an unobservable variable or 
concept such as operational autonomy (Borsboom, Mellenbergh et al. 2003). For this 
reason, a clear distinction needs to be drawn between “autonomy” (as having actual 
decision making competencies) and the “mechanisms” that may influence that autonomy, 
i.e., constraints on autonomy.  
In light of these definitions, government-INGO exchange relationships can be 
regarded as being concerned about “the particular objectives that an actor seeks to 
achieve through interacting with others,” this is likely to include officially stated goals as 
well as hidden ones (Hulme and Edwards 1997). Constraints on the other hand relate “to 
the levers that an actor (e.g., funding sources) may use to control or influence [the 
behavior of] other actors (e.g., INGOs)…” (Hulme and Edwards 1997), and these include 
persuasion by the use of argument (Majone 1989; Salamon 2002a), and offering financial 
incentives or direct coercion (Schneider and Ingram 1990; Hulme and Edwards 1997).  
In some ways, the goal of ensuring that nonprofit organizations are accountable 
has resulted in expanded monitoring, evaluation and reporting obligations; mechanisms 
which could be regarded as types of constraints or controls. And by regarding 
interventional constraints as ex post accountability requirements and threats of sanctions; 
it is clear that INGOs‟ autonomy can be undermined through such interventional means. 
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As a result, a discourse about INGO autonomy in the context of funding must include a 
dialogue about INGO accountability. 
 
1.4 The Complexity of INGO Accountability 
 
Accountability motivates a scenario where “an actor is accountable when that 
actor recognizes that it has made a promise to do something and accepted a moral and 
legal responsibility to do its best to fulfill that promise” (Brown and Moore 2001). In 
Goetz and Jenkins‟ (2002) words, “accountability describes a relationship where A is 
accountable to B if A is obliged to explain and justify his actions to B, or if A may suffer 
sanctions if his conduct, or explanation for it, is found wanting by B.” In light of the 
notion that accountability is not only relational (Cutt and Murray 2000; Ebrahim 2003a), 
it is also “a relationship of power” (Goetz and Jenkins 2002), where one party allocates 
responsibility and another accepts it with an undertaking to report on or render on 
account for that responsibility (Cutt and Murray 2000). Thus a conversation about 
government-INGO relations cannot take place without at least a cursory glance at the link 
between accountability demands by government and INGO autonomy.  
Increased accountability demands on INGOs have been attributed to three factors; 
INGOs‟ increased prominence, attraction of more funding from various sources, and 
increased influence in promoting and shaping social, economic and political development 
in the international polity, (Brown and Moore 2001; Ebrahim 2003a; Bendell 2006; 
Jordan and Tuijl 2006). As a result, different stakeholders place different accountability 
demands on INGOs, which can pose challenges when the expectations and accountability 
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claims of various stakeholders misalign, creating a situation where an INGO may have to 
choose whose claims it can honor (Brown and Moore 2001; Ebrahim 2003a).  
For instance, in upward accountability, funders such as government, corporations 
and foundations, expect INGOs “to be accountable for the integrity, efficiency, and 
impacts of programs that they have funded,” that is, “for the proper handling of donated 
resources” (Brown and Moore 2001). Funders expect INGOs to live up to their promise 
in realizing the agreed-upon goals upon which the partnership is based. In downward 
accountability, INGOs‟ beneficiaries expect INGOs “to live up to their rhetoric about 
fostering locally determined development rather than imposing their own priorities” 
(Brown and Moore 2001).  
Closely related to autonomy is that INGOs cannot always challenge those who 
provide the funds for their programs because they run the risk of alienating themselves 
from their funders. In spite of such risks, Oxfam America refused to accept government 
funding for fear that the latter would impose its purposes on the organization. This draws 
our attention to the possibility of stakeholders like government exerting different degrees 
of power on INGOs in an attempt to advance their own agendas (Brown and Moore 
2001). In this case, INGOs‟ autonomy is compromised through a process sometimes 
called “cooptation” – a deflection of the original purposes of INGOs (Kramer 1985; 
Smith and Lipsky 1993; Young 1999; Cutt and Murray 2000; Najam 2000; Ebrahim 
2003a; Young 2006). 
While the above seems to suggest that accountability demands may vary by 
funding source, accountability also varies by the type of tool used to transfer various 
resources to INGOs. For instance, grants impose very general and broad accountability 
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demands on INGOs, while contracts are usually far more exacting and precise. In 
addition, accountability demands may also vary by other dimensions such as outcomes, 
activities, or outputs (Cutt and Murray 2000; Brown and Moore 2001; Ebrahim 2003b). 
According to Ebrahim (2003a; 2003b), regulators and funders typically operationalize 
accountability largely through external oversight, dominated by mechanisms of 
accounting for funds allocation and utilization, and such accountability mechanisms are 
usually biased in favor of the funders.  
In organizational autonomy terms, accountability demands can be translated into 
ex post or interventional constraints on INGOs. In other words, the requirement for ex 
post accountability acts as a burden of proof placed upon INGOs to verify whether the 
funders‟ a priori preset goals were achieved, that is, to account for funds allocation and 
utilization with respect to the agreed upon goals (similar to functional accountability 
described below). As suggested above, ex ante and ex post controls are thus utilized to 
trace whether INGOs fulfilled or deviated from the preset goals.  
The notion that accountability varies with different dimensions brings us to 
question the normative assumptions upon which the practice of accountability is 
predicated. Ebrahim (2003a) notes that heightened accountability concerns have resulted 
in increased oversight and INGO regulation. Bendell (2006) regards accountability as a 
bureaucratic hurdle, and at worst, a threat to the achievement of INGO missions.  
However, how much accountability is sufficient and how much is “too much” remains 
elusive (Ebrahim 2003a).  
Similar to the concept of organizational autonomy, the concept of accountability 
may have been narrowly viewed as one-dimensional concept of oversight. However, that 
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is but one facet of a complex multi-dimensional concept of accountability (Cutt and 
Murray 2000; Ebrahim 2003a; Ebrahim 2003b). Other dimensions of accountability 
include: -  
 External accountability: When those outside the organization hold the 
organization responsible for its actions, inspired by an obligation to meet 
externally prescribed standards of behavior. 
 Internal accountability: When the organization takes the initiative to hold 
itself responsible for its programs, inspired by a felt responsibility towards 
mission accomplishment.  
 Strategic accountability: This is when an INGO accounts for the impact its 
activities have had on other organization and the wider environment.  
 Functional accountability: This is concerned with “accounting for 
resources, resource use, and immediate impact” (Ebrahim 2003b) 
 
Chisolm (1995) also adds a legal dimension to accountability. This is concerned 
with “either an obligation to meet prescribed standards of behavior or an obligation to 
disclose information about one‟s actions even in the absence of a prescribed standard.” 
This type of accountability presents threats of legal action should a nonprofit fail to meet 
the legal obligation, quite similar to legal constraints defined under autonomy. For 
INGOs such legal obligations arrive by virtue of entering into legal binding relationships 
with funders.  
With regard to government funding, the use of legal instruments such as grants, 
contracts or cooperative agreements, imposes legal obligations on INGOs to meet 
prescribed standards of behavior or goals stipulated in those agreements. There are other 
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legal obligations that nonprofits in general have to meet without necessarily entering into 
an exchange relationship with government. Such obligations include, filing a 990 tax 
form annually, ensuring public access to 990 forms, and the requirement that nonprofit 
organizations with a 501(c) (3) tax exempt status not participate in substantial political 
campaign or substantial lobbying (Grobman 2007). Failure to abide by these regulations 
may result in a loss of tax exempt status. 
However, not all accountability demands negatively impact the autonomy of an 
INGO; as Brown and Moore (2001) pointed out, as long as an INGO‟s structures and 
accountability systems “are aligned with its mission [as defined by the INGO leadership], 
the demands for accountability will neither reduce an [INGO‟s] autonomy nor alter its 
purposes.” What remains clear is that, decisions by INGOs to embrace or resist a 
stakeholder‟s demands for accountability can have profound impacts on their missions, 
strategies, and operations. Overall, accountability demands seem to act as some type of 
ex post constraints on INGOs‟ activities thus impacting INGOs‟ operational autonomy 
and managerial autonomy with respect to financial management.   
 
1.5 Theoretical Frameworks: Resource Dependence and Tool Choice 
 
A number of theoretical lenses can be used to investigate the nature of the 
relationship between government funding and INGO autonomy. For example, the neo-
institutional theory with its focus on institutional isomorphism, contends that the success 
of an organization is based on the degree to which it responses and adapts to external 
forces within its environment. This framework focuses on organizational field as a unit of 
analysis, thus taking into account all the relevant actors in a given institution‟s life in its 
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totality (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  These authors define organizational fields as the 
“key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other 
organizations that produce similar services or products.” As a result, this theoretical 
framework can be used to explain the homogeneity that may exist among organizations 
operating within the same organizational fields.   
This research however seeks to understand how different funding sources, and in 
particular, the influence of one‟s level of dependence on USG funding on an INGO‟s 
autonomy. As such variation in the degree to which funding sources impact the autonomy 
of INGOs and not homogeneity, is of interest here, hence the adoption of resource 
dependence theory. A fundamental premise of resource dependence theory is that, 
organizations lacking in resources will establish relationships with others, in order to 
obtain the resources they need (Pfeffer and Salancik‟s 2003). This theory allows one to 
focus on the variations in the impact funders have on organizational autonomy by 
focusing one‟s attention on the individual exchange environments within which INGOs 
operate in. This is important given the belief that government-INGO exchange 
relationships are dominated by repression and rivalry owing to the power and resource 
advantage enjoyed by government (Hulme and Edwards 1997; Smith 1993; Atmar 2001). 
According to Pfeiffer and Salancik (2003) resource dependence theory characterizes 
associations between organizations as a set of power relations based on resource 
exchange.  
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) define an organization as a “coalition of groups and 
interests, each attempting to obtain something from the collectivity by interacting with 
others, and each with its own preferences and objectives.”  Hence both funding sources 
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and INGOs have their own preferences and objectives. Of interest to this research is how 
those interests, preferences, and objectives are articulated. Viewing organizations as 
coalitions of groups and interests also draws our attention to the boundaries of an 
organization, as being defined by the work it does, and most importantly, by the extent to 
which the organization has discretion – influence and control over what it does i.e., its 
activities (March and Simon 1958; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). Somewhat resembling 
DiMaggio and Powell‟s (1983) institutional isomorphism, organizations resemble 
coalitions changing their structure and patterns of behavior to attract and maintain the 
much needed resources, thus modifying their power relative to funding organizations 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). This suggests a disproportionate dependence of INGOs on 
those organizations that control the strategic resources that they need to carry out their 
missions (Gronbjerg 1993; Mudambi and Pedersen 2007). For example, funding sources 
may influence the way INGOs delivers services (Smith 1993; Chang and Tuckman 1994; 
Smith 2006).   
As such, the funding environment of nonprofits, owing to the funding acquisition 
uncertainties associated with responding to requests for proposals (RFPs) and agreements 
(RFAs), may affect the power and autonomy of nonprofits (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). 
In other words, responding to an RFA or RFP does not necessary secure funding. In 
actuality, the funding environment is characterized by strong competition for grants from 
other INGOs and competition for contracts from other INGOs, as well as corporations. 
Resource dependence therefore, recognizes that the funding environment and context 
within which organizations exist and compete for resources may influence how they 
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operate by way of influencing INGOs‟ decision making competencies (Verhoest, Peters 
et al. 2004).   
Resource dependence also rests on the following assumptions; first, organizations 
are assumed to consist of emergent internal and external coalitions. Such coalitions 
emerge from social exchanges that are formed in order to influence and control the 
behavior of others (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). And as indicated above, a second premise 
is that, the environments within which organizations operate are assumed to contain 
scarce resources which are critical for their survival, thus creating a measure of 
uncertainty among dependent organizations. Disaster relief and assistance INGOs, like 
other nonprofit organizations, operate in a resource-scarce environment such that they 
rely on a variety of funding sources such as, individual, government, corporations, 
foundations, other governments and international organizations (e.g., the UN and the 
African Bank), to fund their missions. In light of these resource pressures, together with 
the shifting nature of humanitarian problems and assistance around the globe, as well as 
shifting policies governing their operations, INGOs face uncertainties and instabilities 
which may impact their decision making.   
Finally, resource dependency theory assumes that organizations work toward two 
related objectives – that is, acquiring control over resources that maximize their 
autonomy or independence from other organizations, or minimizing their dependence on 
other organizations (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Ulrich and Barney 1984; Pfeffer and 
Salancik 2003). In this regard, one could argue that INGOs may choose to increase their 
resource dependence on a variety of funding sources by diversifying their funding 
portfolios, thus relying less on a single funding source (Gronbjerg 1993; Chang and 
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Tuckman 1994). Alternatively, INGOs could maximize the dependence of those that fund 
them by increasing their competitive advantage in a particular field. 
Using this lens therefore, helps to appreciate the funding environment in which 
INGOs exists, while allowing an investigation of the factors through which INGOs‟ 
autonomy is undermined, as well as the mechanisms INGOs use to maximize their 
autonomy. Note that „interdependence” in and of itself does not automatically translate 
into autonomy loss; it does however, impact “the ability of [an] organization to achieve 
its desired outcomes” especially when that interdependence is asymmetrical (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 2003). Resource dependence theory suggests that increased financial inter-
dependency of INGOs on other organizations may reduce INGOs‟ control and decision 
making autonomy (Provan 1982).  
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) identify three critical factors that increase the 
dependence or vulnerability of an organization to extra-organizational influence and 
control;  
1. First, the importance of the resources to an INGO determines its level of 
dependence on a particular source. This is determined by;  
a. The relative magnitude of the exchange or the proportion or share of 
revenue coming from a particular source, measured by the degree to 
which an INGO is dependent on a dominant funding source relative to 
other funding sources. 
b. The criticality of the resource, measured by the extent to which the INGO 
can survive or function in the absence of revenue support from a particular 
funding source. 
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All these factors may determine the degree to which INGOs exist in asymmetrical 
net exchanges where funding sources enjoy a power advantage over them. For example, 
an INGO that is 100 percent government funded may not be in a position to challenge the 
government since all its activities are government funded.  
 
2. An organization‟s dependence on its environment is also influenced by the 
availability of alternative funding sources. Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) point out that, 
access to alternative resources can be constrained through; 
a. Rules and regulations that may restrict access to other sources;  
b. The number of available sources; and  
c. The size or importance of the alternatives.  
As such, control over resource concentration or having input transactions made by 
relatively few organizations or a single significant organization may facilitate the creation 
of organizational resource dependence.  
 
3. Organizational dependence is also determined by the extent of the funding 
source’s discretion over resource ownership, allocation, and use. Having such 
discretion, influence and control is based on; 
a. Resource ownership: This is based on the assumption that whoever 
possesses the resource has power over how that resource is allocated and 
utilized; 
b. The ability to control the actual use of the resources: This is concerned 
with the degree to which an INGO has control over how donated resources 
are utilized. In other words, controlling the actual use of the resource by 
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the funder yield less INGO discretion over how those resources are 
ultimately utilized and therefore what gets done.  
Finally, organizational dependence comes about when  
c. Rules are used to regulate resource ownership, allocation and use: The 
presence and actual enforcement of such rules for example, determines the 
degree to which an INGO becomes dependent on its funders.  
For example, in an informal conversation, one INGO employee complained that 
receiving U.S. government funding through what he referred to as the “Buy America” 
clauses – (referring to The Fly America Act and the Eligibility Rules for Goods and 
Services Clause); restricted USG-funded INGOs from utilizing cheaper or alternative 
modes of transportation or sources of inputs (e.g., the requirement to purchase only U.S. 
manufactured vehicles, or the requirement to use only U.S. shipping companies to 
transport goods and other commodities). In light of these observations, the more an 
organization is self-contained or self-sufficient i.e., less interdependent, the more likely it 
is to influence and control its own activities. This is simply not the case with many 
INGOs, let alone many nonprofit organizations. 
Evidence from the literature suggests that funding sources have been able to exert 
influence on resource allocation, and use through regulations and conditionalities 
embedded within contracts and grants (e.g., Provan 1982; Schneider and Ingram 1990; 
Salamon 2002a; 2002b; Shaikh and Casablanca 2008). Additional examples of such 
rules, regulations, and conditionalities include the Anti-Prostitution Pledge, which 
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requires that INGOs adopt explicit anti-prostitution policies and language in their 
programming, and The Mexico City Policy (also known and the “Global Gag Rule
3
”), 
which “denies U.S. family planning funding to any organization that performs, collects 
data on, provides referrals for, or advocates legal changes for abortions” (Jacobson 2007).  
There is also evidence to suggest that the broad policy language of such 
regulations and conditionalities actually curtails INGO autonomy. For instance, INGOs 
operating in Cambodia “discontinued plans to provide English language training classes 
for people working in the commercial sex sector for fear that such programs would be 
interpreted as promoting prostitution” (Jacobson 2005). And in Jamaica, health workers 
working with men and women in prostitution expressed concern over the restrictions‟ 
capacity to limit their ability to support people working in the commercial sex sector, let 
alone, gain their trust without exacerbating their stigma and discrimination (Jacobson 
2005). These examples also indicate that attaching such conditionalities to funding 
constrain INGOs‟ ownership over funding, which in turn undercuts the INGOs‟ capacity 
to allocate those resources. 
 The second theoretical framework utilized in this research is the tool choice 
approach postulated by Salamon (2002a). Although INGOs themselves can be viewed as 
the policy tools of government (Salamon 1995; Forman and Stoddard 2003), the policy 
tool choice view also offers an interesting framework for understanding the nuances of 
the government-INGO exchange relationship. Of particular interest to this research is the 




 This legislation was first announced in 1984 by President Ronald Reagan. It was then rescinded by 
President Bill Clinton in 1993, but reinstated by President George W. Bush in 2001. According to 
Jacobson, the Bush Administration threatened to expand the Global Gag Rule to include international 
HIV/AIDS programs, but withdrew the threat. 
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proposition that government policy tools are selected on the basis of the kinds of 
behaviors they intend to induce (Schneider and Ingram 1990; Salamon 2002a). This 
approach assumes that public policies are designed to generate specific kinds of 
behaviors from people (or organizations) who otherwise would not have exhibited those 
desired specific kinds of behaviors on their own accord (Schneider and Ingram 1990; 
Salamon 2002a). This „new governance” approach shifts the unit of analysis from 
specific programs to “tools” or “instruments” used to achieve public purposes by 
suggesting that regardless of programs, each tool would have similar effects (Salamon 
2002a).  
Salamon (2002a) draws a distinction between tools, programs and policies. For 
instance, tools are embodied in programs, implying that a single tool can be used in 
different programs, and policies are viewed as collections of different programs aimed at 
some general objective or operating in a similar field (Salamon 2002a). A central 
hypothesis of the tools approach is that particular tools convey similar pressures and have 
similar operating requirements regardless of where they happen to be applied.  
It has also been argued that policy tools such grants, contracts, food aid, and 
cooperative agreements, also define the set of actors engaged in the crucial 
implementation phase of programs, the roles they play, and the nature of the activities a 
program involves (Brown and Moore 2001; Salamon 2002a). Tool choice, not only 
influences the outcome of the process; it is also profoundly political in that specific tools 
provide certain actors with an advantage in determining how policies or programs are 
executed, how discretion is to be utilized, and ultimately whose interests will be served 
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(Schneider and Ingram 1990; Peters 2002; Salamon 2002a; Stoddard 2002b; Schneider 
and Ingram 2005; Lancaster 2007).  
For example, although grants and cooperative agreements are essentially very 
similar, a key distinction exists. The USAID‟s Glossary of Automated Directives System 
(2009) defines cooperative agreements as legally binding instruments were the principal 
purpose is to “transfer money or property, services or anything of value to the recipient in 
order to accomplish a public purpose of support authorized by the federal statute and 
where substantial involvement by USAID is anticipated.” As a result, such a funding tool 
provides government with a discretionary advantage over INGOs.  
Basically, “each …tool has its own distinctive features, skills requirements, 
operating procedures, and asset of institutional relationships” (Salamon 2002a). This 
suggests that the vehicles used to transfer funding to INGOs all “permit very different 
levels of government authority and control” over how those resources are utilized (Shaikh 
and Casablanca 2008). Shaikh and Casablanca (2008) also assert that the closer 
development assistance funding is tied to the U.S. foreign policy, the more likely that 
government will desire control over how those funds are spent and would prefer to use 
the contract mechanism to achieve its objectives. As a result, contracts are deemed more 
effective for financing programs where the government requires greater “control over 
results; greater accountability and transparency; more opportunities for competition; and 
an equally cost-effective result” (Shaikh and Casablanca 2008). 
The tool choice approach also suggests that two layers of tools are at the disposal 
of government. First, INGOs themselves can be viewed as public policy tools especially 
when nonprofits are viewed from a privatization or contracting-out perspective compared 
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to direct provision of goods and services by government (Salamon 1995; Forman and 
Stoddard 2003). This is consistent with the “reinvention of government” (Osborne and 
Gaebler 1992) and “hollow state” paradigms (Milward and Provan 2000) which argue 
that the popularity of the nonprofit form as a policy implementing tool emerged in 
response to government and market failures (Weisbrod 1977; Hansmann 1980; Fama and 
Jensen 1983). As illuminated above however, not only is the nonprofit form a policy tool 
in and of itself, but the different ways in which INGOs are funded represent yet another 
set of policy tools available to the government.  
 
 
1.5.1 Understanding Policy Tools: Contracts, Grants and Cooperative Agreements 
 
INGOs are funded through a variety of sources, including, individual 
contributions, foundations, government, corporations, international organizations (e.g., 
UN agencies; World Bank), in-kind gifts and other governments (Forman and Stoddard 
2002; USAID 2007). While public funding in the 1960s and 1970s spurred the growth of 
the nonprofit sector, there was also a notable decline in discretionary grants and contract 
spending (Smith 1993; Gronbjerg and Salamon 2002). Coupled with these changes is a 
notable growth in regulatory pressures from government to discourage nonprofit 
advocacy, and “other mission-critical nonprofit functions” such as nonprofit commitment 
to serve the greatest need, and values that emphasize quality and community benefit over 
efficiency and responsiveness to market pressures (Gronbjerg and Salamon 2002). 
Kerlin (2006a) underscores three forms of government financing for INGOs, that 
is, contracts, grants and cooperative agreements. The USAID for example, tends to 
provide funding to INGOs through grants more than contracts. Note however that USAID 
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Volag reports lump grants and cooperative agreements together, perhaps credence to the 
fear of a blurring of funding tools Kendall and Knapp (1997) suggested below. In the 
1997 fiscal year, 61 percent of INGOs‟ funding was channeled through grants (compared 
to 18 percent in contracts). In the 2002 fiscal year 86 percent of USAID support came in 
the form of grants (compared to 14 percent in contracts). And in the 2004 fiscal year, 68 
percent of USAID support came in the form of grants (compared to 8 percent in 
contracts)
4
. This is in addition to other forms of government funding such as non-
monetary supports like food aid and freight.  
Kelman (2002) and DeHoog and Salamon (2002) identify two types of contracts, 
a procurement contract and one that entails the purchase-of-services for the recipients 
rather than for the government‟s own use. A procurement contract is analogous to a 
private sector business arrangement and is used to purchase or lease property or services 
for the direct benefit of the federal government, in exchange for money (Kelman 2002; 
Kerlin 2006a; USAID 2009a). Essentially, an INGO makes a promise to provide certain 
services, in exchange for money (DeHoog and Salamon 2002).  
Unlike “contracting for the procurement of products and services used directly by 
government,” a purchase-of-service contract entails the delivery of government-funded 
services by INGOs to external recipients (DeHoog and Salamon 2002; Kelman 2002). As 
such, this is an agreement by which INGOs are enlisted by government to deliver 
services to particular clients (DeHoog and Salamon 2002). Given their high level of 
output specificity, contracts tend to be coercive, allowing less discretion in full and open 




 Source: USAID Volag Reports for 1997, 2004, and 2006. 
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competition, and in some sense “involve a voluntary incursion of obligations in exchange 
for compensation” (Brown and Moore 2001; Bean and Conlan 2002; Kelman 2002; 
Kerlin 2006a). 
Grants, on the other hand, are payments to INGOs by government as a gift to 
either foster or support some activity (Bean and Conlan 2002; Kelman 2002). They are 
used to “transfer resources where there is considerable freedom for the recipient to pursue 
an agreed-upon program and substantial involvement, that is, the participation or 
intervention of the sponsoring government agency is not expected” (Kerlin 2006a; 
USAID 2009).  Unlike contracts, grants tend to be relatively non-coercive, leaving 
considerable leeway over the operation of programs (Brown and Moore 2001; Bean and 
Conlan 2002; Kelman 2002; Kerlin 2006a). However, “the increased specificity through 
the replacement of grants with contracts, will threaten to undermine the autonomy” of 
those INGOs receiving a substantial amount of government funding through grants 
(Kendall and Knapp 1997). On the other hand, “cooperative agreements are a means of 
transferring resources to recipient providers, though recipients can expect involvement of 
the sponsoring government agency during project implementation” (Kerlin 2006a; 
USAID 2009).  
As a result, the relationship between each funding tools and autonomy is mediated 
by the coerciveness and directness of the tool itself. A tool (e.g., grant) is said to be 
coercive when it restricts individual or group behavior as opposed to discouraging the 
behavior, and direct when “the authorization, funding, and execution of the tool are all 
carried out by essentially the same entity,” in this case by government (Salamon 2002a). 
For example, in reference to Table 1 below, coercive funding tools like contracts, tend to 
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be associated with high degree of specificity in terms of the input use, programming, and 
clients to be served (Bean and Conlan 2002; Kelman 2002; Smith 2006; Shaikh and 
Casablanca 2008); as a result, they yield less autonomy to INGOs compared to grants for 
example. There are two additional characteristics of tools – automaticity and visibility 
which I do not address the in this research due to an inability to observe them. 
 
Table 1: Taxonomy of Government Funding and INGO Autonomy 



































Table 1 therefore posits a relationship between government funding and INGO 
autonomy predicated on the constraints embedded in the different government funding 
tools. This suggests that specific funding mechanisms yield varying levels of autonomy 
because of the controls embedded in them. Bear in mind however that this taxonomy may 
only be limited to United States government-INGO relations since government-nonprofit 
relations vary widely across different countries. For example, funding from the 
Scandinavian governments is less restrictive than funding from the U.S. government, in 
terms of how and where funds can be utilized (ODI 1995). 
Embedded in the above view is that, while government funding may be used to 
attract INGOs to provide particular kinds of services or to implement particular kinds of 
policies on their behalf, the variations in the mechanisms through which funding is 
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provided (that is, contracts, grants, cooperative agreements, as well as other funding 
mechanisms) in and of themselves, also serve as tools to coerce and determine specific 
kinds of behaviors and relationships from INGOs. In this light, a double-layered 
relationship exists in that, while the „willingness‟ of government to support INGOs may 
symbolically foster a co-productive or participatory behavior or relationship (Edelman 
1985; Schneider and Ingram 2005) on the part of INGOs, the very character of each 
funding mechanism ensures that the strategic institutional interests and preferences of the 
government are met, thus differentially influencing INGO autonomy. 
Salamon (2002a) also underscores a very important observation, that in reality 
any given tool is more of a „package‟ that contains many different elements, that is, a 
type of good or activity; a delivery vehicle for the good or activity; a delivery system that 
is, a set of organizations that are engaged in providing the good, service, or activity; and 
a set of formal or informal rules defining the relationship among the entities in the 
delivery system. So for as example, a cooperative agreement between an INGO and the 
USAID would be regarded as a package in the sense that, first the agreement defines the 
type of activity to be provided, that is, funding is transferred to an INGO to provide 
support for a defined program (e.g., an alternative agricultural program in Afghanistan). 
The INGO, with the substantial involvement of USAID would deliver these activities 
through the vehicle of a specified educational farming program. USAID expects the 
INGO to request approval for all its implementation plans and workplans, including all 
revisions and changes made to this package prior to implementation.  If the INGO 
decides to sub-contact parts of the project, USAID approval would have to be sought 
before this decision can be finalized. 
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The description of contracts, grants and cooperative agreements provided above 
suggests that government funding involves constraints that limit the spending discretion 
of INGOs, as well as other operational decisions in unique ways. For instance, given that 
government contracts are more exacting and that they are utilized to provide funding to 
nonprofits through the purchase of specific kinds of services, contracts are less likely to 
grant high levels of operational or policy autonomy (Kendall and Knapp 1997; Young 
2000; DeHoog and Salamon 2002; Kelman 2002; Kerlin 2006a). As such, relative to 
grants, contracts allow less autonomy (Brown and Moore 2001; Bean and Conlan 2002). 
The limited constraints or controls embedded in grants and cooperative agreements on the 
other hand allow higher levels of autonomy since they leave room for INGOs discretion 
over operational decisions (Bean and Conlan 2002; Kerlin 2006a).  
As noted by Robinson (1997), “involvement in project implementation and 
service delivery through contracting can [divert] INGOs from their primary objectives 
and compromise their autonomy.” As such, because contracts involve more controls, they 
are likely to yield less autonomy to INGOs, compared to cooperative agreements and 
grants. Cooperative agreements are also presumed to yield much less autonomy than 
grant due the substantial intervention and participation by government.  
U.S. government funding however was not as strict and regulated as it is today. In 
the 1950s, “federal and state contracts and grants lacked stringent guidelines and 
regulations” (Bean and Conlan 2002; Kelman 2002; Smith 2006). In trying to 
“rationalize” the size of service system the government was financing, as well as ensure 
accountability for expenditure of public funds, did the regulations governing contracts 
become stringent (Smith 2006). Beyond accounting for expenditures, government 
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regulations have also had an impact on the internal allocations of funds by nonprofits in 
that “contract requirements greatly limit nonprofits‟ flexibility in appropriately meeting 
client needs and responding to unexpected developments” (Smith 2006).  
It is also important to recognize that government typically provides funding on a 
project-by-project basis and hence, INGOs may have a reasonable expectation of secure 
funding from year to year, even in the face of the application-and-approval ritual (Smillie 
1993). From an organizational autonomy perspective however, tedious application-and-
approval rituals may exist as ex ante controls used to manipulate the processes, policy 
instruments, outputs or outcomes and the performance of INGOs (Verhoest, Peters et al. 
2004).  
Perhaps a strong rationale for this research is provided by resource dependence‟s 
underlying premise that the organization‟s external social context i.e., those in an inter-
dependent relationship with the INGO, accounts for its activities and outcomes (Pfeffer 
and Salancik 2003). This prompts an investigation of INGO autonomy within the context 
of its external funding environment. As Pffeffer and Salancik (2003) point out, an 
“organization ends where its discretion ends…” as such, an INGO‟s relative influence 
and control over its activities defines its boundaries or sphere of influence, that is, it 
defines where the INGO begins and ends.  
 
1.6 Overview of Research Methodology 
 
Based on resource dependence and tool choice theoretical frameworks posited in 
this chapter, two key propositions emerge. First, resource dependence suggests that 
receiving a substantial share of financial support from government or any other funding 
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source (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003) may compromise an INGO‟s autonomy. Second, 
different government funding mechanisms, that is, contracts, grants, and cooperative 
agreements, present their own operating characteristics and programmatic consequences 
(Salamon 2002a), they uniquely influence INGOs‟ autonomy since each tool provides a 
unique structure within which INGO decision making takes place.  
And in response to the question of how government funding influences INGO 
autonomy, as well as what strategies INGOs employ to safeguard their autonomy, this 
study adopts a qualitative multiple case study methodology. This decision is inspired by a 
number of factors. First, understanding “how” organizational autonomy is influenced by 
funding not only identifies funding as the context within which autonomy loss takes 
place; this also draws our attention to the existence of mechanisms influencing INGOs‟ 
autonomy. In addition, a qualitative case study methodology provides this research with 
tools necessary to study the phenomenon of INGO autonomy within this specified 
context of resource dependence and funding tools (Yin 2003; Baxter and Jack 2008; Yin 
2009).   
The use a multiple case study design also has the advantage of enhancing the 
credibility of the findings since such a design is considered more robust (Miles and 
Huberman 1994; Yin 2003; Baxter and Jack 2008; Yin 2009). By restricting this study to 
USG-funded direct relief and development INGOs, affords the advantage of literal 
replication in that the study allows one to investigate the influence of government 
funding across similar organizations. At the same time, selecting INGOs with disparate 
shares of government funding allows significant variation to allow for theoretical 
replication (Yin 2003; Yin 2009).   
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Finally, the literature has treated the concept of INGO autonomy in such nebulous 
terms, making it difficult to identify exactly what “autonomy” really is. A qualitative case 
study approach allows enough exploratory room for this research to navigate complex 
relationships where not only definitions are unclear, but where there is a scarcity of 
literature on the subject. By employing in-depth interviews and drawing from multiple 
data sources, the methodology allows one to uncover nuances around this complex 
relationship between government funding and INGO autonomy, thus generate a detailed 
understanding of government-INGO exchange relationships (Miles and Huberman 1994; 
Baxter and Jack 2008). 
The remainder of this research is organized as follows; the next chapter provides 
an in-depth description of the current state of the literature on government-nonprofit 
interactions and the debate surrounding the influence of USG funding on INGO 
autonomy. Chapter 3 details the research methodology adopted in this study, the 
hypotheses derived from theoretical frameworks and the data collection methods. Chapter 
4 showcases the data analysis techniques adopted in this study, as well as the nature of 
the data derived from the data analysis. A comparison of the within-case findings to the 
hypotheses drawn from resource dependence framework, and a presentation of the cross-
case findings with respect to the hypotheses drawn from the tool choice perspectives are 
presented in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively. And while Chapter 7 discusses some 
practical considerations for managing the risk of autonomy loss, Chapter 8 concludes this 










While INGOs receive their revenue and support from diverse sources, the share of 
U.S. Government (USG) funding has increased steadily over the years, compared to 
multilateral financing. For instance, U.S. official development assistance jumped from 
about $10 billion in 2000 to $16.2 billion in 2003 (Kerlin 2006a). The key rationale 
behind the increased government financing of INGOs is linked to the desire for increased 
control by the U.S. government, especially in light of the failures of government-to-
government aid and the ineffectiveness and waste associated with multilateral 
organizations such as the UN and the Bretton Woods Institutions (Stoddard 2002b; 
Lancaster 2007). In particular, the USG “desires accountability, transparency, and a large 
measure of substantive and managerial oversight of humanitarian programs” (Stoddard 
2002b). In order to establish this control, a wide variety of mechanisms, including 
contracts, grants, vouchers, tax exemptions, have been used by government to finance 
INGO activities (Salamon 2002a). However, this raises concerns as to how governmental 
expectations embedded in these mechanisms influence what INGOs do. 
The desire for control over humanitarian programs is attributed to two primary 
changes that took place after World War II. First, humanitarian assistance became 
politicized in the U.S foreign policy (Atmar 2001; Duffield, Macrae et al. 2001; Fox 
2001; Stoddard 2002b). For instance, in response to the complex emergencies of the 
1990s (e.g., Sudan Crisis, Kosovo), the USG used humanitarian aid more as a foreign 
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policy tool to substitute for direct political involvement (Stoddard 2002b; Drury, Olson et 
al. 2005; Lancaster 2007). In these instances, Congress was divided about the appropriate 
response and administration was reluctant about deploying U.S. troops in response to 
these crises (Stoddard 2002b). In other words, officials spoke of foreign “aid in non-
committal terms, as a policy instrument that can complement, or provide an alternative to, 
diplomatic pressure and military action” (Stoddard 2002a). 
The second change came in the aftermath of the Rwanda Genocide in 1994 in 
response to the poor performance and lack of coordination among NGOs, multilateral and 
bilateral agencies (Stoddard 2002b). This resulted in increased demand for accountability 
and performance measurement by the U.S. government and other donors by demanding 
to see measureable results from their donations and increased oversight of INGO work 
(Goyder 1994; Stoddard 2002b; Lancaster 2007).  
Yet another recent influence is the new security climate following September 11.  
Not only has this strengthened the support for more U.S. control over humanitarian 
programs, but it has also served to reinforce the U.S. government‟s bilateral approach, 
which is generally targeted towards specific locations and tasks (Randel and German 
2002; Stoddard 2002a; Stoddard 2002b; Forman and Stoddard 2003; Lancaster 2007). In 
Stoddard‟s (2002b) words, “US humanitarian policy is likely to be increasingly 
intertwined with national security objectives: as a legitimizing or public relations 
component to military actions, as in Afghanistan; as a political lever for „hearts and 
minds‟ campaigns in key regions; and to help shore up unstable states to prevent new 
terrorist constituencies and staging-grounds from forming.”  
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This chapter reviews the literature on government-INGO relations by outlining 
the different typologies of government-INGO relationships. In an effort to showcase the 
policy environment INGOs operate in, I describe the character of the U.S. foreign aid 
policy and how this policy environment defines government-INGO relationship. I 
conclude this chapter by summarizing the debate surrounding government funding and its 
impact on INGO.  
 
2.2 Typologies of Government-INGO Relations 
 
A broad range of models have been used to explain the existence of nonprofits as 
well as describe the exchange relationship between government and nonprofits. 
Economic models attribute the founding of nonprofit organizations to inherent limitations 
of government and private markets. The “market failure” view argues for government 
provision of collective goods such as clean air, since such goods or services entail “free-
rider” problems owing to the non-excludable and non-rival nature of collective goods. 
Government, as a result of its ability to tax citizens, is in a better position to provide such 
goods (Weisbrod 1977).  
The efficiency of provision by government is nonetheless constrained by 
considerations of equity, given “the need of government officials to treat groups and 
individuals fairly,” that is, “defining need in order to allocate resources by criteria 
deemed to be fair” (Smith 2006). Efficient government provision has also been 
constrained by considerations of majority rule or popular vote such that those programs 
or services that fail to attract enough public support become under-provided resulting in 
what has been labeled “government failure” (Weisbrod 1977). To address this failure, the 
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“third” or nonprofit sector arises when private citizens, using private resources, 
voluntarily decide to participate in the political economy by setting up private 
organizations to supplement government provision (Gidron, Kramer et al. 1992).  
The foregoing “government failure” depiction of the relationship between state 
and nonprofits has been criticized for being one-dimensional, characterized by 
“competition in which one actor‟s gains are another‟s losses” (Gidron, Kramer et al. 
1992). These authors regard the paradigm as positing a misleading picture of a conflicting 
rather than cooperative relationship between government and the nonprofit sector. The 
competitive paradigm is founded on liberal political philosophy which emphasize 
individualism and political liberty in the face of “the overarching power of the state” 
(Gidron, Kramer et al. 1992).  
Gidron, Kramer et al. (1992) contend that the conflicting relationship relates more 
to an ideological rather than real relationship between state and the nonprofit sector. 
These authors assert that the nature of government-INGO relationship in reality, varies, 
by level of analysis, i.e., by fields of service or by individual organizations. In order to 
fully comprehend the character of government-nonprofits relationship, one has to 
appreciate that nonprofits have different functions (e.g., service, advocacy, social, 
representational) and consequently, they each relate to the state in different ways. For this 
reason, this research is restricted to a study of disaster relief and development 
international NGOs. 
Gidron, Kramer and Salamon‟s (1992) conceptualization of the government-
INGO relationships is one that is closely related to the subject of organizational 
autonomy. The authors characterize the relationship between government and INGOs in 
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terms of the level of discretionary power or control over the financing and provisional 
functions of any program (see Table 2 below). So in their view, although the state may 
provide funding for services, it does not necessarily exert full control over the provision 
of the services (Gidron, Kramer et al. 1992). Consistent with a government-INGO 
contractual relationship, the fourth column in Table 2 suggests that “collaborative” 
relationships occur when the government finances programs provided by INGOs. Thus, 
although the government controls the purse-strings, it may also provide nonprofits with 
room for discretion or for making autonomous decisions. INGOs may have some 
discretion in the management and implementation of government-funded programs 
(Gidron, Kramer et al. 1992). However, it is not clear what government control over 
finances entails and how that impacts INGO implementation. 
 




Dual Collaborative Third Sector 
Dominant 
Finance Government Government/Third 
Sector 
Government Third Sector 
Provision Government Government/Third 
Sector 
Third Sector Third Sector 
 
  
The above model however is not clear about the nature of program management 
and implementation discretion when both the government and the nonprofit participate in 
the financial support of the program and the provision of service i.e., the dual or parallel-
track model. Gidron, Kramer et al. (1992) however point out that “dual” relationships can 
take two forms, that is, nonprofits as “supplementary” to the state, that is, delivering the 
same kinds of services to clients not reached by the state or “complementary” – by filling 
the needs not met by government. While the model is insightful, it fails to acknowledge 
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that though funding may come from government, it comes through funding mechanisms 
(i.e., contracts, grants, cooperative agreements) that present unique operating 
characteristics and programmatic consequences for the nonprofits (Salamon 2002a). The 
model also seems incomplete when we take into account the influence different 
government rules, regulations and conditionalities attached to funding have on INGO 
service provision or implementation.  
Young (2000; 2006) and Najam (2000) provide alternative characterizations of 
government-INGO interactions that describe and explain how different kinds of 
relationships develop between INGOs and government. According to Young (2000; 
2006), the interactions between government and nonprofits are animated by different 
theoretical economic strands. Similar to Gidron, Kramer et al. (1992), the “supplementary 
model” postulates nonprofits as fulfilling the demand gap for public goods and services 
left unsatisfied by the public sector. This is also consistent with the government and 
market failure theories. According to the supplementary view, as private financing of 
public goods increases, government expenditure is expected to drop. This inverse 
relationship implies that as the public sector takes more responsibility for the provision of 
public goods, there is a less need for voluntary collective provision. Hence the view 
explains the dominance of one type of institutions over another in providing public good 
and services.   
Also similar to Gidron, Kramer et al.‟s (1992) “collaborative” view, Young‟s 
“complementary” model depicts nonprofits as partners to government, carrying out the 
delivery of public goods while the government serves as the financing partner. This is 
done through contracts and grants. This view is also consistent with Salamon‟s (1995) 
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view of nonprofit agencies as implementing partners of government. In this direct 
relationship between the state and nonprofits, an increase in government funding results 
in increased levels of nonprofit activities. Finally, Young‟s “adversarial model” describes 
a reciprocal relationship where the nonprofit push government to make public policy 
changes and maintain accountability to the public. In turn, government influences the 
behavior of nonprofits through regulation and oversight of its services, as well as 
responds to its advocacy initiatives.  
Young (2000; 2006) however does not question whether different funding 
mechanisms would affect these relationships in different ways. Najam (2000) on the 
other hand, bases his Four-C‟s model of government-INGO relations on a theory of 
strategic institutional interests. This view regards the emergent relationships between 
government and INGOs as a function of whether the goals (ends) and strategies (means) 
of government and INGOs converge or diverge (see Table 3). “Cooperative” relationship 
exists when there is alignment between the goals and strategies of both parties, while the 
relationship becomes “confrontational” when the goals and strategies collide. Najam 
(2000) also posits a fifth possibility characterized by non-engagement. This may 
exemplified by the decisions of INGOs such as Oxfam America and Direct Relief 
International to pass on government funding.  
 































Again the model does not get into detail about how the decision making 
competencies of INGOs are influenced when a government-INGO relationship is deemed 
complementary or cooperative. In other words, do INGOs have more discretion when 
their goals and strategies are similar to those of their state benefactor or when they share 
similar strategies but not similar goals? Branching off from Najam‟s (2000) theory of 
strategic institutional interests, this research first draws the assumption that government 
preferences and interests are articulated through different funding, through different 
funding tools. In other words, knowledge about whether an emergent relationship is 
cooperative or complementary does not tell us much about the degree to which INGOs‟ is 
compromised. This proposition is consistent with Salamon‟s (2002a) and Schneider and 
Ingram‟s (1990) suggestion that different policy tools are selected on the basis of the 
kinds of behaviors they are intended to induce. In my view, government-INGO autonomy 
relationships are probably best understood in the context of funding. 
Using a case study approach, Gronbjerg (1993) goes beyond merely providing a 
typology of government-INGO relations by examining how different funding 
environments and institutional structures influence INGO management tasks. She 
examines these through organizational environments, resource dependence and strategic 
management lenses. Though referring to domestic nonprofits, Gronbjerg (1993) proposes 
a model that defines the distinctive institutional environment within which nonprofits and 
government interact (see Table 4 below). The model is defined in terms of the public 
sector‟s dependency on nonprofits and the degree of prominence of the proprietary 
sector, i.e., private sector providers. As such, the dominance of one type of nonprofit in a 
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particular policy arena is influenced by how dominant the private sector is in the same 
arena, as well as by the level of public investment or endorsement.  
For example, the “cooperation pattern” exists when, because of market or contract 
failures, people who want the service cannot afford it, or when the service itself is not 
easily standardized, thus creating insufficient incentives to foster the entry of the 
proprietary or private sector. Similar to Najam, cooperation between the public and the 
nonprofit sector comes about as a result of a shared commitment to substantive goals and 
the limited public resources devoted to the issue area (Najam‟s 2000). In the early stages 
therefore, the public sector may actually be dependent on the more developed nonprofits 
to execute the public mandate. Related to disaster relief and assistance INGOs, this 
suggests that the U.S. government may be dependent on INGOs to implement some of its 
foreign assistance policies, in return for financial support. 
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Gronbjerg‟s “competitive pattern” arises when the public sector has a strong 
vested dominant interest in a particular policy area (e.g., education) and is directly 
involved in the delivery of the service. While the public sector‟s strong responsibilities 
over the service create barriers to entry of the proprietary sector, the establishment of 
direct public services also implies that the public sector is not so dependent on nonprofits 
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to implement the services on their behalf. Gronbjerg (1993) envisages a relationship 
characterized by an implicit division of labor between nonprofits and public sector. The 
competitiveness of the relationship thus arises as a result of a  scarcity of resources 
(Gronbjerg 1993).  Given that the government rarely directly provides humanitarian 
assistance (perhaps with the exception of the use of the military in relief aid (Stoddard 
2002a)), the competitive pattern however does not seem to describe the relationship that 
exists between government and INGOs. However, the situation may change if resources 
become more constrained, especially if more of the proprietary sector decides to become 
more socially responsible and implement its own social programs (e.g., Coca Cola 
implements its own water and sanitation programs in Africa). 
The “symbiotic environment” on the other hand emphasizes a co-existent 
relationship that ranges from mutual advantage to mutual exploitation. In such an 
environment, nonprofits play a specialized role given their inability to compete directly 
with either the public or the private sector. In this situation, the only role nonprofits can 
play is that of mediation or drawing attention to the decision making process (Gronbjerg 
1993). Overall, the model captures key aspects of the organizational funding 
environments in which nonprofits operate in the United States, though it does not address 
the concept of nonprofit autonomy in detail.  
A final government-INGO typology discussed here is one by Coston (1998). 
Similar to Najam (2000), Coston (1998) provides a more internationally-oriented model 
of government-INGO relationships. Using extensive empirical research, Coston (1998) 
created a typology with eight classifications of government-INGO relations predicated on 
two dimensions, the power relationship between government and the nonprofit sector, 
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and the acceptance or resistance of the sectors to institutional pluralism. The government-
INGO relationship is observed to vary with the degree of the formality of interaction 
(shown in Figure 1). As such, an environment with symmetry of power between 
government and INGOs and a greater acceptance of institutional pluralism or autonomy 
is likely to result in more “complementary” or “collaborative” relationships (Coston 
1998). “Collaboration” entails an explicit relationship or partnership between 
autonomous actors, where the partnership rests on formal agreements, a balance of power 
and an environment characterized by an acceptance of institutional pluralism. In this 
environment, INGOs participate in the planning and policy making processes (Coston 
1998). The description of government funding tools provided here however, suggests not 






Figure 1: Model of Government-INGO Relationships (Coston 1998) 
 
Conversely, relationships characterized by rivalry or repression emanate from an 
environment where there is greater resistance to institutional autonomy and where the 
government enjoys greater power at the expense of INGOs. Coston (1998) however, 
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notes that it is this relationship that dominates between government and INGOs since the 
government enjoys a power and resource advantage over INGOs. Assuming that 
government-INGO relationships are rarely based on equal partnership, this may explain 
the link between government funding and INGO autonomy loss. 
In summary, the models presented above, illuminate that different environmental 
and institutional conditions influence the forms of interactions that can emerge between 
government and nonprofits (see Table 5). While the different forms of government-
nonprofit interactions articulated in the models share some similarities, inconsistencies 
remain as to the key environmental and institutional conditions and factors that influence 
the government-nonprofit relations. 
 
Table 5: Summary of the Government-Nonprofit Typologies  
Author(s) Environmental/Institutional Conditions Type of Government-Nonprofit 
Interactions 
Weisbrod (1977) Majority rule Competitive 
Zero-sum relationship 
Gidron, Kramer et al. 
(1992)  
Service financing function 
Service provision function 
Shared service financing 
Shared service provision 
Government Dominant 
Dual or Parallel-Track 
Collaborative 
Third Sector Dominant 
Young (2000; 2006) Supply & Demand Economic models Supplementary 
Complementary 
Adversarial 




Gronbjerg (1993) Dominance of the private sector 
Dependence on the nonprofit sector by the 
government  





Coston (1998) Symmetry or asymmetry of power relations 
Acceptance or rejection to institutional 
pluralism 
Degree of formality of the interaction 




Overall, the models fail to shed much light on how each emergent relationship 
form influences the way INGOs make decisions about their activities, that is, INGOs‟ 
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decision making competencies. The literature points out that there are dangers associated 
with receiving government funding, especially since government may have divergent and 
possibly conflicting motives, demands and expectations (Smith 1993; Salamon 2003; 
Kerlin 2006a). It is this gap that this research addresses by examining the influence that 
government funding may have on INGO autonomy. 
Although Najam‟s (2000) theory of institutional interests and preferences does not 
articulate how government articulates its interests and preferences, this research builds on 
this theory by drawing the assumption that government articulates its interests and 
preferences through funding. Essentially, this study posits that government‟s interests and 
preferences are articulated through government funding choices and specified through 
specific funding mechanisms. As a result, each funding tool impacts INGOs‟ autonomy 
in different ways. Whether the emergent government-INGO relationship is deemed 
cooperative, complementary or not, probably makes very little difference in terms of the 
autonomy of INGOs. 
 
2.3 U.S. Foreign Aid Policy Environment: Implications for INGOs 
 
Unlike governments, INGOs “do not enjoy the legal status enjoyed by nation-
states and their representatives under international law” (Ahmed and Potter 2006), e.g., 
the diplomatic immunity extended to governments. Rather, INGOs are subject to the laws 
of the nation-state within which they reside as well as those of the nation-states where 
they operate. As Ahmed and Potter (2006) also note, the legal status of INGOs within 
their own states is no trivial issue given that it is this environment that determines 
whether INGOs are permitted to operate and if so, under what terms. This section 
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illuminates how the position of U.S. based INGOs may be influenced by U.S. foreign aid 
policies. 
One way of viewing the environment in which INGOs exist is by identifying the 
reasons for aid provision by nation-states. This helps us to understand the kinds of 
purposes a government pursues with its aid and why it selects certain kinds of purposes 
and not others (Lancaster 2007). The debate surrounding this concern centers on whether 
foreign aid should be utilized for diplomatic purposes, that is, to advance “the national 
security and economic interests of the donor country,” or development purposes, that is, 
“to help better the human condition in [the] countries receiving aid” (Lancaster 2007). 
Consistent with Kerlin‟s (2006a) observations, “…we need to understand the often 
neglected domestic politics of aid in aid-giving countries [that is, understand] the widely 
shared ideas and norms shaping aid giving, the political institutions in which aid 
decisions are made, the interests competing for influence over aid‟s purposes,” and how 
government is organized to manage its aid (Lancaster 2007). So while international 
NGOs may have ideologically and historically been regarded as apolitical organizations, 
their roles have major political implications (Ahmed and Potter 2006), not only because 
they operate in foreign nations, but by virtue of receiving funding from the U.S. 
government. 
The questions about why nation-states give aid however are not new. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, using formal modeling techniques, economists predicted that bilateral aid 
donors would be driven by donors‟ own interests (Lancaster 2007). Such predictions 
were based on correlations between how much aid was provided to certain countries and 
the characteristics of those countries. Such predictions, would postulate that the U.S. 
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government was motivated by the Cold War concerns, while the French were motivated 
by the desire to maintain a post-colonial sphere of influence in Africa (Dudley and 
Montmarquette 1976; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Dollar and Levin 2004). In this light, the 
role of INGOs would consist of implementing donor interests. Alternative to this view is 
the “dependency” perspective which emanates from the Marxist and the postmodernist 
schools of thoughts. This perspective regards foreign aid as a capitalist instrument used 
by dominant nations to control and exploit developing countries (Cockcroft, Frank et al. 
1972; Rodney 1974; Escobar 1995). INGOs would be regarded as mere conduits for 
exercising that dominance, a view that would threaten their credibility and legitimacy.   
The “constructivist” perspective on the other hand, portrays foreign aid as a social 
norm that emerges from the interaction between rich and poor nations. This view argues 
that foreign aid cannot be explained in terms of political or economic interests instead, 
foreign aid is predicated on the belief that long-term peace and prosperity is only possible 
in a generous and just world order (Lumsdaine 1993). Inherent in the current U.S. foreign 
aid policies are some of these constructivist notions. For instance, “the National Security 
Strategy introduced by President Bush in September 2002, underscores that, although 
poverty, poor health and lack of economic opportunity do not lead directly to unrest and 
terrorism; they can be their precursors” (Kerlin 2006a). The inherent security concerns 
however, may have reinforced the politicization of U.S. foreign aid, thus overriding the 
development-oriented purposes explicit in the constructivist perspective.  
Based on the foregoing theories, it is clear that any discussion of government-
INGO relations, especially with the objective of trying to understand NGO autonomy, 
should account for one crucial element, “the impact of domestic [and foreign] politics on 
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aid-giving” (Lancaster 2007). This is crucial since U.S. motivations behind foreign aid 
have been depicted as a “Morgenthau Puzzle,” which describes a mixed-purpose 
approach to foreign aid (Morgenthau 1962; Lancaster 2007). While the U.S. foreign aid 
began as an instrument for diplomacy, today it is characterized by a dual purpose – 
diplomatic ends and altruistic values (Lancaster 2007). Based on this dualistic approach 
to foreign aid, one could speculate that the goal misalignment between government and 
INGOs that Kerlin (2006a) states occurs when the motivation behind government funding 
exhibits diplomatic leanings at the expense of the altruistic values of international NGOs. 
As a result, INGOs lose their autonomy and may start to act as mere appendages of 
government implementing government projects. 
Alternatively, goal misalignment may occur as a result of ideological or 
philosophical differences about how humanitarian problems should be solved. An 
example of this is implicit in why CARE turned down federal funds for food aid and 
intends to phase out the practice by 2009. According to one CARE staff member, 
importing food from the United States which is then sold in an aid recipient country in 
exchange for money that is then channeled to aid provision has the danger of stunting the 
growth of local agriculture thus damaging both the local farmer and the trade. Contrary to 
the U.S. federal government, CARE regards this system of monetization as inherently 
flawed and inefficient (Dugger 2007). 
Note however that, the tension between dual purposes of the U.S. foreign aid 
policy is no historical accident, but is a consequence of two factors, the peculiarities of 
U.S. domestic politics which is characterized by left-right wing controversy over its 
utility, and “the nature of American political institutions, which tend to amplify 
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controversies involving foreign aid” (Lancaster 2007). Other actors also influence foreign 
aid. For example, by 2006, domestic political support for foreign aid geared toward relief 
and development was strengthened by a growing engagement of the evangelical 
movement in development and related activities abroad (Lancaster 2007). In addition, the 
War on Terror also elevated the prominence of diplomatic purposes in aid provision.  As 
such, it is within this dual-purpose-tension climate that U.S. based INGOs must exist. 
This motivates our investigation of the influence a funded relationship with the U.S. 
government has on INGO autonomy. 
The influences of domestic and foreign politics on aid-giving also highlight the 
fact that different federal administrations, approach foreign aid in different ways. This 
may imply different kinds of relationships with INGOs. A good example of this is The 
Global Gag Rule highlighted in Chapter 1; first announced in 1984 by President Ronald 
Reagan, the rule was rescinded by President Bill Clinton in 1993 only to be reinstated by 
the Bush Administration in 2001.  
For the most part however, the direction and motivation for foreign aid has been 
determined by changes taking place in the global environment (A detailed timeline of the 
U.S. foreign aid policy is provided in Appendix 1). For instance, the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR) in 1989 resulted in emergent countries 
rising from the demise of the USSR. The Bush Administration responded by providing 
aid to support these political and economic transitions (Lancaster 2007), some of which 
was provided through INGOs. 
On the other hand, U.S. support to Sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s was 
spurred by an increase in the demand for multiparty elections and democratic 
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governments in that part of the world (Lancaster 2007). Scholarly discourse during the 
Clinton Administration also provided justification for investing in the promotion of 
democracy. Specifically, President Clinton declared that democracy was a necessary 
precursor to international security because democratic countries were perceived as 
predisposed against inter-state wars (Lancaster 2007). In addition, aid was also provided 
in response to global problems such as environmental degradation and international 
health, in particular, the rise and impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic.  
At the domestic politics front, it is important to recognize that bilateral aid 
provision is also governed by numerous congressional “earmarks” and “directives” 
(Stoddard 2002b). For example, “Congress has the power to impose legislative earmarks 
on how aid is used or what countries or organizations receive it,” and this was especially 
so beginning with the Clinton Administration given the administration‟s dedication 
toward the promotion of democracy as shown above (Kerlin 2006a; Lancaster 2007). 
Earmarks and directives are also a mechanism to ensure that congressional priorities as 
well as those of the administration are implemented. While the 1970s directives and 
earmarks were largely characterized by sectoral allocations (e.g., for agriculture, health or 
education), the scope and specificity of earmarks and directives have actually intensified 
over the years. “By 2005, they were often quite specific as to how the aid should be” 
(Lancaster 2007), further constraining INGO autonomy if channeled through them. 
Different institutions within the U.S. government not only determine federal expenditure 
but also shape policies. Most importantly, consistent with Salamon‟s (2002a; 2002b) 
framework, not only does government articulate its strategic institutional interests via 
earmarks and other policy instruments, but different institutions do so as well.  
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Clearly, the debate surrounding government-INGO relationship extends to the 
current political climate. The terrorist attacks of September 11, the national security 
priority, and the current War on Terror are developments that have had major 
implications for U.S. foreign aid policy and hence influence the nature of the relationship 
between government and INGOs. As has been noted above, the White House‟s National 
Security Strategy for the United States of America (September 2002) elevates 
development purposes of aid as one of the three priorities of U.S. foreign policy, along 
with defense and the promotion of democracy abroad (Kerlin 2006a; Lancaster 2007). 
Also clear is the prominence of INGOs as the official public policy implementing 
partners of government (Smith 1993; Salamon 1995; Forman and Stoddard 2003; 
Salamon 2003). And as Coston (1998) pointed out, a competitive relationship has 
historically dominated relations between government and INGOs. And since government 
enjoys both a power and resource advantage over INGOs, an analysis of government 
funding-INGO relations in the absence of an appreciation of the political (and global) 
environment within which INGOs operate would fail to provide a complete picture of the 
degree to which INGOs retain or lose their autonomy.  
 
2.4 Government Funding and INGO Autonomy: Then and Now 
 
Speculations over the dysfunctional consequences of government funding have 
been discussed in the literature since the early 1900s. For example, Fleisher (1914) saw 
the determination of the boundaries between state and the voluntary sector as a complex 
and perennial problem (cited in Smith 2006). Beck (1970) and Manser (1974) also 
identified dependency, a dilution of the advocacy role of INGOs, increased 
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bureaucratization and professionalization and a loss of autonomy (see Kramer 1985), as 
some of the dysfunctional consequences of government financing of INGOs.   
However, not only is there no clear definition of autonomy, evidence supporting 
autonomy loss is ambiguous. For instance, a study of the Greater New York United Way 
conducted by Hartogs and Weber in 1978 yielded little data to support the alleged inverse 
link between government funding and INGO autonomy. Instead, most organizations 
reported that government funding actually enabled them to carry out their programs more 
effectively, that is, “rather than leading voluntary agencies into oblivion, government 
funding permits their survival as they deliver services for which the government is 
willing to pay” (Hartogs and Weber 1978; Kramer 1985).  In fact, the core program, i.e., 
the original purpose of the agency‟s raison d’etre and the services rendered to 
accomplish the raison d’etre and the target population essentially remain the same in 
spite of government funding (Hartogs and Weber 1978). Another study emanating from 
an Urban Institute national survey of 3,411 nonprofits conducted in 1982, also revealed 
little evidence of mission distortion as a consequence of government funding (Kramer 
1985).  
Kramer (1985) attributes the above conclusions to the payment-for-service form 
of transactions which involved less control than grants or subsidies; a lack of incentives 
and capacity in government for stricter accountability controls; and the diversity of 
nonprofit income sources. In his view, the threat to organizational autonomy is not 
credible in light of a lack of government oversight and monitoring. Instead, Kramer 
(1985) argued that the high degree of income pluralism was more likely to result in goal 
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deflection [than autonomy loss], owing to the entrepreneurialism and vendorism 
stemming from the problem of donor dependency.  
However, a lot has changed since the 1980s – for one, the government has 
increased its efforts to foster and demand INGO accountability. For example, the passage 
of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) has injected a high 
demand for performance measurement of government operations at all levels (Gronbjerg 
and Salamon 2002). This mandate has offered the “federal government a valuable tool for 
catching up with the demands of managing indirect government” by providing managers 
with an avenue for “focusing on what goals they seek and how well their programs 
achieve them, regardless of who actually does the work” (Kettl 2002). This has also 
strengthened government‟s ex post oversight (Posner 2002). Also noted by Ebrahim 
(2003a), heightened accountability concerns have resulted in increased oversight and 
INGO regulations by both government and other donors. 
Nonetheless, the speculations surrounding the link between government funding 
and the loss of INGO autonomy remain pervasive in the literature. For example, it has 
been argued that contracting out profoundly changes nonprofit organizations because 
nonprofits belong to a “like-minded community” of people whose primarily concern is 
responsiveness, and are responsive to the norms of that community, while government 
tends to approach services and clients from an equity standpoint (Weisbrod 1977; Smith 
2006). Norms of equity create challenges for government officials by requiring them to 
provide justification for providing services to one group as opposed to another (Smith 
2006). Though referring to domestic nonprofits, Smith (2006) also argued that 
government funding does affect nonprofit agencies‟ operations, particularly the services 
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provided and the clients served. Smith also predicted that “the specific effects are likely 
to vary depending on the type of services provided, level of professionalization, the 
agency‟s origins and mission, as well as the character of the government-nonprofit 
relationship.” A fresh investigation, with more clear measures of organizational 
autonomy, into the government-INGO autonomy relationship is necessary.  
Hulme and Edwards (1997) also speculate that the risk to an INGO‟s autonomy 
appreciates with receipt of government funding. INGOs are especially at risk when their 
goals and those of government are not aligned (Kerlin 2006a). Nonetheless, the real 
impact of government funding on nonprofit organizational autonomy is largely 
unexplored (Kerlin 2006a). Perhaps this gap in the literature can be attributed to limited 
attempts to explicitly investigate the different forms of government financial transfers – 
the means by which government articulates its institutional strategic interests and 
preferences, as well as the dearth of clear organizational autonomy measures applicable 
to the nonprofit sector. Although this research is unable to quantify the degree of INGO 
autonomy loss given the qualitative research design adopted here, the study does however 
provide insights as to the degree to which government funding undercuts INGO 
autonomy across specific dimensions, relative to other funding sources. This research 
also seeks to understand the mechanisms through which such autonomy loss may occur. 
Investigating the government funding-INGO autonomy dynamic has become even 
more crucial given the increasing popularity of international NGOs with government and 
official donors as credible implementing partners of public policies. This comes in the 
wake of the dismal failure of the government-to-government foreign aid and development 
assistance approach (Hulme and Edwards 1997; Stoddard 2002b; Forman and Stoddard 
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2003; Grossrieder 2003). In a sense, part of the allure of the nonprofit sector may derive 
from the distinctive character of INGOs as being what governments are not, that is, “not 
bureaucratic, not rigid, not directive, and not stultifying of local initiatives” (Smillie 
1993) and not corrupt and wasteful. In addition, nonprofits project a reputation of 
neutrality, independent and impartiality and a level of responsiveness that is characterized 
by speed, effectiveness, efficiency (Smillie 1993; Smith 1993), programming innovation 
beyond the reach of official political or bureaucratic actors, a participatory approach, and 
an ability to reach the poorest sectors in developing societies (Smith 1993; Robinson 
1997; Forman and Stoddard 2003).  
Although INGOs have come to be regarded as the operational arms or the 
implementing partners of government and multilateral assistance agencies (Salamon 
1995; Forman and Stoddard 2003), a mistrust of INGOs still lurks in the shadows. For 
example, some regard INGOs as veneers for spies or simply as pawns or tools for 
furthering the objectives of their own national donors (Atmar 2000; Forman and Stoddard 
2002). This view is consistent with those that predicted that bilateral aid donors would be 
motivated by their own interests (Lancaster 2007). So, while in some circles, INGOs have 
been depicted as the “saviors of failed economies,” i.e., consistent with the constructivist 
view, they have also been reviled as puppets of Western imperialism, i.e., consistent with 
the dependency view (Carapico 2000). Such conflicting notions continue to raise 
concerns about the influence of funding on INGOs given that those who fund nonprofit 
organizations may have strong diverse and possibly conflicting motives, demands and 
expectations at odds with those of INGOs themselves (Salamon 2003; Kerlin 2006a).  
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Others have also observed that nonprofits begin to resemble those who fund them, 
thus suggesting a blurring of sectors (Young 1984; Brody 1996). The „new governance‟ 
paradigm also posits an interdependent relationship between government, the private and 
third sectors (Salamon 2002a).  Despite this purported interdependency between 
government and the third sector, INGOs often are “in agreement with government on the 
basic goals of saving and improving lives abroad, although they are at times out of 
alignment with government in terms of ideology and approach to international work 
(Kramer 1985; Robinson 1997; Salamon 2002a; Kerlin 2006a). In light of the increasing 
politicization of foreign aid, and given that foreign assistance has become an important 
tool of foreign policy, INGOs are increasingly confronted with complex questions about 
their ability to remain autonomous while accepting government funding (Atmar 2001; 
Duffield, Macrae et al. 2001; Fox 2001; Stoddard 2002a; Kerlin 2006a).  
The influence of government funding has also been inversely linked to INGOs‟ 
ability to advocate and respond effectively to their missions (Kramer 1985). For instance, 
“[I]NGOs are facing increasingly difficult questions about their autonomy (Smith 1993), 
legitimacy, and ability to advocate when accepting government funding” (Kerlin 2006a). 
“In several European countries, Canada [and the U.S.], special funds have been 
earmarked to support [I]NGO activities in regions that are foreign policy priorities of the 
home governments (such as former colonies) or specific issues of domestic public 
concerns (such as AIDS, women in development)” (Smith 1993; Lancaster 2007). Smith 
(1993) goes further to state that although none of the restrictions on the funds necessarily 
run contrary to the goals or interests of INGOs, they do reduce the autonomy of INGOs 
to set their own agenda, increase the temptation for some INGOs to undertake activities 
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that lie outside of their areas of expertise or scope in order to attract grants and subsidies, 
and skew their activities towards immediate relief as compared to programs that produce 
enduring results. Scholars are therefore encouraged to investigate the mechanisms by 
which INGOs are responding to the stringent and restrictive government funding 
conditions in order to preserve their independence (Smith 1993); a challenge that is 
undertaken in this research. And like Smith (1993), it is crucial to recognize that 
government funding is associated with stringent restrictions which may constrain INGOs‟ 
autonomy. A CARE staff member contributed the rise in restrictive U.S. Government 
(USG) funding to the very outsourcing of USG functions, including foreign assistance. 
It is worth pointing out that nonprofit organizations are not unique in being 
influenced by their funding relationship with governments and donors. Public agencies, 
though distanced from central government, have also faced questions concerning the 
devolution of power and authority vis-à-vis the actual discretionary powers that public 
agency managers have when making strategic and policy decisions on the ground (see 
(Behn 1995; Christensen 1999; Carpenter 2001; Verhoest, Peters et al. 2004). Examples 
from the public administration and management literature also suggest a positive link 
between organizational autonomy and performance and responsiveness (Behn 1995; 
Braadbaart, Van-Eybergen et al. 2007). For example, Behn (1995) positively linked 
discretion to performance and staff motivation.  
Other researchers have also observed that although the steady increase in 
government funding for INGOs to undertake development and relief work in developing 
countries has been taking place since the 1960s, the changes in both the amounts and 
purposes of such funding raise serious challenges for INGOs‟ autonomy (Smith 1993; 
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Gronbjerg and Salamon 2003). These changes were also accompanied by changes in the 
nature of government-nonprofit relations (Gronbjerg and Salamon 2002). In particular, 
the substantial growth in government spending and support of nonprofits inadvertently 
“created the need for greater formality and structure,” and subsequently a loss of 
flexibility not only for nonprofit organizations but also for government (Gronbjerg and 
Salamon 2002).  
Though chiefly ignored, there are several other largely positive sides to this 
complex story of government-INGO exchange relationship. For example, closer relations 
with government have been associated with increased professionalization on the part of 
INGOs (Kramer 1985; Korten 1990 cited in Robinson 1997). And while recognizing the 
dangers of “too close” a relationship with donor governments, Commins (1997) notes 
that, closer relationships have also led to positive results at least for World Vision 
International (WVI), where the organization has been able to achieve some balance 
between work done in the field and policy work on aid issues. In particular, WVI has 
been able to exert influence on public policy by persuading governments to revise their 
funding priorities, a process labeled “reverse agenda” (Commins 1997).   
Commins (1997)  also reports that although (the umbrella association) InterAction 
was concerned that the government funding of its members would result in reduction in 
public policy work, a review of the period from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s revealed 
that this has not been the case. Commins (1997) does not seem to regard the loss of 
organizational autonomy as the main concern. Instead, he is more concerned about 
INGOs‟ ability to be accountable to multiple actors or funders, which, based on the 
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discussion of autonomy and accountability supplied in Chapter 1, is really an 
interventional constraint question. 
In summary, the literature does reveal differences between INGOs and 
government preferences, particularly on where aid is provided and the kinds of programs 
offered (Smith 1993; Stoddard 2002a). While it is commendable that WVI criticized the 
U.S. government for cutting assistance for human development programs such as those 
related to child morbidity, mortality and education in the early 1990s (Commins 1997), 
Mawer (1997) points out that donor influence on INGOs is far greater than INGO 
influence on donors (reverse agenda). As such, it would seem that donors, intentionally or 
inadvertently, have relatively more power to reshape INGO activities than the other way 
round.   
Many authors seem to agree that, based on examples of INGOs around the globe 
(see (Dichter 1997; Hodson 1997; Pearce 1997; Perera 1997), “the tail (INGOs) is not 
wagging the dog (donors)” (Hulme and Edwards 1997). Instead, it seems that there is 
increased pressure on INGOs to become public service contractors, that is, “market-,” as 
opposed to, “value-oriented
5
” nonprofit businesses serving public purposes by selling 
their services as implementers of donors‟ and government agencies‟ projects and 
programs (Korten 1990 cited in Robinson 1997; Smith 2006). Moreover, given that 
different tool packages result in varying operational characteristics and programmatic 
consequences, and hence differentially influence INGO autonomy, it is plausible that the 
different policy instruments used to transfer funds to INGOs are being employed by 




 Value-oriented NGOs are nonprofits that define their programs on the basis of their social missions, and 
then seek the funding required to implement them (Brown and Korten 1991, as cited in Robinson 1997). 
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government to foster particular kinds of behaviors from INGOs (Schneider and Ingram 
1990; Salamon 2002a; Salamon 2002b; Stoddard 2002b). 
That being said, there is also evidence to suggest that at times “the tail does wag 
the dog” – a process Commins (1997) referred to as „reverse agenda.‟ In as much as 
INGOs operate in multiple funding environments fraught with many rules, regulations 
and compliance demands; they also operate in a much broader humanitarian assistance 
and development environment that can be influential in its own right. For example, the 
humanitarian community establishes its own way of doing things and best practices 
which may influence the programs and policy solutions and strategies that funding 
agencies adopt. This is exemplified by The Sphere Project, which is a commitment by 
INGOs to establish best common practices or Codes of Conduct for emergency response.   
Consistent with the above is the view supplied by Stoddard (2006) that 
humanitarian INGOs also influence governments‟ foreign assistance policies through 
information. The hands-on information taken from INGOs‟ field experience and best 
practices, can and at times, does shape governments views by influencing how policy 
makers frame humanitarian policy problems and the solutions to those problems 
(Stoddard 2006). Such information helps shape what policy actor know and how 
problems and solutions to humanitarian issues are framed. 
This chapter summarized three bodies of literature, the U.S. foreign aid 
environment and its implications for INGOs‟ autonomy, INGO-government relationships 
and the impact of INGO-government interactions on INGOs‟ autonomy. These bodies of 
literature not only help frame this research in the current INGO-government relations 
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discourse; they also help to establish some context for the investigation of INGO 
autonomy.  
Undergirding this study are resource dependence and tool choice frameworks. 
These two frameworks, together with the literature, highlight the environmental context 
within which INGO autonomy may be influenced. Assuming that funders use their 
donations as conduits for articulating their interests, priorities and preferences (an 
assumption that is not explicit in Najam‟s theory of institutional interests), this research 
investigates both the influence of government funding on INGO autonomy within the 
context of inter-organizational resource dependence and tool choice.  
This study attempts to understand the concept of autonomy as it relates to INGOs‟ 
interactions with government funding. Understanding that government funding is 
provided through a variety of tools, this research also investigates into the mechanisms 
through which INGO autonomy is undermined. And finally, in response to Smith‟s 
(1993) challenge, the study also seeks to understand the strategies by which INGOs are 
responding to the constraints associated with government funding, thus illuminating how 
INGOs are managing the risk of autonomy loss. 
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To investigate the relationship between government funding and INGO 
autonomy, this research adopts a qualitative multiple case study methodology. This 
methodology is most suitable when investigating a complex subject, one that is not 
sufficiently understood (Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 2003; Baxter and Jack 2008; Yin 
2009). Evidence from the literature is such that, the relationship between government 
funding and INGO autonomy has been ambiguous and therefore not fully understood. 
This has also been exacerbated by an absence of clear measures of organizational 
autonomy particularly applicable to the nonprofit sector. 
Qualitative multiple case studies are also more applicable when responding to 
research questions that focus on “how” and “why” complex phenomena occur, and when 
contextual factors are believed to be relevant to the phenomena under investigation (Yin 
2003; Baxter and Jack 2008; Yin 2009). This study meets these conditions in that, as 
indicated by the expansive literature on government-INGO relations with respect to 
INGO autonomy, autonomy has largely been referred to in nebulous terms like discretion, 
flexibility, and independence thus, lacking a clear definition and understanding as to what 
it really is or means. In addition, the relationship between government funding and INGO 
autonomy is not only complex, it is also not clearly understood (e.g., Hulme and Edwards 
1997; Forman and Stoddard 2002; Kerlin 2006b; Lancaster 2007). This research therefore 
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seeks to understand “how” the government-INGO autonomy correlation can be 
characterized and explained. 
This chapter outlines the research questions and hypotheses. The chapter also 
details the research methodology and the data collection methods employed in this study. 
I conclude the chapter with a review of the study limitations stemming from the 
qualitative multiple case study nature of the research design employed here.  
  
3.2 Research Questions  
 
This research investigates the ways in which funding impacts the autonomy of 
international NGOs, with a primary focus on the impact of U.S. government funding. 
Central to this dissertation is the research question, “How does government funding 
influence INGO autonomy?” To understand the nature of this exchange relationship, the 
study assesses how INGOs have experienced USG funding relative to foundation or 
corporate funding, with respect to their decision making competencies. Of interest to this 
research is to establish an understanding of the behavior of different funding sources and 
their impact on INGO autonomy, by focusing on the conditions attached to funding. And 
in an effort to understand how INGOs maximize their autonomy, this dissertation poses a 
second research question – “What strategies do INGOs employ to preserve their 




Undergirding this research are two theoretical frameworks; resource dependence 
and tool choice as shown in Figure 2 below. Resource dependence theory enables the 
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investigation of the impact of an INGO‟s dependence on a single funding source on its 
autonomy, while the tool choice approach helps investigate whether different funding 
mechanisms, i.e., grants, contracts, and cooperative agreements, translate into differential 
levels of government control of INGO activities, thus yielding varying degrees of 
autonomy to an INGO. As a result, resource dependence allows one to focus on the 
impact of an INGO‟s high dependence on any one funder; while the tool choice approach 
allows a closer examination of how and why different funding mechanisms due to their 

















Figure 2: Theoretical Framework 
 
FACTORS 
(1) RESOURCE IMPORTANCE 
a. Proportion of revenue from source  
b. Criticality of the revenue source 
 
(2) RESOURCE ALTERNATIVES 
a. Regulations restricting access to 
other sources 
b. Number of available sources 
c. Size or importance of alternatives 
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a. Ownership of the resource 
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In addition, both resource dependence and tool choice frameworks assume that 
environmental designs can be changed to affect organizational behavior (Schneider and 
Ingram 1990; Salamon 2002a; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). Hence, by observing the 
funding environment characterized by the funding type (e.g., government, corporate, 
private contributions or foundations), and by the funding mechanism, one may be able to 
understand how and why funding influences INGO autonomy.  
This research explores the impact of three factors on autonomy – resource 
importance, resource alternatives, discretion and tool characteristics, i.e., the degree to 
which the funding tool is coercive, restrictive, and direct. And while the intention was to 
regard the third resource dependence factor of discretion as an organizational autonomy 
variable since it fits into the definition of organizational autonomy provided in Chapter 1, 
an analysis of the data revealed the tautological challenges associated with this attempt, 
as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.  
 
3.3.1 Resource Importance  
 
The literature suggests that increased inter-organizational dependence by INGOs 
for financial resources leads to reduced control and decision making autonomy (Provan 
1982; Gronbjerg 1993; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). As noted in Chapter 1, the 
vulnerability or dependence of an organization to extra-organizational influence and 
control may depend on the importance of the resource, that is, the relative magnitude of 
the exchange from a particular funding source and the criticality of that resource, as 
measured by the extent to which an INGO can survive without that particular source 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). As a result, greater dependence on a singular major funding 
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source diminishes the capacity of an INGO to make autonomous decisions since the 
decisions of that one major source will affect the INGO (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003).  
The literature also recognizes that each funding source entails some exchange 
relationship with the recipient organization, and that organizations disproportionately 
dependent on a particular funding source must pay a relatively higher price in order to 
manage those exchange relationships (Gronbjerg 1993; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). We 
should expect a high dependence on government funding to yield less autonomy to 
INGOs, especially so, given that the relationship between government and INGOs has 
been dominated by repression, rivalry and competition in light of the power and resource 
advantage government enjoys over INGOs (Coston 1998).  In addition, Hulme and 
Edwards (1997) associated an appreciation of USG funding receipt by an INGO with an 
increased risk to the INGO‟s autonomy.  
In this regard, I expect INGOs receiving a high proportion of USG funding to 
possess less autonomy compared to those that dependent less on the USG funding for 
their total revenue and support.  
Hypothesis 1: High dependence on government funding as the primary source of 
revenue and support is likely to result in less INGO autonomy 
 
 
Unlike Pfeffer and Salancik (2003), Gronbjerg (1993) considers nonprofits that 
develop funding in single concentrated sources to be efficient in that it simplifies 
management tasks by allowing the recipient “organization to specialize and fine-tune its 
management efforts.” In a similar vein, others contend that some nonprofits have grown 
big, not by seeking after diverse sources of funding as conventional wisdom would have 
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it, but by going after a single type of funder such as corporations or government (Foster 
and Fine 2007). However, most of the nonprofits Foster and Fine (2007) studied reported 
having restricted programs or operations as a result of their high dependence on a single 
dominant funding source. It is likely that, by virtue of contributing the lion‟s share of an 
INGO‟s revenue relative to other sources, some funding sources may place more 
demands and control on a recipient INGO, thus undermining its autonomy. Any shifts 
and instabilities in the funding environment become sources of vulnerability for the 
INGO as this threatens the reliability of the funding source.  
Another factor to consider is that, while a high dependence on institutional 
funders like foundations, government, or corporations may raise questions about the 
autonomy and perhaps the credibility of INGOs (Hulme and Edwards 1997; Kerlin 
2006a), the same can hardly be surmised about a high dependence on individual 
contributions, especially when those contributions are unrestricted. In other words, a high 
dependence on unrestricted dollars would actually yield much higher levels of autonomy 
to INGOs than restricted funding. For this reason, we should expect INGOs with a high 
dependence on unrestricted individual contributions to be more autonomous than those 
that are highly dependent on more exacting funding sources like the USG.  
Hypothesis 2: High dependence on any one dominant funding source is likely to 
result in limited INGO autonomy   
 
3.3.2 Resource Alternatives 
 
Resource dependence can also be minimized by a lack of access to alternative 
resources, the number of available sources, and the size or importance of the alternatives. 
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For the most part, an INGO‟s resource dependence arises due to the existence of rules 
and regulations that may restrict access to other resources and especially if the funding 
sources are important. The availability of alternative resources refers to the extent to 
which there are fewer funding alternatives available for INGOs, that is, whether an INGO 
has access to funding from other sources (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). For instance, the 
increase in government funding going to INGOs, relative to foundations and corporations 
could be regarded as a measure of concentration of alternatives in terms of the share of 
government funding going to INGOs. This speaks to the substitutability of funding 
sources, that is, an organization‟s ability to replace government funding or a portion of it 
with foundation grants or corporate gifts. Such a strategy also reduces the criticality or 
importance of a single funder. The INGOs‟ funding environment has been characterized 
by intense competition among INGOs. And increasingly, INGOs have found themselves 
competing with the private sector for government contracts.  
As noted above, enlarging its share of funding from a single source however 
increases an INGO‟s resource dependence. “Organizations are controlled by an external 
source to the extent they depend on that source for a large proportion of inputs or output” 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). The maintenance of discretion is regarded as a crucial 
organizational activity, and one way to accomplish that is to loosen dependencies through 
resource diversification.  
Resource diversification diminishes an INGO‟s dependence on any one particular 
source, thus diminishing the external control the funding source may have over its 
activities –a process called structural differentiation (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). 
Dispersing dependency in this way reduces an organization‟s need to respond to any 
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given demand, instead various groups may be simultaneously satisfied, thus providing the 
INGO with more discretion or autonomy (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). As the authors 
indicate, “the most direct solution is to develop an organization which is dependent on a 
variety of exchanges and less dependent on any single exchange.”  
As a way of reducing their external dependence, I expect INGOs to demonstrate 
efforts to diversify their funding portfolios as a strategy for reducing control by any one 
funder. I also expect INGOs with low revenue concentration indices
6
 to be more 
autonomous than INGOs with high revenue concentrations (closer to 1).   
Hypothesis 3: INGOs maximize their autonomy or minimize their external 
dependence and control through revenue diversification.  
 
 
While an INGO can have access to alternative resources, a funder can exert 
control over those resources by regulating access to them and their exchange. In other 
words, a funding source can use different rules and regulations to restrict access to 
alternative resources in spite of their availability (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). An 
example if this would be the Fly America Act noted in Chapter 1. This regulation restricts 
INGOs receiving USG funding from utilizing cheaper or alternative modes of 
transportation by requiring them to fly on American airlines, as well as transport their 
commodities only on U.S. shipping companies. And based on the USG‟s Eligibility Rules 




 A Revenue Concentration Index, also referred to as a Herfindahl Index is an index that measures an 
organization‟s degree of revenue diversification. The index ranges between “0” (least concentrated) and 
“1” (highly concentrated) and it is a sum of the individual revenue streams squared divided by the square of 
total revenue and support. Revenue Index = ∑ (Revenue streamij
2
/Total Revenue & Supporti
2
); where i 
represents the INGO and j refers to the revenue stream. 
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for Goods and Services, USG-funded INGOs are also required to purchase U.S. 
manufactured inputs such as U.S. manufactured vehicles regardless of the availability of 
cheaper alternatives. As a result, I expect USG funding to restrict INGOs‟ access to 
alternative resources, thus yielding less autonomy to USG-funded INGOs.  
Hypothesis 4: Compared to other funding sources, government is more likely to 
minimize INGO autonomy by restricting access to alternative resources. 
 
3.3.3 Tool Characteristics 
    
 Certain conditions facilitate the control that some organizations may have on 
others (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). Such conditions include the funding source‟s 
discretion in the allocation of the resource, as well as its ability to make its preferences 
known. This research assumes that funding is the mechanism through which government 
uses to convey its interests, priorities, and preferences to recipient INGOs. As a result, 
funding instruments such as contracts and cooperative agreements are used to articulate 
those preferences and interests, and therefore steer and direct INGOs decision making 
thus yielding less autonomy to INGOs. When donors retain the decision-making power to 
allocate resources towards specific activities, such preemptive acts result in an 
“allocation-effect” on INGOs resources, thus minimizing INGOs‟ discretion over 
resource allocation and use (James 1983). 
In as much as the idiosyncrasies of each funding source may matter since each 
source displays unique environmental factors (Gronbjerg 1993), the same can be 
surmised about each of the funding mechanism used to transfer funds to INGOs. As 
proposed in Table 2 in Chapter 1, this research postulates that different funding tools, i.e., 
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grants, cooperative agreements and contracts, constrain INGOs‟ autonomy in differential 
ways, owing to the degree to which the tools are coercive, restrictive or direct (Kelman 
2002; Salamon 2002a). 
Also noted in Chapter 1, a funding tool is deemed coercive by the extent to which 
it restricts an organization‟s “behavior as opposed to merely encouraging or discouraging 
it” (Salamon 2002a).  And contracts are considered relatively more coercive than grants 
and cooperative agreements because of the way in which they specify INGOs outputs, 
input use, aid recipients and program operations (Brown and Moore 2001; Bean and 
Conlan 2002; DeHoog and Salamon 2002; Kelman 2002; Shaikh and Casablanca 2008). 
As such, “contractors …, when implementing U.S. government programs, are subject to 
the government‟s direct instruction and control …, and close public scrutiny …, through 
annual independent and government audits by the inspector general” (Shaikh and 
Casablanca 2008).  
Since INGOs implement clearly specified scopes of work, the authors assert that 
contracts offer the greatest accountability and transparency for government. For INGOs 
however, this translates into higher accountability demands which in turn undermine their 
interventional autonomy.  I expect INGOs highly dependent on contracts and to a lesser 
extent, cooperative agreements, to be less autonomous than those dependent on grants. 
Hypothesis 5: Greater dependence on highly coercive funding instruments 
surrenders less autonomy to INGOs. 
 
 
On the other hand, the hallmark of restrictive funding tools or sources is the 
presence of conditionalities attached to aid which prohibit INGOs from engaging in 
 77 
certain activities.  For example, the United States President‟s Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief funds (PEPFAR) have been criticized because of the mandate they place on 
INGOs to adopt an organization-wide anti-prostitution policy. The same policy applies to 
the INGOs sub-grantees and any other INGOs they may partner with. Another example is 
“The Mexico City Policy also known as the Global Gag Rule, which denies U.S. family 
planning funds to any organization that performs, collects data on, provides referrals for, 
or advocates legal changes for abortion” (Jacobson 2005). In view of these examples, I 
not only expect contracts to be associated with lower levels of INGO autonomy, but also 
USG funding in general to be associated with lower levels of INGO autonomy for the 
funded program, relative to  corporate and foundation funding.  
Hypothesis 6: Greater dependence on highly restrictive sources of funding is likely to 
limit the autonomy of INGOs. 
 
 
And finally, a funding tool is considered direct by the extent to which the entity 
financing a public activity is involved in carrying it out. This is when the authorization, 
funding, and execution of a funded project are essentially carried out by the same entity 
(Salamon 2002a). Such directness can also be interpreted as control. In this light, I expect 
not only USG funding, but contracts to exert more direction and control over INGOs‟ 
program implementation for the funded program (Brown and Moore 2001; Bean and 
Conlan 2002; DeHoog and Salamon 2002; Kelman 2002; Shaikh and Casablanca 2008), 
thus undermining their autonomy. 
Hypothesis 7: Greater dependence on highly direct funding instruments is likely to 
result in lower levels of INGO autonomy  
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Note however that, while the funding source itself may not physically engage in 
the implementation process, it may do so indirectly, for example, by sending monitors 
into the field or by retaining discretion over resource allocation and use through requiring 
prior approvals of changes to budgets, implementation plans and key personnel.  
In closing, the literature makes multiple assertions about the dysfunctional 
consequences of government funding by drawing our attention to a pervasive fear of 
government interference in INGOs‟ autonomy through funding (Beck 1970; Manser 1974 
as cited in Kramer 1985; Lipsky and Smith 1993; Hulme and Edwards 1997; Smith 2006; 
Brown and Moore 2001; Kerlin 2006a). As noted in Chapter 2, Salamon (2003) indicates 
that INGOs face fiscal challenges associated not only with the changing funding terrain 
and issues relating to receiving funds from multiple sources, but also with receiving 
government funding. Reason being that, given its strong foreign policy orientation, USG 
funding may manifest in divergent and possibly conflicting motives, demands and 
expectations to the longer-term development focus of INGOs (Smith 2006; Lancaster 
2007).  
Others draw our attention to the notion of INGO credibility, that by receiving 
government funding, it becomes suspect that INGOs are no longer connected to the 
grassroots – that is, the communities they serve, thus undermining their downward 
accountability (Atmar 2001; Ebrahim 2003b; Kerlin 2006a). Should the negative 
correlation between government funding and INGO autonomy be legitimate, we should 
have reason to be concerned. As Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) underscore, an 
“organization ends where its discretion ends,” that is, to the extent that an INGO has 
influence and control over its own activities.  
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3.4 Research Design: Qualitative Multiple-Case Study  
The nonprofit literature suggests an inverse link between funding, especially 
government funding and INGO autonomy. Employing a multiple case study design helps 
to explore and explain this causal link within “real-life interventions that are too complex 
for the survey strategy” (Yin 2003). Apart from the imprecise manner with which the 
subject of INGO autonomy has been dealt with, an analysis of this nature is further 
confounded by the fact that INGOs hire special staff to navigate and negotiate funding 
relationships with the diverse funding sources. This set up presents problems when trying 
to identify participants to respond to a survey. For example, INGOs retain foundations 
and corporate funding specialty staff and a separate set of staff members to deal 
specifically with USG funding.  
In addition, the implementation of the solicited contracts and grants is usually 
conducted by different sets of people (e.g., the program managers and their staff members 
in the INGOs‟ country offices), from those that negotiate the contracts and grants with 
the funders. Consequently, this disaggregated set of events and actors makes it difficult to 
adopt a survey approach. For this reason, coupled with a lack of data to allow for 
statistical analysis, and following careful consultation with peers in the field and the 
INGO community, the qualitative case study design was deemed more suitable for this 
study.  
A case study is defined as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 2003). While the method generally 
“relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulation 
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fashion,” it also has the advantage of benefiting “from the prior development of 
theoretical propositions [which help] guide data collection and analysis” (Yin 2003; 
2009). The case study design too can be “generalizable to theoretical propositions 
[though] not to populations or universes – [hence] the cases do not represent a “sample” 
per se” (Yin 2003; 2009) While the object of quantitative designs due to the ability to 
enumerate frequencies is to make inferences about a population based on empirical data 
collected about a sample – a process called statistical generalization; case studies can 
conducted with the object of expanding and generalizing theories – a process referred to 
as analytical generalizations (Yin 2003).  
The decision to use a qualitative methodology was also inspired by other factors. 
The approach is instrumental in understanding how and why different funding sources 
uniquely influence the different dimensions of organizational autonomy. It also helps us 
to understand the strategies INGOs employ to safeguard their autonomy within the 
context of funding. For instance, understanding “how” organizational autonomy is 
influenced by funding not only identifies funding as the context within which autonomy 
loss takes place; the question also draws our attention to the existence of the mechanisms 
influencing INGO autonomy. A qualitative case study methodology provides the 
researcher with tools necessary to study the phenomenon of INGO autonomy within the 
specified context of resource dependence and funding tools (Yin 2003; Baxter and Jack 
2008; Yin 2009).   
Case study designs, unlike experiments, do not divorce the phenomenon from its 
context (Yin 2003; Baxter and Jack 2008). The logic of the design allows the researcher 
to deliberately consider contextual conditions such as the fact that unlike public or private 
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entities, INGOs can receive funds from multiple funding sources with diverse interests, 
preferences and priorities. Each exchange relationship between the recipient INGO and a 
funding source, presents unique environmental factors and idiosyncrasies, and thus 
demanding different management tasks and efforts, resulting in different degrees of 
management discretion (Gronbjerg 1993).   
In addition, employing a multiple case study design has the advantage of 
enhancing the credibility of the findings since such a design is considered more robust 
than relying on a single case study (Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 2003; Baxter and 
Jack 2008; Yin 2009). This research relies on a purposive convenient sample of three 
INGOs that receive differential levels of USG funding. The rationale behind this 
selection is predicated upon two replication logics. First, literal or direct replication 
enables cross case comparison by selecting similar INGOs, in this case, from the same 
subfield of direct relief and development INGOs (Rubin and Rubin 1995; Yin 2003; 
2009).  
On the other hand, the logic of theoretical replication is a technique that is used to 
deliberately select cases primarily because they offer contrasting scenarios; in this case, 
differential levels of government support. In this regard, the three organizations display 
varying levels of dependence on government funding. The advantage of using this 
technique, especially, to multiple-cases (as opposed to a single-case) is that, the technique 
does not only provide analytical benefits, but also strengthens the external validity, i.e., 
analytical generalization of the findings (Yin 2003; 2009). Multiple-cases enable the 
researcher to seek convergent evidence from dissimilar cases (Yin 2003; 2009).  
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Furthermore, the choice of a qualitative multiple case study design was also 
inspired by the nebulous manner in which the literature has treated the concept of INGO 
autonomy. The ambivalence associated with not only the concept of autonomy, but also 
with the dysfunctional relationship between government funding and INGO autonomy, 
begs a fresh investigation into the matter. A qualitative case study approach allows 
enough exploratory room for the researcher to navigate unclear complex relationships 
where not only definitions are unclear, but where there is a scarcity of literature on the 
subject. By employing in-depth interviews and drawing from multiple data sources, the 
methodology allows one to uncover nuances around the complex relationship between 
government funding and INGO autonomy, thus generate a detailed understanding of 
government-INGO exchange relationships (Miles and Huberman 1994; Baxter and Jack 
2008). 
Generally speaking however, the case study approach faces a number of criticisms 
and challenges. The design has been criticized for lacking sufficient precision, i.e., 
quantification; objectivity and rigor on the grounds of failing to follow systematic 
procedures. They have also been criticized for “allowing unequivocal evidence or biased 
views to influence the direction of the findings and conclusions,” thus providing little 
basis for scientific generalization since one can hardly generalize from a single case (Yin 
2003; Babbie 2004; Yin 2009). And finally, case studies are criticized for taking too long 
to conduct and for resulting in massive, unreadable documents.  
To counterbalance these criticisms, it is important to recognize that the case study 
design and its amenability to multiple sources of evidence (e.g., documents, interviews, 
surveys, and observations), can provide measures or indicators with greater validity 
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compared to surveys and experimental measurements, through triangulation and by 
allowing one to dig into the depth of the meaning of various concepts such as that of 
organizational autonomy (Yin 2003; Babbie 2004; Yin 2009). This research therefore 
takes advantage of this strength by relying on in-depth face-to-face (FTF) guided 
interviews and documentation review as the primary sources of evidence. This approach 
allows for an in-depth analysis of the nature of organizational autonomy as it relates to 
the INGOs, and with respect to government funding. 
In addition, when organized carefully, the multiple case study design can follow 
systematic procedures especially in the data analysis stages. To ensure a systematic 
analysis, this research takes advantage of the three distinct phases of open, axial and 
selective coding inherent in grounded theory methods (detailed in Chapter 4, section 
4.2.2). To enhance this systematic qualitative data analysis, the study also takes 
advantage of NVIVO 8 software to assist in data organization and management (also 
detailed in Chapter 4, section 4.2.1). As Yin (2003; 2009) pointed out, a well-organized 
qualitative database can also enhance the reliability of a case study since by using 
qualitative software one can leave a trail leading one to evidence for independent 
inspection. 
 
3.4.1 The Selection Process and Criteria for the Cases 
 
To enhance the precision of this study and to ensure a systematic approach, this 
study sets out criteria to guide the selection of case studies, one that can easily be 
replicated. The case selection process was largely conducted using two methods – the 
theoretical replication logic (Yin 2003) noted above – a technique quite similar to the 
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theoretical sampling method (Glaser and Strauss 1967), and purposive convenience 
sampling.  
In addition, the following observations also guided the selection process; first, 
Kerlin (2006b) points out that, between 14 and 19 percent of USAID‟s overall budgets 
have traditionally been allocated to PVOs. And according to the National Center for 
Charitable Statistics (NCCS) – Guidestar National Database, while 71 percent of INGOs‟ 
revenue came from private contributions, only 20 percent came from government grants 
in 2003. And of the 4,124 INGOs in the NCCS international dataset, only 391 (about10 
percent) of these received government grants in 2003 (Kerlin 2006a; Kerlin 2006b; 
Lancaster 2007). This also indicates that USG funding does not represent the lion‟s share 
of relief organizations‟ total revenue and support, but constitutes a small percentage 
(approximately 13 percent) of their overall funding (Kerlin 2006b).  
The above also shows that, government funding tends to be biased towards 
particular kinds of INGO activities and that is towards international relief. For instance, 
between 2002 and 2003, the share of USG funding to international relief INGOs 
increased by 60 percent, compared to a 21 percent increase in government support to 
education-oriented INGOs and a 30 percent increase in support of health-oriented INGOs 
(Kerlin 2006b). 
Gronbjerg (1993) also argues that individual nonprofit service industries or 
subsectors constitute unique organizational environments. For example, the 
organizational environment for direct relief and development INGOs is distinct from that 
of education research-oriented INGOs. For this reason, this study restricts its 
investigation to a study of three U.S-based disaster relief and development INGOs (or 
 85 
PVOs) registered with the USAID in 2005. These INGOs were also registered with the 
NCCS.  
To select the three candidates for the case study, I used the USAID Volag data 
from 2002, 2004, 2005, and 2006. While the data represents only 489 PVOs that were 
registered with USAID in 2005 (note that this does not compare to the 4,124 INGOs 
reported in the 2003 NCCS data); using the USAID Registry, I generated a list of 108 
disaster relief and development INGOs. The three INGOs were therefore selected using 
two main guidelines; they had to be U.S.–based direct relief and development agencies 
conducting operations outside of the United States, and they had to be recipients of USG 
funding, though at varying levels.  
Using the average share or percentage of government support received over a four 
year period (FY 2002, 2004, 2005, and 2006), and using the following cutoff points to 
capture variations in the share of government support or private contributions, that is, the 
degree of dependence on USG funding, I selected at least one INGO whose share of USG 
funding constituted, 
(i) less than 20 percent of its total revenue and support, 
(ii) nearly 50 percent of its total revenue and support, and  
(iii) over 80 percent of its total revenue and support. 
 
Figure 3 below shows the three INGOs recruited into the study and the names 
represent pseudonyms provided to protect the INGOs‟ and participants‟ confidentiality. 
Figure 3 also provides a summary of the financial profiles of the three cases; more 
detailed profiles of three INGOs are provided in Chapter 5.  
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Beta Assistance International (BETA) is the largest of the three organizations 
with a budget of approximately $656 million in FY2006. Averaging its total support over 
a 4-year period, i.e., FY2002, 2004, 2005, and 2006, BETA‟s share of government 
funding is about 46 percent. Sigma Relief Development (SIGMA) is the smallest of the 
three INGOs, with a budget of approximately $29 million in FY2006. On average, 97 
percent of its total revenues support came from the USG.  ALPHA on the other hand, has 
a budget of about $38 million in FY2006. Averaging its support over the 4year period, 
ALPHA‟s share of government is less than 10 percent. As such, these three organizations 
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INGOs identified about were contacted via telephone and email. And upon accepting the 
invitation to participate in this study, I worked with my initial contact to schedule 
interview sessions, usually via email and telephone. 
 
3.5 Data Collection Methods 
 
Since this study involved contact with human subjects as a result of the 
interviewing data collection method, a research protocol was approved by the Georgia 
State University‟s Institutional Review Board on July 3, 2008. As a result, data for this 
research was collected using two key methods, in-depth interviews and document review. 
By allowing for triangulation hence boosting the reliability and validity of the findings 
(Yin 2003; Babbie 2004; Baxter and Jack 2008; Yin 2009), these two methods facilitated 
a comprehensive appreciation of the relationship between funding and INGO autonomy 
through seeking a convergence of evidence. Detailed below therefore, are descriptions of 
the data collection methods adopted in this study.  
 
3.5.1 Guided Interviews  
 
Interviews are considered to be one of the most important sources of evidence of 
case study information (Weiss 1993; Yin 2003; Kvale and Brinkman 2009). The decision 
to employ qualitative interviews as a data collection method was inspired by the capacity 
of the interview method to provide one with “access to the observations of others,” thus 
yielding a deep understanding about a phenomenon (Weiss 1994; Rubin and Rubin 1995; 
Babbie 2004). As a process of knowing through guided conversations, interviews are 
appropriate for gaining insight and context (Kvale and Brinkman 2009) into the 
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interactions between funding and INGO autonomy. As a result, interviews can inform us 
about the nature of the relationship between government funding and INGOs‟ autonomy 
by providing perceived causal inferences (Weiss 1994; Yin 2003; Kvale and Brinkman 
2009).  
To ensure consistency in data collection, an interview guide was used to focus and 
direct the conversations on the topic of funding and its influence on autonomy (Yin 
2003). Each participant was therefore asked the same set of questions with some 
exceptions, while at same time allowing sufficient flexibility for probing emergent issues 
(Weiss 1994; Rubin and Rubin 1995; Babbie 2004). The interview guide, which is 
included in Appendix 3, focused on questions covering seven key areas: resource 
dependence; the autonomy of INGOs; steering and control of the INGO by donors; 
perceptions of general administrative red tape; the influence of grants, contracts, and 
cooperative agreements; strategies of autonomy retention and additional questions on 
board influence. This last set of questions was only asked to higher level staff such as, 
executive directors, chief financial officers, as well as board members. Three pilot 
interviews were conducted with staff members from an Atlanta-based direct relief and 
development INGO. These interviews were instrumental in refining the interview guide. 
The interviews from the pilot were not analyzed for this report.  
In total, 19 interviews were conducted, with only one potential participant from 
SIGMA declining to participate in the study because she felt unknowledgeable about 
INGO funding issues. Despite my intention to conduct face-to-face interviews, at the 
request of some respondents, five out of the 19 interviews (from the three cases) were 
conducted via telephone. The order in which participants were interviewed was 
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established on the basis of the availability of the staff members. Each face-to-face and 
telephone interview lasted approximately 45 to 90 minutes. Extensive field notes were 
also taken during each of the 19 interviews. Clarifications and follow-up questions were 
all conducted via email and telephone. 
 
 
3.5.1.1    Description of the Study Participants 
Similar to the case selection process, participants for the study were also 
purposively selected. In all three cases, my initial contact person from each of the INGOs 
suggested possible participants I could interview based on their own assessment of my 
information needs. These candidates were then contacted by email to establish suitability, 
as well as set interview dates. Additional information emerging during the initial 
screening, the data collection process and based on suggestions from some participants, I 
was able to seek out additional participants to include in the study. Ultimately, this study 
recruited individuals whose primarily role in the organization including soliciting funding 
from different funding sources, especially USG funding. As a result all participants 
interviewed had experience dealing with either government funding, foundation grants or 
corporate gifts.  
I also recruited Chief Executive Officers were possible, as well as Chief Financial 
Officers in order to gain insight into government-INGO autonomy relationships at 
strategic levels. And in order to augment the sample size, this study also recruited 
members of the board who where available to give interviews. The following participants 
and their roles were ultimately recruited for this study:  
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 Chief Executive Offices (CEOs): From ALPHA and SIGMA, which are the 
smallest of the INGOs (N=2). 
 Chief Financial Officers (CFOs): From ALPHA and BETA, though for BETA, 
this was an acting position for the participant. I also recruited BETA‟s Internal 
Auditor, who had experienced dealing with the USG‟s A133 Audit and other 
internal and external compliance issues (N=3) 
 Experts on USG Funding: In order to understand INGOs‟ experience with USG 
funding, this research recruited participants with experience soliciting USG 
funding, as well as responding to USG compliance and reporting requirements. 
These included two participants from ALPHA that is, the Director of Grants and 
Contracts Compliance and the Director of Institutional Funding. And from BETA, 
I recruited the Director of Competitive Bids whose position involves identifying 
funding announcements to respond to. (N=3).  
o The following participants also had extensive experience with USG 
funding: ALPHA‟s Program Director and the VP of International 
Programs; BETA‟s VP of Global Support, the Director of Food Programs, 
and the Director of Humanitarian Assistance (N=5). These directors had 
experience implementing different USG-funded programs. 
o Note that SIGMA‟s CEO and Program Coordinator (N=1), as well as 
ALPHA‟s CEO also had experience dealing with USG funding. The two 
participants from SIGMA are heavily involved in funding solicitation. 
 Foundation and Corporate Giving Experts: The study also recruited participants 
experienced in soliciting and dealing with corporate and foundation funders. 
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These included the BETA‟s Deputy Director of External Relations and ALPHA‟s 
Foundations Expert (N=2) 
o SIGMA‟s CEO and Program Coordinator also had experience dealing 
with corporate giving.  
 Board of Directors: This research recruited ALPHA‟s Board Chair and Treasurer 
and BETA‟s Board Secretary (N=3). For SIGMA however, the CEO and the 
Program Coordinator also held the positions of Board Chair and Treasurer, 
respectively.  
 
3.5.2 Issues of Confidentiality 
 
At the signed consent of all participants, all the interviews were audio recorded 
using a digital voice recorder. The interviews were transcribed verbatim in order to 
preserve the context of the responses. The transcription phase also presented me with an 
opportunity to familiarize myself with the data. Both the audio files and transcribed files 
were stored on a password-protected computer that only the researcher had access to. 
And to further protect the confidentiality of the INGOs and participants recruited for this 
study, pseudonyms in lieu of the real names of the organizations and the research 
participants are used. The participants were made aware of these facts using the Informed 
Consent Form included in Appendix 2. 
 
3.5.3 Documentation Review 
 
This research collected a number of documents as sources of evidence for the case 
study. While the study relies mainly on data collected via face-to-face interviews; 
 92 
additional sources of data include strategic plans, corporate engagement guidelines, 
annual reports from BETA and ALPHA. The study also reviewed an example of a 
contract, grant, and cooperative agreement supplied by BETA. Table 6 below, provides a 
summary of all the data sources. Due to privacy and confidentiality concerns surrounding 
sharing some of the key documents needed for this research, I was unable to obtain 
contracts, and grant cooperative agreements from the other INGOs. Furthermore, the 
INGO also determined which parts of the documents to share with me. 
  
Table 6: Overview of the Data 
 ALPHA 
< 20 percent USG-funded 
BETA 
c. 50 percent USG-funded 
SIGMA 
> 80 percent USG-funded 
In-depth Interviews 
(FTF & Telephone) 
9 8 2 
 






- Strategic Plan 
-Annual Reports 
- All efforts to obtain 
grants and cooperative 
agreements were futile. 
The International 
Programs Director 
referred me to the website 
http://www.grants.gov 
instead 
- Strategic Plan 
-Annual Reports 
- 1 Cooperative 
Agreement 
- 1 Grant 
- 1 Contract 
- Corporate Engagement 
Guidelines 
-Attempts to obtain 
corporate and foundation 
grants have been futile 
All my efforts to obtain 
documents from the 
INGO were futile 
Other Sources and 
Documentation 
- Websites: ALPHA, BETA, SIGMA, USAID; GRANTS.GOV 
- Requests for Proposals and Requests for Agreements (RFP & RFA] 
- “USAID Grants and Cooperative Agreements to Non-governmental Organization,” 
Automated Directives System, Acquisition and assistance Chapter 303 [ADS 303] 
- USAID Glossary of Automated Directives System [ADS] 
- The 2002 Code of Federal Regulations Title 22 – Foreign Relations, Volume 1 of 
Chapter III, “PART 226--ADMINISTRATION OF ASSISTANCE AWARDS TO 
U.S. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS.” [CFR 22] 
- USAID Volag Reports (1999, 2004, 2006 & 2007) – contains Financial data on 
U.S.-Based -PVOs registered with the USAID. 
 
Additional documents were obtained from the USAID website, with the USAID 
being the main U.S. agency responsible for implementing international aid programs. 
Documents from the USAID include; 
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 Automated Directives System (ADS) Chapter 303: Grants and Cooperative 
Agreements to Non-governmental Organization: This document describes the 
“USAID‟s internal guidance, policy directives, required procedures, and standards 
for the award and administration of USAID grants and cooperative agreements.” 
 Automated Directives System (ADS) Chapter 302: USAID Direct Contracting 
(2009): This document describes the USAID‟s “policy directives and required 
procedures for the procurement of goods and services through direct contracts.” 
 USAID Glossary of Automated Directives System (2009): This document provides 
a list of definition of terms that the USAID and other USG funding agencies use, 
thus establishing a common language and understanding of terms between the 
USAID and its INGO contractors and recipients. 
 Automated Directives System Chapter 591: Financial Audits of USAID 
Contractors, Recipients, and Host Government Entities (2005): This document 
provides “policy directives and required procedures for planning and conducting 
financial audits of USG-funded contractors, recipients, and host entities.” 
Stipulated in this document is the requirement of an annual program-specific 
financial and non-financial audit – called an A133 Audit, effective of 2004. This 
applies to all U.S. nonprofit organizations that spend $500,000 or more of federal 
awards within their fiscal year. 
 The 2002 Code of Federal Regulations Title 22 – Foreign Relations, Volume 1 of 
Chapter III (CFR 22): Published by the federal government, this document is a 
“codification of the general and permanent rules” governing the use of federal 
funding. Title 22 of the CFR for instance, contains rules and regulations 
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governing financial and program management, procurement standards, the 
Eligibility Rules for Goods and Services, and Air Transportation, among other 
areas. These rules are applicable to INGO recipients of USG funding. 
 Mandatory Standard Provisions for U.S. Non-Governmental Recipients: These 
provisions are attached to all grants, contracts and cooperative agreements as a 
reminder to INGO recipients of the rule and regulations they are required to 
comply with as part of their funding agreements with USG funding agencies.  
 
Note that as long as an INGO receives USG funding, the standard rules and 
regulations contained in these documents apply to it. As such, these documents were used 
as evidence to facilitate the process of triangulation described in detail in Chapter 4. And 
due to limited access to actual contracts, grants and cooperative agreements, I decided to 
review grants, contracts and cooperative agreements funding announcements from the 
USAID instead. 
The financial data used to guide the selection and profiling of the three INGOs are 
obtained from the USAID Volag Reports. Unlike the publicly available NCCS-990 Core 
data from the Urban Institute, which does not distinguish between government grants 
from contracts, this data shows relatively distinct revenue sources for each INGO, i.e., the 
amount of support and revenue coming from the USAID in the form of food donations, 
contracts, and grants; support from the other USG bodies – also in the form of contracts 
and grants; support from other governments and international organizations; in-kind 
contributions, private contributions and private revenue. This data however, does not 
distinguish between grants and cooperative agreements as these two are lumped together 
under grants. 
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3.6 Limitations of the Study 
 
There are several shortcomings to this research. Like with any case study 
approach, the findings in this study are only applicable to the three cases studied. As a 
result, generalization of the findings is not only limited by the small sample size, it is also 
limited by the limited number of participants interviewed for this study. However, this is 
not to say that any one of these cases does not represent some class of USG-funded relief 
and development INGOs; there are organizations similar to the three studied here. 
Notwithstanding this limitation, confidence in the findings is enhanced by the multiple 
cases studied, as well as the reliance on multiple sources of data which enabled 
triangulation (Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 2003; 2009). 
Second, the inability to access internal document due to privacy concerns resulted 
in some INGOs providing access to more documents than others. This affected the 
distribution of documents, with BETA providing more documentation. However, an 
advantage emanating from the examples of grants, contracts and cooperative agreements 
obtained from BETA is that the documents contained the USG Standard Provisions for 
all U.S. Non-governmental Recipients. These standards contain rules and regulations 
applicable to all INGOs recipients of USG funding, thus facilitating the triangulation 
process.  
In addition, alternative data sources were obtained to make up for this deficiency. 
This research also reviewed a number of documents from the USAID. Such documents 
include the USAID‟s ADS (303; 302) which define and explain USAID funding 
instruments and when such instruments are used, the CFR 22 and a few funding 
announcements.   
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Finally, the nature of the subject of autonomy may have caused some participants 
to become defensive due to the problem of social desirability. This is a tendency among 
participants to provide distorted responses in an attempt to make themselves look better 
or avoid making themselves look bad (Fowler 1998). Other sources of social desirability 
include, providing distorted responses to avoid risking improper disclosure (e.g., about a 
major funding source) or as a way of managing one‟s self-image because the respondents 
do not want to think of themselves or their organization is a certain way (Fowler 1998).  
However, positing the second question of how INGOs are mitigating autonomy 
loss helped balance out this problem in that, the question assumed that an INGO was 
already losing its autonomy. As a result, the question acted as a point of reflection for the 
participants by compelling them to explicitly consider the strategies they have used to 
exercise their autonomy.  
In summary, the research questions outlined in this section suggest that this study 
is both exploratory and explanatory in nature. This is largely inspired by the dearth of 
autonomy measures in the nonprofit literature, as well as the scarcity of robust evidence 
in support of the presumed negative link between government funding and INGO 
autonomy. To gain insight on the complexity of INGO autonomy within the context of 
funding, this research employs a qualitative multiple case study methodology. By so 
doing, the design helps investigate “how” government funding, relative to other funding 
sources such as foundations, individual contributions, and corporations, adversely 
influences INGOs‟ autonomy across the different autonomy dimensions. In this regard, 
one is able to provide explanations for the causal link between INGO autonomy loss and 







4.1    Introduction 
 
Miles and Huberman (1994) outline three phases of a qualitative data analysis. 
Data reduction is exemplified by data coding and generation of themes, while data 
display organizes and compresses all the data codes and themes. According to the 
authors, the information assembled here permits the drawing of inferences, which leads to 
the final stage of drawing of conclusions and verification. In actuality, the qualitative 
analysts establishes meaning of all the data “by noting regularities, patterns, explanations, 
possible configurations, causal flows, and proposition,” right from the start of the data 
collection process (Miles and Huberman 1994).  
This chapter showcases the data analysis process. Using various data displays, 
chapter outlines the nature of the data collected and coded for purposes of this research. 
The coded data is compared to the conceptual model presented in Chapter 3 for 
consistency. The chapter also outlines the process by which the research conclusions 
were drawn and verified. And given that the emergent meanings from the data have to be 
tested for plausibility, “confirmability,” or validity (Miles and Huberman‟s 1994; Yin 
2003; Yin 2009), this chapter also addresses the ways in which validity tests were 
conducted. 
According to Miles and Huberman (1994), final phase of data analysis is in 
qualitative research – the verification of the conclusions, can be achieved by simply 
revisiting a second thought the analyst had or what Yin (2003; 2009) refers to as 
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revisiting rival hypotheses. This is when the analyst takes excursions back to the field 
notes and memos to confirm hunches (Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 2003; Yin 2009). 
In addition, various triangulation techniques can be employed to facilitate this process. 
For instance, the analysts can conduct an in-depth review in an effort to establish 
“intersubjective consensus,” a type of triangulation Miles and Huberman (1994) refer to 
as triangulation by researcher. Since only one researcher was involved in this research, 
rival hypotheses were sought and explored and other triangulation techniques were 
employed.  
Yin (2003; 2009) asserts that, in order to link data to the hypotheses and confirm 
the findings emerging from one‟s analysis, data needs to converge in a triangulation 
fashion, that is, through a synthesis and integration of multiple sources of data. This study 
relied on what Miles and Huberman (1994) refer to as triangulation by method that is, 
when data collected through different methods such as, observations, interviews or 
documents, converges. A second form of triangulation – by source, is also employed in 
this study; this is when data from different participants corroborates.  
In view of these distinctions and of the nature of the data available for this 
analysis, this research adopted the following triangulation rule for both the within-case 
and pooled case analyses. Findings were considered corroborated when evidence from 
both the interview data and any one of the documentation converged (methodological 
triangulation). And for situations where supporting documents were unavailable, as in the 
case of foundations and corporate gifts, the findings were considered confirmed when 
two or more of participants‟ experiences, across any of the three cases corroborated or 
converged (source triangulation).  
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And as Yin (2003; 2009) also pointed out, “if two or more cases are shown to 
support the same theory, replication may be claimed” especially compared to a rival 
theory. As a result, the process of triangulation helped strengthen the interpretation of the 
findings, thus increasing the reliability and validity of the findings (Yin 2003; Baxter and 
Jack 2008; Yin 2009). 
 
4.2 Notes on the Methods of Analysis 
To facilitate the data analysis process, I used a qualitative software package called 
NVIVO 8. In order to facilitate a systematic data analysis, I employed the grounded 
theory techniques of open, axial, and selective coding. 
Aside from defining the research questions, articulating the research hypotheses, 
and the unit(s) of analysis, some of the major challenges to using the case study approach 
include identifying the logic linking the data to the hypotheses and establishing “criteria 
for interpreting the findings” (Yin 2003). The use of multiple cases however offers 
solutions to this challenge through pattern matching and triangulations techniques.  
The multiple-case study approach not only enables cross-case comparisons and 
syntheses (Yin 2003; Yin 2009); it also permits within-case analyses. In light of this and 
the theoretical frameworks applied in this research, the data analysis process, using the 
pattern matching technique, takes place at two levels. Recognition of the “organization” 
as the resource dependence framework‟s unit of analysis, this study conducted within-
case analysis by examining data collected for each INGO. And to test the tool choice 
hypotheses, the study employed the cross-case analysis by examining data pooled from 
all three INGOs.  
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Before probing into the nature of the data, the following sections describe the 
nature of the qualitative software used to assist with the data organization, management 
and data mining processes, as well as the methods used for data coding. This is followed 
by a description of the codes, nodes or concepts generated from the data and a description 
of the nature of the emergent data used in this research. 
 
4.2.1 NVIVO 8: Organizing and Managing Qualitative Data 
 
The analysis of the interview transcripts is centered on a qualitative analysis of 
texts using a qualitative data analysis software package called NVIVO 8. The software 
package, an updated version of NUD*IST (Non-Numerical Unstructured Data Indexing, 
Searching and Theorizing), is highly recognized for its ability to improve the quality of 
analysis by assisting the researcher with the organization and management of data files 
(Ozkan 2004; Bazeley 2007). The researcher does the coding and analysis; the software 
simply helps the researcher to organize and manage the data and the themes generated 
(Ozkan 2004; Bazeley 2007), allowing for a systematic analysis (Yin 2003; Yin 2009).  
A key advantage of NVIVO is that the software allows one to “package” the 
emerging themes from different participants across different research questions. In 
addition, data analysis can be conducted on a question by question basis to compare how 
different participants responded to the same questions. To facilitate the basic coding and 
analysis, this research used a grounded theory approach as a channeling technique for the 
identification of themes and patterns from the data. It is important to highlight that the 
NVIVO 8 software only helped me to organize and manage the data in order to facilitate 
a systematic analytical approach for data mining. As a result, while much of my judgment 
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is involved in the process of interpreting and drawing meaning from the data, as well as 
arriving at the conclusions reached in this report; this is done in consultation with the 
data, as well as, the triangulation techniques identified above.  
Note that NVIVO 8 also has other functions such as memoing, annotations, and 
queries, which can be instrumental in searching for evidence that can be utilized in 
hypothesis testing.   
 
4.2.2  Pattern Matching Technique Using a Grounded Theory Approach 
 
Unlike quantitative analysis, qualitative data analysis “involves a radically 
different way of thinking about data” given that it forces the researcher to “listen” to the 
data, by allowing the data to speak to them (Strauss 1987; Strauss and Corbin 1998). 
Consistent with the hallmark of qualitative research, the researcher becomes the 
instrument of analysis. Such a methodology therefore calls for a more flexible and less 
rigid approach to one‟s data analysis. And this is where a grounded theory approach is 
instrumental in helping one to organize one‟s data analytical process by implementing 
three distinct phases. The approach also provides a systematic procedure for analyzing 
qualitative data by enabling the researcher to identify the patterns or themes within the 
interview data using distinct analytical processes (Strauss 1987; Strauss and Corbin 1998; 
LaRossa 2005).  
Using LaRossa‟s (2005) interpretation of grounded theory approach, a method 
consisting three main phases of open coding, axial coding, and selective coding.  I began 
with the open coding phase, which is an analytical process where “data is broken down 
into distinct incidents, ideas, events, and acts and are then given a name that represents or 
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stands for these” (Strauss and Corbin 1998). This process “open(s) up the text and 
expose(s) the thoughts, ideas, and meanings contained therein” (Strauss and Corbin 
1998).  Open coding therefore, fosters a microscopic examination of the text, by 
promoting a detailed, line-by-line analysis with the intent to break the data into discrete 
concepts or variables (Strauss 1987; Strauss and Corbin 1998; LaRossa 2005).   
The axial coding phase on the other hand, involves an intense analysis conducted 
around an individual concept or theme. The process entails asking questions about how 
the emergent categories or concepts could be linked to one another, under what 
conditions, and with what consequences (Strauss and Corbin 1998; LaRossa 2005). The 
process involves a deliberate search for clues that reveal potential ways in which the 
concepts emerging from the interview data could be related to each another along 
different dimensions. For example, in order to understand the relationship between 
managerial autonomy with respect to human resource management and the concept of 
funding – I searched the data for evidence indicating variation across different funders. 
As a result, a statement like the following would signal the existence of variation among 
funder with regards to human resource management. 
The USG wants to review your chief of party, but foundations don‟t really 
care about that.  
 
 
Asking the data questions like, “Does the USG approve the chief of party for 
every project? If not, under what conditions does it render its approval,” helps one 
interpret the relationships, as well as test one‟s hypotheses.  
Finally, once the key themes or concepts were identified, the selective coding 
phase helped to integrate and refine categories or concepts into a coherent theory or 
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“story” (Strauss and Corbin 1998), that is, to identify the “main story underlying the 
analysis” (LaRossa 2005). This phase helped channel this analysis toward a focus on 
USG funding and its associative impact on INGOs‟ autonomy, relative to other funding 
sources, thus centering the “story” around this relationship. 
To ensure a systematic analysis, I employed the concept-indicator comparison 
model introduced by Glaser (1978), but refined by LaRoass (2005). This is predicated 
upon a constant comparison of the indicators of concepts, i.e., the labels associated with 
particular indicators, as well as, the concepts themselves, as one conducts open and axial 
coding. Constant comparison is achieved through the identification of similarities and 
differences between indicators and their subsequent concepts (LaRossa 2005). The 
identification is achieved by asking questions such as; “What is being talked about here? 
What does this sentence connote? What is going on here? What is the story?” Asking 
these questions also helps one bring meaning to the data by enabling one to advance from 
data analysis into the interpretation realm (Rossman and Rallis 2003). 
Based on this grounded theory approach therefore, the first step in my analysis 
was to conduct a careful microscopic, line-by-line analysis of all the transcribed 
interviews. Using open coding, I examined words, sentences, and phrases, and was able 
to identify a number of indicators related to the different dimensions of autonomy. 
Instead of giving these indicators new labels (referred to as nodes in NVIVO), I labeled 
indicators using the existing autonomy dimensions labels of financial, managerial, 
structural, operational and interventional autonomy formulated by Verhoest, Peters et al. 
(2004). Using the descriptions of each of the autonomy dimensions, I was able to identify 
numerous phrases or indicators that aligned well with the definitions and descriptions. 
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Based on this process, I was able to identify multiple indicators leaning towards each of 
the autonomy dimensions with the exception of legal autonomy and to a limited extent, 
structural autonomy.  The concept-indicator in Table 7 shows some examples of 
indicators used to identify the autonomy dimensions coded from the interview data using 
open coding. Note that a theoretically saturated concept would have numerous indicators 
(LaRossa 2005).  
 

























Managerial Financial Operational Structural Interventional  Constraints 
 
*They can reject 
your key personnel, 
they can simply say 
look, your chief of 
party isn‟t acceptable 
to us, find another 
one. I think that‟s 
fair, sadly, who holds 
the purse strings 
basically gets to 
make some 
decisions. 
* they don‟t dictate 
who we hire – for 
key personnel, 
particularly for a 
contract, they do 
have approval over 
that, they do have to 
agree to that, so yeah 
– with any big award. 
It is usually chief of 
party or something at 
that level needs to get 
the approval of the 
donor, of the USG. 
*I mean it‟s a fairly 
complex bureaucracy 
and so they prefer 
someone who has 
been through it, who 
understands the 
ropes, rather than 
someone who 
doesn‟t. 
*we are setting up a 
Grants Compliance 
Unit, that‟s a new 
unit, but we have had 
a compliance officer, 
but just one person. 
So we are increasing 
the resources 
 
*USAID is the worst 
… but they are also 
our single largest 
donor so we don‟t 
have any choice. 
* (Referring to US 
government funding) 
We‟ve actually gone 
down, when I first 
gone down here I think 
it was 60% and now 
it‟s about 40%. 
* Everybody can go 
well, “we kind of agree 
with this but we are 
not prepared to give up 
the money because 
there is not 
replacement money.” 
* Are you looking for 
resource support to 
basically fill your cash 
pipelines and even 
though it may not be 
optimally what you 
would like to do? I‟m 
still going to do it 
because I need cash to 
run my program?  
 
 
*If the organization 
says we are going to 
program this way, 
and you know, if 
some of that resource 
support doesn‟t 
match the way we 
would like to 
program – you say 
ok, thank you, but we 
can‟t do this anymore 
*there were restricted 
projects that they 
didn‟t allow us to 
achieve the full 
potential of our 
programs 
*The grant spells out 
exactly that, it 
doesn‟t allow you to 
do any other things… 
If we identify (other) 
issues.., with those 
very closed project, 
we don‟t address 
those issues that we 
identify as we 
implement this 
program 
*The difference is we 
made a decision on 
how we were going 
to use their resource 
or not and that was 
our decision. 
*A contract is a 
different type of 
relationship…you 
have to be willing to 
pretty much take 
whatever direction 







– has a central 
coordinating 
function and they 
are getting money 









the money goes 
and what it‟s going 
to be spent on, 
unless it has been 
designated by the 
donor to be spent 
in a certain way. 
*we have such a 
diverse set of 
funding because 




*USAID is the 
worst as far as the 
independent audits 
and what we are 
having to do to 
comply with them... 
*This whole time 
and effort in 
reporting, if we 
don‟t get that in 
place, we could 
lose millions of 
dollars –and so the 
time and effort we 
are spending to put 
in place and the 
time and effort 
reporting is for just 
for one donor – and 
so it‟s we either do 
it or we can‟t take 
that money 
*So the reporting 
has gotten much 
more rigorous 
*But a $10,000 
donation to a CO 




report on how we 
spend that fund 
 
*Most of their rules 
and regulations is 
how we spend that 
funding. 
*Now the USAID 
has a standard book 
of indicators, you 
have to have 
certain indicators 
that align with 
those indicators 
*we do what are 
called A133 audits 
… an audit of the 
financial 
statements…more 
importantly it is an 
audit of compliance 
with government 
rules and 
regulations and an 
audit of the internal 
controls to promote 
compliance 
*But the largest 
constraints are 
often over some of 
the financial 
reporting and the 
booking side of it, 
they want to see 
very detailed 
records of how the 




Picturing each of these labels or free nodes as a “basket,” I placed only those 
indicators that resonated with the definition of that label into the baskets. A free node is 
simply a „stand-alone‟ container or basket that is not linked to other nodes or labels (QSR 
2008). I initially generated 40 free nodes; however, not all of the nodes were related to 
the subject of INGO autonomy. This is also one area were selective coding became 
instrumental in deciding which of the nodes to include to support the central “story.” This 



















Figure 4: Tree Nodes: Parent Nodes with their Child Nodes, by Case 
 
Using axial coding and the constant-comparison techniques, I was able to reduce 
29 of the 40 free nodes generated to 5 tree nodes – leaving 11 free nodes that are not used 
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for purposes of this research. Trees nodes are labels organized in a hierarchical structure, 
moving from a parent node (general label) to more specific nodes (child nodes) (Bazeley 
2007; QSR 2008a; 2008b). Each child note therefore has its own indicators, i.e., those 
generated during the open coding phase. Once I began to ask questions about how these 
nodes or common themes of patterns could be related, it was then that I was able to 
reduce 29 of the free nodes to the 5 tree nodes shown in Figure 4 above. 
Therefore Figure 4 shows the 5 tree nodes used to respond to the research 
questions addressed in this research. Note that each of the child nodes represents a 
“basket,” and each of the baskets contains various indicators or phrases coded from the 
interview data. Each of the indicators is regarded as evidence to support the label. The 
process of placing indicators in appropriate baskets was also facilitated by the constant 
comparison of the phrases or indicators.  
The numbers shown in the parentheses illustrates the number of INGOs that 
contributed to the discussion of each of these concepts. For example, participants from all 
three cases contributed to the discussion around their experiences with coercive tools. 
And information on INGOs‟ experience with corporate funding could only be found in 
interviews from two of the cases (SIGMA and BETA). With regard to strategies for 
managing the risk of autonomy loss, BETA and ALPHA contributed a lot to this 
discussion, with SIGMA contributing to the discussion surrounding the subject of 
revenue diversification and congruence and fit of funded programs. This information 
therefore gives us a rough idea of where information supporting these concepts or themes 
originated from. 
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4.3 Description of Data 
 
Unlike quantitative research, qualitative research does not rely on correlation 
matrices, regression coefficients and significant tests to showcase the correlation between 
variables and the strength of the findings. Instead, this research relies on techniques such 
as counts; and matrices to show points of consensus among participants within the same 
organization, as well as across cases. Various descriptive data displays are therefore 
employed to populate the evidence emerging from the data.  
An advantage of NVIVO 8 is that, it keeps a record of the number of sources used 
to code for each concept, as well as a count of the indicators used to populate that node. 
As shown in Table 8 below, the numbers under the source column reflect the number of 
interviews from which indicators pertaining to the subsequent concepts or nodes were 
coded from. The numbers under the reference column show a count of each indicator, 
phrase or word coded for each of the concepts indicated in the first column. However, 
care should also be taken when interpreting these numbers since a single interview 
(source) can have multiple references, while others may only have referenced the concept 
a few times.  
To help bring more light to the richness of the data, Table 8 also breaks down 
these counts by case. Note that these numbers are based only on the interview data and 
not the documents review. This is primarily due to NVIVO‟s sensitivity when uploading 
particular files. Due files size or formats, I was unable to upload some documents into 




Table 8: Key Nodes by Count and by INGO 
Dependent Variables Source References Count ALPHA BETA SIGMA 
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Strategies Source References Count ALPHA BETA SIGMA 
Diversification 








INGO Professionalism  



























































This variable model above (Table 8) shows the variables that emerged from an 
analysis of the interview data. The funding sources row shows word counts grouped by 
INGO. For example, across all 19 interviews, the word government was mentioned 226 
times. Participants in ALPHA mentioned the word 127 times, compared to BETA‟s 57 
times and SIGMA‟s 42 times. The word USG on the other hand, was mentioned 296 
times, with ALPHA mentioning the words 137 times. The word foundation(s) was 
mentioned 151 times, while the corporate funding, corporation or corporations were 
mentioned a combined 89 times. Only ALPHA spoke of individual contributions in terms 
of sponsorships and participants mentioned this word 89 times. The word individual and 
contributions were mentioned 41 and 30 times, respectively. Other words of interests 
include rules (69), regulations (59), requirements (50), and reporting (64 times).  
Table 8 also shows some of the key strategies that emerged from the data. 13 
participants (6 from ALPHA; 5 from BETA and 2 from SIGMA) identified revenue 
diversification as an autonomy retention strategy. And 15 participants out of the 19 
interviewed, made reference to the need for INGOs to ensure that the goals embedded in 
funding announcements were congruent with their own. From the 15 participants, 8 were 
from ALPHA, 5 from BETA and 2 from SIGMA. Another interesting theme emerging 
from the interview data analysis is that of INGO professionalism; 18 out of the 19 
participants interviewed for this research felt that USG funding had helped improve the 
professionalism of INGOs, especially with respect to establishing systems that encourage 
self-evaluation. This theme was coded 79 times. 
It is also important to note that the numbers shown in the INGO Autonomy, 
Constraints, and Tool Characteristics rows represent the number of interviews from 
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which these concepts were coded. For example, data from 17 out of the 19 participants‟ 
interviews contained indicators suggesting the existence of interventional constraints. Of 
the 17 interviews, 32 indicators were coded from 7 interviews from ALPHA. Another 32 
indicators were coded from all of BETA‟s 8 participants‟ interviews and the remaining 
16 indicators were generated from SIGMA‟s two interviews. These numbers therefore 
suggest that the topic of ex post controls was a hot subject among participants from all 
three INGOs.  
There is also evidence to support the existence of operational or policy autonomy 
concept from 18 of the 19 participants interviewed. Of the 91 indicators used to code for 
this concept, 43 came from all 9 of ALPHA‟s participants, 42 indicators from 7 
participants from BETA and only 6 indicators from SIGMA‟s two interviews. This too 
suggests that the data from all three INGOs contained strong evidence supporting the 
existence of the concept of operational autonomy. In addition, 17 out of the 19 
participants also gave indication of the importance of an INGO‟s financial autonomy.   
In addition to ex post controls, Table 8 also suggests that a keen discussion took 
place around the idea of the ex ante controls utilized by funding sources. This discussion 
provided strong evidence to suggest that such ex ante, (mid-course) and ex post 
constraints do steer and control INGOs‟ decisions as will be shown in the findings. 15 out 
of 19 participants pointed to the existence of ex ante constraints associated with the 
INGOs‟ funding sources – that is, 7 participants from ALPHA, 6 participants from BETA 
and the two participants from SIGMA.  
These numbers provide strong evidence to suggest that the presence of ex ante 
controls create tightly controlled environments within which INGOs‟ decision making 
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occurs. For instance, as a way of ensuring that USAID policy interests are met, INGOs 
are required to adopt USAID indicators in their evaluation plans. However, this does not 
mean that INGOs cannot include indicators of their own.  And according to Section 
226.21 (a) of the Code of Federal Rules, INGO recipients are required to “relate financial 
data (including budget plans) to performance whenever practical,” for evaluation 
purposes. Linking ex ante promises to ex post evaluation and reporting requirements may 
stand to ensures and verifies that INGOs do what they promised by holding INGOs 
accountable to ex ante promises.  
In contrast to the conceptual model shown in Figure 2 (in Chapter 3), the variable 
model in Table 8 shows evidence to suggest a strong consistency between the two 
models, with some exceptions. This consistency is strong across all other factors with the 
exception of resource dependence‟s resource alternatives factors. However, evidence 
supporting the existence of regulations restricting access to alternative funding sources 
was coded under the tool choices‟ restrictive label.  
A second area of inconsistency is seen in the disappearance of a number of the 
organizational autonomy dimensions. The employment of the constant-comparison 
techniques in the close examination of the indicators groups under each of these concepts 
revealed tautological issues associated with trying to operationalize Verhoest, Peters et 
al.‟s (2004) dual conceptualization of autonomy. To correct for this, and based on the 
emergent themes, this research moved to regard the authors‟ second formulation of 
autonomy (as the presence of constraints), in terms of intervening variables that lead to a 




Description of Key Topics, by Case 
 
Table 9 summarizes the distribution of topics discussed by case. Some details are 
not shown in order to preserve the confidentiality of the INGOs.  
 







Founded 1930s 1940s 1980s 
Scope of Work Children-Focused 
development programs, 







including relief efforts 














USG Funding (41%); 
Other Governments and 
International 
Organizations (36%) 
USG Funding (94%); 
Private Support (6%) 
Major USG Funding 
Tool Used 
Grants (100%) Grants (69%);  
Donated Food & Freight 
(31%) 
Contracts (48%);  
Grants (29%);  
Donated Food & Freight 
(23%) 





Executive Director;  
Chief Financial Officer; 
Dir. of International 
Programs; 
Director of Grants and 
Contracts Compliance; 




Chairman of the Board; 
Treasurer of the Board 
8 
Positions: 
Acting Chief Financial 
Officer; 
Dir. of Competitive 
Bids; 
Dir. of Humanitarian 
Assistance; 
Deputy Dir. of External 
Relations; 
VP of Global Support; 
Dir. of Food Programs; 
Internal Auditor; 
Secretary of the Board 
2 
Positions: 
Chief Executive Officer 
(also the Chairman of 
the Board); 
Program Coordinator 
(also the Treasurer of 
the Board) 
# of Participants who 
talked about Contracts 
8 (Excludes the Board 
Treasurer) 
7 (Excludes Acting 
CFO) 
2 
# of Participants who 
talked about Grants 
9 8 2 
# of Participants who 
talked about 
Cooperative Agreements 
4 (CEO; Dir. of Grants 
and Contracts 
Compliance; Dir. of 
Institutional Funding & 
the Program Dir.) 
3 (Dir. of Competitive 
Bids; VP of Global 





# of Participants who 
talked about Individual 
Contributions 
8 (Excludes the Dir. of 
Grants and Contracts 
Compliance) 
2 (External Relations & 
Dir. of Competitive 
Bids) 
0 
# of Participants who 
talked about 
Unrestricted Funding 
3 (CEO; Program 
Director & VP of 
International Programs) 
3 (Acting CFO; External 





As noted above, all the cases are directly replicable since they were selected from 
the same subfield of INGOs engaged in relief and development. The cases also exhibit 
variations in their dependence on government funding.  In order to display the nature of 
the data used in this study, Table 9 also shows the numbers of participants who talked 
about grants, contracts, cooperative agreements and unrestricted funding. Detailed 
financial information for each of the INGOs is provided in Chapter 5. This section details 
the data variance between the three cases, including variance in the topics discussed by 
participants within these three cases. This section outlines this data with respect to the 
context under which these topics were discussed. 
 
4.3.1   Discussion on the Nature of Funding Tools 
 
Compared to grants and cooperative agreements, all 18 participants who 
discussed contracts (all participants from BETA and from ALPHA), agreed that contracts 
are very specific in terms of what is expected of INGOs, thus establishing INGOs as 
contractors of the USG. With the exception of SIGMA‟s CEO, all other participants 
expressed a preference for grants and cooperative agreements compared to contracts. 
Overall, data from all 18 participants indicated that dealing with contracts would require 
a specialized machine – that is, strong capacity to take on the high compliance 
expectations associated with contracts. 
Speaking on the coercive nature of contracts, compared to grants, and whether the 
funding tools employed by the USG to finance INGOs‟ activities influence INGOs‟ 
decision making and activities; BETA‟s VP of Global Support had this to say, 
It matters very much; I mean, a cooperative agreement is much easier to 
work through, contracts are the difficult ones because, contracts are almost 
 114 
business documents and everything is set out very clearly and we have 
very little leeway in terms of how we can influence that. I mean, the steps 
are there, you just have to follow them 1, 2 and 3; while a cooperative 
agreement is much looser, and we have a chance to influence it and 
modify it a bit if needed. Grants and cooperative agreements are very 
similar. And BETA prefers cooperative agreements or grants. 
Unfortunately the USG is going much more towards contracts and it is 




This view was commonly shared among all participants, again, with the exception 
of SIGMA‟s CEO who found contracts easier to deal with as a result of their specificity. 
In his view, the specificity of outputs, tasks and outcomes actually simplifies what is 
expected of SIGMA. In other words, the specificity of contracts actually frees the INGO 
to do only that which is specified in the contract, that way, “there would be no surprises.”  
An interesting subject emerging from the literature is one of the degree to which 
USG-funded INGOs can exercise their autonomy in some way given that USG funding 
has largely been considered as a more exacting funding source. In light of the foreign 
policy climate surrounding USG funding, participants from ALPHA and BETA pointed 
out that their INGOs are strategic in the way they make choices about which Requests for 
Agreements (RFAs), that is, the grants and cooperative agreements that they choose to 
respond to. This suggests that different grant requests impose different restrictions and 
limitations on INGOs such that their ability to choose between different RFAs provides 
INGOs with some latitude to make strategic choices in the kinds of relationships they 
want to enter into with the USG. The idea is that INGOs are at least autonomous in 
making that choice. This also suggests that all grants restrict INGOs in some unique way. 
As a result, the choice of RFA to respond to becomes one of weighing the benefits and 
costs based on inherent restrictions and requirements.  
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In light of this, participants from both ALPHA and BETA emphasized the need 
for INGOs to carefully scrutinize the contents of contracts and grants announcements and 
awards, a process others referred to as due diligence. For example, according to its 
Treasurer, ALPHA makes,  
choices in terms of what grants to go after and so if there is a USG grant 
or grant from a multi-lateral donor, that‟s going to put some kind of 
restrictions on our activities then we choose not to participate. 
 
 
ALPHA‟s Director of Grants and Contracts Compliance also pointed out the 
following; 
Our key focus is “compliance,”… so if a request for application (RFA) 
comes out, we read it through and pull out all the requirements because 
there is compliance when you submit a proposal too… Our unit is 
involved is throughout the whole life of a project from the decision on 
whether to bid on something or not. We may look at something and say, 
look there are inordinate amount of requirements on this for a small 
amount of money, and we just don‟t think that the cost-benefit ratio is 
worth it.  
 
 
And according to BETA‟s Director of Humanitarian Assistance, 
BETA is very deliberate in analyzing where we will work in country. So at 
times we don‟t work where donors would like us to be operating. 
 
 
Illustrating the process of sifting through grant solicitation, the following 
statement from BETA‟s Direct of Competitive Bids outlines how grant solicitations are 
selected;  
We distribute it the COs… then we will ask them to let us know their go-
no-go decision… we have a whole set of tools about what types of factors 
they look at. They look at their capacity and alignment with their own 
country operating strategy, they look at the competition, and they look at 
what it would take them to do it, in terms of partners and resources and the 
feasibility of implementing it.  
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So if they are and usually if they are issues with the bid, I mean policy 
issues, then those get uncovered pretty early in the process. For example, 
recently there was an RFA that came out in Afghanistan, it was called 
IDEAS. It was for some alternative development… a poppy substitution 
and it required that you would work very closely with the Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRTs) – kind of the USG military Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and you would have to work very 
closely with those. BETA determined that while we wanted to… work 
with the farmers on improving their income and their livelihood; we did 
not want to work closely with the US military. So after about a week of 
going back and forth, and we asked questions, really because it wasn‟t 
clearly how closely you were going to have to work with them – so we 
submitted questions to USAID and then they answered and we decided no, 
we couldn‟t go for it. 
 
 
The same sentiments were also articulated by BETA‟s Humanitarian Assistance 
Director; however, he goes further to state that,  
a grant that is somehow amended to also meet some of the donor 
requirements… does affect how we implement it on the ground because 
we need to comply with the grant regulations…. but that being said, it 
doesn‟t necessarily mean that we are influenced or driven by that grant. 
 
 
This view helps explain ALPHA‟s Board Chair‟s perception that the USG is not 
necessarily “restrictive” but is “demanding” as shown in the rival hypotheses section 
below. Her statement, in light of the above views, suggests that by responding to 
particular grants and not others, INGOs in essence demonstrate their willingness to and 
acceptance of compliance requirements inherent in funding tools and associated with 
USG funding. However, because of the inherent compliance requirements, USG funding 
is seen to be demanding since INGOs are still held accountable for what is expected of 
them, according to those agreements. In other words, complying with USG regulations 
and various other expectations is demanding, hence why both ALPHA and BETA have 
established formal Grants and Contracts Compliance Units “just to keep up with 
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government regulations” (Director of Grants and Compliance, ALPHA, also highlighted 
by BETA‟s Internal Auditor) 
As a result, there was a great deal of discussion in the interview data about the 
differences between contracts, grants and cooperative agreements and the implications of 
that on INGOs‟ decision making and implementation. This discussion was mostly 
associated with a common emergent theme of the presence of various ex ante regulations 
attached to different funding tools that INGOs have to comply with in exchange of 
receiving USG funding. This also suggests that by signing a grant agreement and hence 
signaling one‟s acceptance of the terms therein, an INGO in some ways automatically 
foregoes some measure of its autonomy. As ALPHA‟s Grant and Compliance Director 
and Program Director, and BETA‟s Director of Competitive Bids all pointed out, grants 
are essentially “conditional gifts.”    
A great deal of discussion also took place around financial and non-financial ex 
ante and ex post controls. Participants talked about the degree to which funders 
scrutinized INGOs‟ budgets, and spending, as well as how INGOs are required to comply 
with different procurement rules. A highly discussed ex post requirement attached to the 
USG funding is the A133 audit. The A133 Audit of State, Local Governments, and 
Nonprofit Organizations requires nonprofit spending more than half a million dollars of 
federal funds annually to have this audit. According the OMB circular, the A133 audit 
closely tracks and classifies revenue received from the federal government, by looking 
for compliance with general and specific government audit requirements covering 
financial and non-financial factors such as program effectiveness, efficient use of 
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resources, and the allocation and spendability of federal resources. External auditors also 
test for the adequacy of INGOs‟ internal control systems. 
While participants from all three INGOs described the A133 Audit as being rather 
tedious and quite demanding since it requires INGOs to be more careful in how they 
allocate and spend federal funds through rule compliance; participants also indicated that 
the audit also encourages INGOs to become more professional in their recording keeping 
and information tracking. In other words, the audit requirement and other ex post 
monitoring and evaluation requirements may have compelled these INGOs to develop 
advanced internal financial controls, efficient procurement practices, as well as establish 
formal evaluation practices. 
 
4.3.2   Discussion on INGO‟s Capacity to Influence Funding Agencies 
 
In spite of the nature of funding tools and restrictions associated with funding 
sources, participants also talked about the different ways their INGOs exert influence on 
the contents and terms of funding agreements. The interview data provides information to 
suggest that INGOs have room to negotiate, during the grant application phase, what the 
final grant agreements would look like. BETA‟s Director of Food Programs highlights 
this point in the following statement, 
What essentially happens is you assess the need, design your program and 
then you prepare your proposal and if approved, you implement it… With 
Title II Programs… like any grantee, you can try and push the envelope a 
bit, but at some point, you can‟t go over the line. So I wouldn‟t call it 
necessarily autonomy as much as flexibility and I think we have had a fair 
amount of flexibility as programs have been evolving.  
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First, participants pointed out that their INGOs respond to RFAs by articulating 
the activities to be implemented (through the implementation plans they design in 
consultation with the funding announcement guidelines), the outputs or results of those 
activities, and the cost function associated with the activities (budget plan). It appears 
therefore that INGOs can influence USG programs by putting their “signature” on 
program activities. In a sense, INGOs exercise their autonomy during this stage since the 
specifics of the program (unless stipulated by the USG, as with contracts and other 
unsolicited funding), originate with the INGOs. All 19 participants agreed that the USG 
Technical Cognizant Officers (TCOs) would then review and evaluate the INGOs‟ 
programmatic proposals and would either suggest amendments or decline the proposals 
altogether. In order for proposals to be accepted, they would need to include the USG‟s 
program objectives and goals. 
A review of the data also suggests a second opportunity for INGOs to exercise 
their autonomy and this comes once the INGOs have received the Letter of Award from 
the funding agency. Consistent with views from BETA‟s Director of Competitive Bids, 
ALPHA‟s Director of Funding highlights this observation in the following statement;  
Once you get to the letter of award, you then begin the negotiation process 
with the government agency as to what the final agreement would look 
like. And once you get to an agreement, you sign the agreement and you 
start implementing the project. 
 
 
In addition, INGOs can also suggest changes to the implementation plans during 
the implementation phase; however, this can cause delays for the INGO since any 
deviations from the agreed-upon agreements require USG review and approval, 
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suggesting a type of ex ante or mid-course constraint. These views were common shared 
among all the participants with USG experience.  
The data also highlights the recognition that INGOs operate in specific funding 
environments that are laden with unique politics and cultures, as well as, the limitations 
and controls inherent therein. Also emergent from this data is that, it is equally important 
to recognize that INGOs also operate in a broader humanitarian environment that has its 
own culture and generates its own language of best practices. As a result, such an 
environment also stands to strengthen INGOs‟ bargaining power and ability to push back 
when funder attempt to co-opt them. In other words, the humanitarian assistance and 
development community has devised its own culture of doing things and best practices 
which funding agencies may have to respect. This view was shared by 4 participants from 
ALPHA and 5 participants from BETA. 
The above suggests avenues INGOs can take to militate against complete 
autonomy loss. Other avenues open to INGO influence are explicated in the following 
statement by BETA‟s Deputy Director of External Relations, 
Corporate philanthropy is changing, whereas in the past, corporations 
would kind of sit down as a foundation and say $200,000 to BETA, 
$100,000 to the United Way. That type of philanthropy from an 
international development perspective is different were BETA just doesn‟t 
want the $200,000. They want to sit down with the corporation and help 
influence their policies, especially corporations that are international and 
corporations that have presence in the countries we work with. We want to 
sit down with them and talk about, you know, Child-labor practices, we 
want to talk about how they can be very socially responsible and they are 
also approaching BETA and saying, can you help us develop a better 




4.3.3   Discussion on Unrestricted Funding 
 
Across all the 7 participants who talked about unrestricted funding (3 from 
BETA, 3 from ALPHA and 1 from SIGMA), the conversation illuminated on how this 
type of funding source affords INGOs with the ultimate level of autonomy.  One 
participant described unrestricted funding as, 
 flexible funding…, (that is), the blood that causes this whole organization 
to function. (BETA‟s Deputy Director of External Relations)  
 
 
And according to ALPHA‟s Program Director, unrestricted funding is what 
allows INGOs to accomplish,  
what is near and dear to their hearts. 
 
 
The only limitation associated with unrestricted funds is how costly it is to 
acquire as noted in a statement by BETA‟s Competitive Bids Director.  
Unrestricted (funding) being the kind of funding that is not project-tied…. 
is very expensive to get – it is more expensive to get unrestricted than 
restricted, you have to invest more dollars to get one dollar back. 
 
4.4    Interpretation of the Data 
 
Qualitative researchers draw a distinction between data analysis and 
interpretation. Were data analysis involves immersion into one‟s data, organizing and 
data coding to generate themes or pattern identification; an interpretation of the data 
involves a process of finding meaning from the data or of the relationships between the 
nodes or concepts (Weiss 1994; Rossman and Rallis 2003). While is it important to 
understand the patterns and concepts inherent in the data, it is equally important to 
understand the linkages between them, as such relationship nodes were instrumental in 
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that they gave me “containers” to record evidence of the connections between two or 
more concepts in the data (Bazeley 2007).  And in order to derive meaning from the 
interview and documentation data, this research also relied on the research questions, 
theoretical frameworks and the subsequent hypotheses as guides or contexts to help 
explain the findings.  
 “Pattern matching” through explanation building helps one to establish the link 
between the data collected and the derived hypotheses (Campbell 1969). This aids one in 
connecting the research questions to the emergent conclusions. Pattern matching entails a 
comparison of the findings (patterns) from each case against the hypotheses derived from 
the theory (Yin 2003; Yin 2009). By using NVIVO, one is able to achieve this through 
the creation of relationship nodes in which the data collected, is linked to the derived 
hypotheses. The link is essentially achieved by storing evidence supporting the 
hypotheses articulated by the relationship nodes (shown in Table 10 below). 
One advantage of using NVIVO is that, it allows the researcher to generate 
relationship nodes, which are nodes or labels that define a symmetrical, one way or 
associative link between two parent or child nodes (e.g., government funding and 
constraints).  Together with the triangulation techniques, it is at this phase that hypothesis 
testing for this research took place. To code for relationships between the tree nodes, 
including the child nodes, I looked for indicators from within the individual baskets 
(shown in Figure 4) for evidence to support the hypotheses in this research. In other 
words, evidence supporting these hypotheses is coded at the relationship nodes (Bazeley 
2007) and this evidence is pooled mainly from the interview data.   
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For example, in order to test the hypothesis, “High dependence on government 
funding as the primary source of revenue and support is likely to result in less 
INGO autonomy,” I first created a relationship node or basket for this hypothesis with 
respect to each of the emergent autonomy dimensions. As a result, I ended up with sub-
hypotheses where government funding influenced managerial and operational autonomy 
in particular directions or where USG funding influenced INGOs‟ operational autonomy 
through ex post constraints. I labeled one such relationship node Government Funding is 
associated with high Interventional Constraints. Table 10 below shows additional 
hypotheses tested in this research. As a result, all evidence supporting this hypothesis was 
packaged within this node. Some of the indicators supporting this hypothesis include 
statements like,  
The results-based framework that the USG has and the various regulations 
that they have can be arduous. (VP of International Programs, ALPHA) 
 
The bad thing about the Department of State is that they are very 
centralized…. they rely very heavily on the reporting and the indicators 
because they don‟t have any field presence and they are only going to go 
out once a year to check on your project and that one time a year, they are 
going to try and figure out, did you do what you said you were going to 
do. (Director of Competitive Bids, BETA) 
 
The A133 Audit which is conducted every year – this looks only at those 
projects that meet a certain threshold in terms of funding and checks for 
contractual compliance (with USG regulations). The process is very 
rigorous and tends to be very specific in that at times evidence of reports 
submitted, as well as, the reception of that report is required by these 
external auditors. (Program Director, ALPHA) 
 
Well, the compliance issues, they have become more onerous as time goes 
on; they require more every year, it‟s getting to be you spend more time 
complying with things than you do actually doing things sometimes. 
USDA compliance has increased. (Program Coordinator, SIGMA)  
 
And then they will do a direct costing where they will pick out 3 or 4 of 
our projects and really scrutinize them in a detailed manner, they go out to 
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the field and look at detailed expense reports and individual vouchers and 
things like that… (Director of Institutional Funding, ALPHA) 
 
 
To facilitate the methodological triangulation process, this research relied on a 
review of documents such as the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR 22), the USAID‟s 
Automated Directives System, Acquisition and Assistance Chapter 303 (ADS 303) and 
BETA‟s grant, contract and cooperative agreement, including the mandatory standard 
provisions attached to them. As a result, anytime indicators in the relationship nodes 
converged with or were supported by indicators from any one of these documents, a 
hypothesis was assumed to have been supported. In the case of the sub-hypothesis 
pertaining to influence of interventional constraints, supporting data came from a review 
of the ADS Chapter 591 document on the financial audits requirements for USG funding 
recipients, as well as Sections 226.50 – 226.52 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 
The above illustrates that this analysis paid close attention to the strategies and 
tactics employed by each funding source in order to understand the mechanisms through 
which autonomy is undermined. By so doing, I was able to understand the conditions 
under which autonomy is undermined. For instance, in the context of managerial 
autonomy with respect to financial management, ex ante requirements can impinge upon 
an NGO‟s managerial autonomy, as well as operational autonomy. Commenting on an 
INGO‟s ability to make budgetary changes between different line items, one participant 
pointed out that, 
If you have a valid reason, particularly and again if you go to them before 
hand and say, things have changed since the proposal was developed, we 
want to move some of this money to another activity and you have a good 
reason, they will allow it and you can do that. They don‟t like it when you 
do that on your own and afterwards you say, we have made these changes. 
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This also gives us an indication of how budgetary approvals act as ex ante 
constraints on an INGO‟s decision making. In this case, an INGO would need to seek a 
priori approval by providing justifications for budgetary shifts before any changes can be 
made. This is confirmed in Section 226.25 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as well as 
the funding tools obtained from BETA. Such approval requirements could result in major 
delays on implementation thus reducing the timeliness of a response. Indicators such as 
these provided this research with key information that helped clarify how INGO 
autonomy could leak as a result of such ex ante and mid-course budgetary requirements. 
Therefore Table 10 (below) shows examples of hypotheses or relationships nodes 
generated from this research. The table also shows the number of participants from which 
statements were coded as evidence supporting these relationships or hypotheses nodes. 
These counts are also shown by INGO. Again, source refers to the number of interviews 
the evidence was coded from, while references shows a count of each indicator, phrase or 
word coded for each relationship node. As such the numbers listed under the heading 
sources and references suggests that data from 9 participants interviewed indicated that 
coercive tools diminish their INGO‟s operational autonomy. Evidence in support of this 
was coded 22 times from 3 participants from ALPHA, 2 participants from SIGMA and 4 
participants from BETA. All these participants were qualified to talk about this 
relationship given their experience with government funding. 
Also shown in Table 10 is that, 16 out of 19 participants in this study associated 
government funding with high ex post controls. Evidence to support this relationship was 
coded at least 77 times from all 8 participants from BETA, 6 participants from ALPHA 
and both participants from SIGMA. Also shown is that 13 participants talked about the 
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degree to which restrictive tools diminish INGOs operational autonomy at 33 different 
occasions. There was also strong evidence (a total of 17 participants) to suggest that 
government funding weakened INGOs‟ operational autonomy – that is, the extent to 
which INGOs can make independent decisions about processes, procedures, policy 
instruments, target groups and outcomes. 
 
Table 10: Relationship Nodes and Hypotheses Testing 



















17 44 8 7 2 Contract; 
Cooperative 
Agreement (CA); 




13 27 6 5 2 Contract; CA; 
CFR 22; ADS 303 
 
CONSTRAINTS ON INGOs’ ACTUAL DECISION MAKING COMPETENCIES 
Government Funding is 
associated with High Ex Ante 
Controls 
16 77 6 8 2 Contract; Grant; 
Agreement (CA); 
CFR 22; ADS 
303; ADS 591 
Government Funding is 
associated with high Ex Post 
Controls (Interventional) 
16 59 7 7 2 Contract; Grant; 
Agreements; CFR 
22; ADS 303; 591 
 
TOOL CHOICE  
Coercive Tools diminish 
Operational Autonomy 
9 22 3 4 2 Contract; Grant; 
CA; CFR 22; 
ADS 302 & 303 
Restrictive Tools diminish 
Operational Autonomy 
13 33 5 6 2 Contract; Grant; 
CA; CFR 22; 
ADS 302 & 303 
Direct Tools diminish INGO‟s 
Operational autonomy 
9 20 4 3 2 Contract; Grant; 
CA; CFR 22; 
ADS 302 & 303 
 
OTHER FUNDING SOURCES 
Foundation Funding is 
associated with High Ex Ante 
Controls 
2 9 1 1 0  
Foundation (large)  Funding 
diminishes Operational 
Autonomy 
3 8 2 1 0  
Corporations constrain NGO 
Autonomy through Ex Ante 
Controls 
2 4 6 8 2  
Individual Contributions 
enhance Operational Autonomy 




Bear in mind however that this distribution includes only the majority of the data 
coded up until theoretical saturation was achieved. Grounded theory suggests that one 
ceases to code for a particular concept once one reaches a point of theoretical saturation 
where additional coding would not yield anything new about the concept (Strauss and 
Corbin 1998). It is therefore probable that continued coding could have yielded more 
references or evidence to in support of these hypotheses. Note also that the last column in 
Table 10 shows the documents containing evidence to confirm these findings. 
 
4.4.1     Memos, Annotations and Queries 
 
Also instrumental in elucidating some of the nuances associated with the analysis, 
and the link between the data collected and the hypotheses derived from the theoretical 
frameworks were, the “memos” and “annotations” I kept during open and axial coding 
stages. Memos are records of one‟s thoughts and observations generated during the 
analysis, while annotations are texts that are linked to selected interview content similar 
to scribbles on the margins of a text (QSR 2008a; 2008b). Yet another key advantage of 
using NVIVO is that it allows one to keep such memos, and annotations by linking each 
one to specific interviews, in the case of memos and to specific sentences or words, in the 
case of annotations. As a result, the memos and annotations represent some of my 
judgments about the data. 
I found it easier to use annotations to record my thoughts and observations since I 
could do this for each sentence or phrase I found insightful in explaining the relationship 
between funding and INGO autonomy from the interview data and documents (though 
done manually).  Both procedures were instrumental in providing me with space to record 
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my reflections on the data, as well as space to clarify some of the nuances associated with 
the analysis. The following example is an annotation highlighting my reflection of a 
statement made by BETA‟s Director of Humanitarian Assistance; 
Director of Humanitarian Assistance: A grant that is somehow amended 
to also meet some of the donor requirements…. therefore it does affect 
how we implement it on the ground because we need to comply with the 
grant regulations… It may be the case that certain objectives may have 
been amended to reflect some specific requirement that made sense for us 
to implement anyway.  
 
Annotation: In a sense this does support the hypothesis that the tools 
matter, for different tools are managed differently. As with a grant, it is 
amended (through some form of negotiation whose power dynamics lean 
heavily on the donor/funder side I presume) before it is accepted and 
implemented. So there is a clear compromise and that there is definite 
variation based on each tool as to how much is compromised.....tools also 
seem to influence INGO operations/implementation in situ…. What 
process does negotiation take? How long does it take to get things 
amended; how does that influence operational autonomy? 
 
 
Such annotations helped me trace my initial observations and impressions for all 
key phrases and insights encountered during the line-by-line analysis of open coding.   
To further help with the data interpretation, I also took advantage of another one 
of NVIVO‟s useful features of queries. This process allowed me to ask questions about 
my data across all nodes, all interviews and even across selected cases, in order to 
investigate and confirm patterns, as well as track and test some ideas (QSR 2008).  
For example, in trying to confirm the relationship between funding tools and 
INGO autonomy, I conducted a text search for the word “contracts.” NVIVO highlighted 
every time the word “contracts” was used. By so doing, I was able to understand under 
what contexts and conditions the term was used and what was uttered pertaining to 
contracts. I was also able to identify when comparisons were made between contracts and 
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other tools. The query function also allowed me to restrict my text search to the context 
of autonomy. Doing this also helped me construct the tables and continuums showing the 
relationships between the funding tools and the autonomy dimensions (also see Appendix 
4). I conducted similar searches for grants and cooperative agreements and for each of the 
funding sources to confirm these relationships, as well as identify alternative 
explanations.  
Apart from showing how a researcher conducted his or her analysis, another 
challenge associated with qualitative research is how to present the findings from that 
analysis. I chose to illustrate the findings in the form of impact continuums, in order to 
illustrate the degree to which government funding for instance, impacts autonomy, 
relative to other funding sources. In a sense, the continuums are designed to emphasize 
the direction of the relationship between funding and autonomy. The position or 
placement of the funding source (or tool) suggests the magnitude of the impact of that 
funding source (or tool), relative to other funding sources (or tools), with respect to a 
given autonomy dimension.  
As shown in Appendix 4, it is important to emphasize that the decision to place a 
particular funding source or tool on a certain point on the continuum, relative to others, 
was also informed by various statements derived from the data. As such, I relied on the 
indicators within the nodes to guide and inform the construction of the impact 
continuums. For example, I found phrases the following phrases or indicators 
instrumental in placing different funding sources on the impact continuums;  
So when we work with the Lorner Dowen* Foundation (*pseudonym), or 
when we work with any of our large foundations, it‟s our health expert 
talking to their health expert about the programs. And so compare that to a 
corporation where with a corporation you might be working with a head of 
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a foundation, but the corporation doesn‟t understand our work as much – 
there is this huge educational background, just really educating them about 
the work that we do. (Deputy Director of External Relations, BETA) 
 
USAID is the worst as far as the independent audits and what we are 
having to do to comply with them, but they are also are single largest 
donor so we don‟t have any choice.  (Acting CFO, BETA) 
 
Oh, no, foundations are the highest (referring to compliance demands); I 
would say the government is the highest, then foundations, then 




4.4.2    Rival Hypotheses 
 
In order to verify the findings, thus strengthening their interpretation, this research 
also searched for rival theories that could be used to explain the findings. For instance, 
the study explored why ALPHA‟ Board Chair did not consider USG funding to be 
“restrictive” per se, but “demanding.” In her words, she thought government funding was 
“demanding” as opposed to “restrictive” since, 
You are not doing anything you didn‟t say you are going to do in your 
grant relationship. It does require the operational arm or part of the 
organization to do things that it had or has not done before taking USAID 
money. But I don‟t call that restrictive; that‟s just the expectations and the 
demands of that funding source. 
 
 
By further exploring this and other negative hypotheses, and also using the 
constant comparison model, I was able to establish strong evidence grounded in the data 
(Miles and Huberman 1994; Rossman and Rallis 2003) to support the degree to which 
USG funding compared to other funding sources can be considered as demanding and 
restrictive. In effect, packed in her statement is evidence to indicate the existence of both 
ex ante and ex post requirements that INGOs have to comply with. The rival hypotheses 
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identified in this research however, served to facilitate a deeper understanding of the 
relationship between funding and autonomy by allowing an exploration of the different 
insights and nuances surrounding this relationship.  
In addition, further clarification of hypotheses was conducted during the data 
collection and follow up process. For instance, in trying to understand the relationship 
between funding tools and autonomy, this study explicitly and repeatedly asked 
participants to expound on their experience with different funding tools in subsequent 
interviews. Additional questions were emailed to Government Grants and Contracts staff 
for further clarification. This analysis found strong corroboration across participants in all 
three INGOs to suggest that different funding tools do confine INGOs‟ decision making 
in varying degrees. 
 
4.4.3   Tautological Challenges Emanating from the Data Analysis Process 
 
As shown in the first chapter, Verhoest, Peters et al. (2004) draw a distinction 
between autonomy as the level of decision making capacity an organization actually 
possesses, and “autonomy as constraints on the actual use of the decision making 
competencies”  – that is, “referring to the structural, financial, legal and interventional 
constraints on an agency‟s decision making competencies” (Verschuere 2007).  While the 
original design was to treat resource dependence‟s discretion measures such as rules to 
regulate resource ownership, allocation and use, as types of autonomy.  The constant-
comparison technique employed in this analysis unearthed serious tautological issues 
emanating from conceptualizing autonomy as constraints that impede organization‟s 
actual use of decision making competencies. Such a characterization made it very 
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difficult to separate the variables that influence organizational autonomy from the 
autonomy variables themselves.  
For example, with respect to Verhoest, Peters et al. (2004) characterization of 
interventional autonomy as the extent to which an organization is free from ex post 
monitoring and reporting requirements; a review of the interview data documents 
revealed that participants discussed such ex post factors in terms of conditions or 
mechanisms through which their ability to make autonomous decisions is weakened, and 
not as a type of autonomy in and of itself. This strongly suggested that constraints on 
organizational autonomy, whether channeled through structural or legal means, need to 
be regarded strictly as factors that contribute to an organization‟s loss of autonomy.   
To counter this problem, this research shifted Verhoest, Peters et al.‟s (2004) 
second conceptualization of autonomy as financial, structural, legal and interventional 
constraints from the dependent to the independent side of this research‟s conceptual 
model (shown in Figure 5 below), thus framing these as concepts describing the 
mechanisms through which autonomy is undermined. As a result, and consistent with the 
need to regard the concept of autonomy as a latent variable, this research treats the 
financial, structural, legal and interventional constraints as intervening variables since in 
essence, they describe mechanisms by which organizations decisions and activities are 






Figure 5: Comprehensive Variable Model 
 
Therefore, Figure 5 represents the concepts where the conceptual model and the 
variable model (Table 8) align. This model suggests that autonomy needs to be strictly 
regarded as the condition of possessing actual decision making competencies or capacity 
to make independent operational and managerial decisions. Such a conceptualization may 
help prevent the tautological challenges of having constraints on both sides of a causal 
relationship, a problem this study encountered. In this way, one is able to identify and 
separate the sources of control from an organization‟s actual decision making 
competencies.   
In summary, this research recommends a reframing of Verhoest, Peters et al.‟s 
(2004) conceptualization of organizational autonomy as a pre-emptive move against 
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that undermine an organization‟s decision making competencies (autonomy) therefore, 
need to be regarded as types of intervening variables or mechanisms through which an 
organization‟s ability to make independent decisions is undermined. As such, from a 
quasi-experiment sense, constraints would be viewed as a type of treatment. 
 
4.5   Validity and Reliability Issues 
 
To conclude this chapter, the following section outlines the techniques used to test 
the comfirmability of the findings in this research. A general challenge with qualitative 
interviews is that they have limited ability to guarantee reliable measures. Like any 
research design, employing the case study approach requires that one not only explicitly 
address concerns about consistency or reliability, but also about internal and external 
validity. Several quality control techniques were used to improve the quality of the 
design, the data and the findings.  
 
4.5.1   Consistency 
 
First, the logic of theoretical replication technique noted in this research, was 
instrumental in setting up the research design in such a way that it would allow for case 
comparison and hence facilitating theory testing across the different cases (Yin 2003; Yin 
2009). And o increase the reliability or consistency of the data collection methods, this 
research employed an interview guide in order to focus and direct the conversations on 
the influence of funding on INGO autonomy. By so doing, participants across all three 
INGOs were asked the same questions. And since the literature has treated the concept of 
organizational autonomy in an ambiguous, one-dimensional fashion, this research was 
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able to adapt the Verhoest, Peters, et al.‟s (2004) measures and the Leuven Institute‟s 
measures of organizational autonomy in an effort to understand the concept within 
context of a nonprofit sector environment.   
While this approach helped improve the construct validity and reliability of the 
measures utilized in this study, the approach was not without its challenges as seen with 
the tautological concerns encountered. Arising from these challenges however, was an 
opportunity to advance alternative ways of conceptualizing autonomy. As a result of 
having autonomy constraints on both sides of the causal model, this research was thus 
able to evaluate the compatibility of Verhoest, Peters et al.‟s (2004) characterization of 
autonomy when used in conjunction with other theoretical frameworks like resource 
dependence and tool choice.  
Therefore, he findings from this research suggest that the present characterization 
of autonomy as both decision making competencies and constraints, creates model 
specification problems. And if we are to understand the nuances of organizational 
autonomy, it may be pre-emptive to be very clear about separating the concept of 
organizational autonomy as the possession of actual decision making competencies, from 
the mechanisms that constrain those decision making competencies; thus establishing the 
premise that one leads to the other. 
And apart from relying on source and method triangulation techniques, I also 
maintained a coding trail with recordings of the decision rules made during the coding 






4.5.2    Internal Validity 
 
According to Miles and Huberman (1994), internal validity is a question about the 
“truth value,” that is, “whether we have an authentic portrait of what we were looking at,” 
and whether the findings are credible to the people studied. Various techniques can be 
used to check for the internal consistency of the findings and these include the methods 
of triangulation, rival hypotheses check and member checking (Miles and Huberman 
1994; Yin 2003; Yin 2009). 
First, this research‟s reliance on multiple sources of evidence permitted 
triangulation by method. As such, finding convergence among the interview data and 
several documents collected from the INGOs, as well as the USAID and USG websites, 
helped improve the internal validity of the findings. In addition, the pattern-matching 
technique, through explanation building was also instrumental in establishing links 
between the data and the hypotheses by searching for patterns or common themes within 
and across cases (Campbell 1969; Yin 2003).  
The literature also suggests that researchers identify and address rival hypotheses 
in an effort to verify the credibility of the findings (Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 2003; 
Yin 2009). As pointed out above, the rival hypotheses identified in this research, served 
to facilitate a deeper understanding of the relationship between funding and autonomy by 
allowing an exploration of the different insights and nuances surrounding this 
relationship. 
A final technique used to verify the internal validity of the study, thus establishing 
the credibility of the findings, involved sharing the findings with at least one participant 
from each of the cases. Findings from the within-case and cross-case analyses, the 
 137 
strategies and the conclusions, were emailed to participants for their review. Follow up 
conversations took place via email and telephone once participants had completed their 
reviews. At least one participant from BETA and ALPHA was able to ascertain the 
plausibility and accuracy of the findings.  
 
4.5.3   External Validity 
 
In quantitative research, external validity refers to the generalizability of the 
findings to the population under study. In Yin‟s (2003; 2009) view, the external validity 
of qualitative research can be achieved in terms of making analytical generalizations of 
the findings to broader hypotheses or propositions. In this case, the findings in this 
research can be generalized to the broader government funding-INGO autonomy 
discourse or the hypotheses tested in this research.  
With regards to making generalizations about the population of INGOs however, 
given that these cases represent single INGOs, care need to be taken in making 
generalizations about the findings to the INGO population. That being said, the logic of 
literal replication employed in this study ensured that the three cases were pulled from the 
same organizational environment, that is, direct relief and development INGOs. This 
logic can also provide us with a strong basis for making generalizations about the 
population of direct relief and development INGOs, but only those INGOs that are 









5.1       Introduction  
 
This chapter compares the within-case findings to the resource dependence 
hypotheses presented in Chapter 3 to illustrate the nature of the relationship between 
government funding and INGO autonomy across different dimensions. The findings for 
each of the cases are preceded by a description of the financial profile of the INGO. As 
indicated in Chapter 3, the three INGOs in this study vary in their dependence on USG 
funding. The profiles also show revenue pictures that vary across different government 
funding tools. Below is a brief description of some of the USAID implementing or 
funding tools used to transfer money to the three INGOs, and how each one operates.  
P.L. 480 Donated Food: The Public Law (480) food aid was signed into law by 
President Eisenhower, under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 
1954. This is also known as Food for Peace supporting programs generally designed to 
combat hunger and malnutrition, as well as promote sustainable development. P.L. 480 
comprises three sections; Title I consists of government-to-government sales of 
agricultural commodities; this is administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
Title II (or Monetization) and III are administered by USAID. While the former consists 
of food donations by the USG to meet humanitarian food needs in foreign countries, the 
latter meets government-to-government grants in support of long-term economic 
development in developing countries.  
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USAID Freight: This is a program that provides competitive grants for INGOs 
registered with the USAID to ship humanitarian assistance-related goods overseas. 
INGOs are reimbursed for costs associated with the transportation of donated 
commodities. 
P.L. 480 Freight: This refers to the funding associated with the transportation 
element of the food aid under USAID contracts. 
USAID Grants: These are defined as legal instruments used “where the principal 
purpose is the transfer of money, property, services or anything of value to the recipient 
in order to accomplish a public purpose of support or stimulation authorized by Federal 
statute and where substantial involvement by USAID is not anticipated” (USAID 
Glossary). Unlike cooperative agreements, grants recipients have substantial freedom to 
pursue their stated programs (USAID 2005). 
USAID Contracts: These are defined as “mutually binding legal instrument(s) in 
which the principal purpose is the acquisition, by purchase, lease, or barter, of property or 
services for the direct benefit or use of the Federal government, or in the case of a host 
country contract, the host government agency is a principal, signatory party to the 
instrument” (USAID Glossary). Contracts are used for funding “activities or programs 
over which the USAID intends to exercise a substantial amount of operational control,” 
that is, “day-to-day oversight of the implementation of the program and exercise 
technical direction” (USAID 2005).  
Other USG Grants and Contracts: These are similar to USAID grants and 
contracts except these are administered by other USG agencies other than the USAID 
(e.g., Department of Agriculture). 
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5.2 CASE #1: ALPHA RELIEF AGENCY (ALPHA) 
 
Established in 1937 with the mission to help support children and their families in 
the area of health and education, in developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Central and 
South America, ALPHA is part of a federation of national member organizations. Apart 
from providing technical assistance in operating country offices (COs), ALPHA‟s main 
function involves assisting COs with fundraising. 
While the organization receives less 10 percent of its funding from the US 
government (USG), more than 80 percent of its total revenue comes from contributions 
through child and family sponsorships. As shown in Table 12 below, ALPHA received 
95 percent of its total revenue from private contributions and revenue in FY2005; and 91 
percent in FY2006. In an explicit effort to diversity its revenue sources, ALPHA is just 
beginning to invest in foundation and corporate funding solicitations.  
As indicated above, USG government funding also varies by funding tool. In the 
case of ALPHA, its share of USG funding comprises, grants from the USAID and other 
USG agencies such as the Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Department of 
State. Table 11 below, shows that ALPHA has a strong preference for USG grants 
compared to contracts; all of its USG support is channeled through grants. In other words, 
in light of ALPHA‟s experience with managing USG grants, such experiences could be 
viewed as an indication of the extent to which the organization utilizes an existing 
administrative structure for managing grants. Therefore, they may have to create a new 
apparatus for contract management.  This may explain their strong preference for and 
ease with grants rather than contracts. Bear in mind however that the USAID financial 
data does not separate USG grants from cooperative agreements; as a result, one is not 
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able to discern how much of ALPHA‟s funding is channeled through cooperative 
agreements, which involve significant government participation. 
 
Table 11: ALPHA'S Revenue Sources (FY1997 - 2006) 










USAID Freight $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
P.L. 480 Freight $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
P.L. 480 Donated Food $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
USAID Grants $1,304,674 $2,190,322 $3,448,518 $1,946,174 $3,274,838 
USAID Contracts $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Other USG Grants $0 $0 $183,792 $0 $0 
Other USG Contracts $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Total USG Support $1,304,674 $2,190,322 $3,632,310 $1,946,174 $3,274,838 
      
By Mechanism, combined      
USG Grants 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
USG Contracts 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 





Other Gov't. & International 






In-Kind Contributions $0 $560,806 $0 $0 $0 
Private Contributions $28,554,842 $40,256,360 $29,940,231 $34,818,032 $33,462,713 
Private Revenue $1,297,052 $0 $879,997 $1,193,853 $1,597,880 






TOTAL SUPPORT & 
REVENUE $32,805,846 $43,007,488 $34,452,538 $37,958,059 $38,335,431 
% USG Support 4% 5% 11% 5% 9% 
% Other Gov't Support 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 





I interviewed nine participants from ALPHA, and these included the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO), the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Director of International 
Programs, Director of Grants and Contracts Compliance; a Foundations liaison, Program 
Director; and the Director of Institutional Funding. And from the Board of Directors, I 
interviewed the Chairman and Treasurer of the Board of Directors. Six out of the nine 
 142 
interviews were conducted in person in their Washington DC office, the rest were 
conducted over the telephone. 
 
5.3 FINDINGS  
5.3.1 Resource Importance  
 
Hypothesis 1: High dependence on government funding as the primary source of 
revenue and support is likely to result in less INGO autonomy 
Since USG funding constitutes less than 10 percent of ALPHA‟s total revenue 
support, the findings suggest that the INGO retains most of its autonomy with respect to 
financial autonomy. This is because the participants do not regard USG funding to be of 
critical importance to the organization. For instance, while participants recognized USG 
as a credible funding source (especially, the CEO and the Director of Institutional 
Funding), the CFO, Director of International Programs, Board Chair, Program Director 
and Treasurer of the Board, all emphasized the importance and dependence of ALPHA 
on sponsorship, more so than USG funding.  As a result, should the organization fail to 
receive any government support; only 10 percent of the organization‟s programs would 
be negatively affected – assuming that no replacement funding is found. The inverse of 
this is that 90 percent of the programs that are funding through individual contributions 
would remain operational. This organization therefore can survive without government 
funding. As ALPHA‟s Treasurer pointed out, 
Unlike some INGOs, we have a steady stream of revenue from 
sponsorship dollars; we are not wholly dependent upon USAID in what 




This suggests that the INGO is not as vulnerable to shifts in USG foreign policy 
priorities.  However, there is also recognition of the efficacy of government funding, in 
terms of improving an INGO‟s capacity to increase its programs. The following 
statement illuminates this. 
Government funding is growing. As an organization…for a long time, 
sponsorship was the bread and butter full stop. Government funding - we 
really didn‟t need it… we want(ed) it under the conditions that it met 
certain criteria we had, (that) we were in the driving seat. We decided that 
if the government did not want to do it our way, we won‟t take it. More 
and more we have opened up to government funding in the sense that we 
realized that there are potentials of reaching more children in country if we 
take government funding. So we are taking government funding to 
supplement our funding within the context of the program design 
elaborated by the country. (Program Director) 
 
In spite of this new outlook toward government funding, ALPHA still maintains a 
guarded approach to dependence on USG funding. The statement below illuminates some 
of this anxiety, thus strongly suggesting that there may be some truth to the hypothesis 
that a high dependence on government funding yields lower levels of autonomy to an 
INGO. Illuminating this pervasive anxiety toward a high dependence on USG funding, 
especially with regard to financial autonomy is a statement from ALPHA‟s CFO. 
The only limitation that they (Board of Directors) put is… at least, under 
our current rules – they don‟t want to see institutional funding (USG 
funding) be more than half of our total funding, without them talking 
about it. They still want us to be known as a sponsorship organization 
where we have a lot of funding still (coming) from individual families and 
people in the U.S. who are supporting our cause. They feel that they don‟t 
want to become too dependent on the federal government because some 
organizations do that and then you have a turn in the economy or the 
administration changes, and they reduce the funding of the USAID and all 





This guarded view seems to stem from the fact that in spite of the 10 percent share 
of USG support, ALPHA as an organization is not entirely shielded from the spillover 
influence of USG funding. The interview and documentation data indicate that the 
organization still faces influence and control through the USG mid-course and ex post 
reporting requirements to the extent that they have set up a formal Grants and Contracts 
Compliance Unit as a buffer to solely deal and manage the constraints and compliance 
demands associated with USG funding. For example 7 out of the 9 participants from 
ALPHA associated USG funding with high interventional controls, while 6 participants 
associated it with high ex ante controls and influence.  
In addition, the USAID‟s ADS 303 and 591, as well as the CFR 22 – all 
emphasize the requirements for INGOs‟ ex post accountability. While the interventional 
(and ex ante) controls apply to the funded programs; it appears that USG funding has 
helped reshape ALPHA‟s organizational structure by compelling the INGO to set up a 
department in response to ex ante and ex post demands and expectations. Compared to 
individual contributions therefore, government funding restrictions and requirements 
remain more arduous even for an organization that receives less that 10 percent of its 
funding from the USG.  
In terms of the influence of USG funding on ALPHA‟s operational autonomy, the 
preceding discussion suggests that government funding weakens the INGO‟s operational 
autonomy relatively more than individual contributions. In this case, USG funding 
undermines ALPHA‟s operational autonomy more; however, this only applies to the 
INGO‟s capacity to make decisions concerning those programs supported by the 10 
percent share of USG grants and cooperative agreements.  
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ALPHA‟s Vice President for International Programs paints the autonomy picture 
very well in the following statement, as he commented on the efficacy of resource 
diversity and autonomy loss in the face of high dependence on government funding in 
general. 
You would be very aware that if 70 or more percent of that came from a 
particular government (or the USG), that you had a potential risk on your 
hands, because if that government where to fall out with the government 
of the country in which you are working, you could lose all your funding 
and indeed the other side of it, you are more prone to have difficulties in 
being independent in your particular views and direction. 
 
 
This comment suggests that government funding lowers any INGO‟s autonomy 
with respect to operational autonomy by influencing the particular views and directions 
an INGO takes. As shown in Table 10, 8 out of 9 participants from ALPHA gave 
indication to suggest that the USG as a funding source, imposes limitations on the 
INGO‟s operational autonomy. These limitations come about through a number of 
strategies ranging from program ownership, where an INGO can and cannot operate with 
USG funding, and through centralized resource ownership and control. The following 
statements illustrate some of the mechanisms.  
A long time ago USAID stopped implementing its own projects, so the 
INGOs stepped in… we really are implementing USAID projects, whether 
people like to admit it or not, there are USAID projects. (Director of 
Grants and Contracts Compliance) 
 
…like Myanmar for instance… we can‟t use USG money (CEO) 
 
You have to wait for them (USG) to give you the funding availability, they 
give you a grant for $18 million, but they don‟t authorize all that money 
upfront, so you don‟t have access to it upfront. They have incremental 
funding –so there is a lot of technical things that some people prefer not to 




And according to Section 226.25 (b) of the Code of Federal Regulations, INGO 
“recipients are required to report deviations from budget and program plans, and request 
prior approval for budget and program plan revisions.” The requirement for prior consent 
suggests that INGOs cannot make budget or program decisions independent of USG 
funding agencies. Sub-section 1 of that code calls for INGOs to seek consent for any 
changes in the scope or program objective or any deviations to the program as a whole, 
even if there are no budget revisions associated with the changes. “Prior approval” 
suggests the presence of ex ante rules and requirement and it is defined as “written 
approval by an authorized (USG funding agency) official evidencing prior consent.”  
ALPHA‟s operational autonomy is also limited through the USAID‟s substantial 
involvement in the administration and implementation of programs funded through 
cooperative agreements, as will be shown in Chapter 6. Again, this is with respect to 
those programs that are funded through the 10 percent share of USG funding, thus 
demarcating the sphere of USG funding influence on ALPHA‟s overall programming and 
managerial decisions.  
 
Hypothesis 2: High dependence on any one dominant funding source is likely to 
result in limited INGO autonomy  
Similar to the above, a high dependence on any one funding sources would be 
expected to yield less autonomy to an INGO. This is not the case with ALPHA due to the 
nature of its funding source. In the past 4 years, over 90 percent of the organization‟s 
revenues came from individual contributions and private revenues, of which, for FY2006, 
almost 85 percent of that is unrestricted. The absence of restrictions on these funds render 
 147 
the organization highly autonomous in contrast to the 10 percent share of USG funding 
which is laden with all sorts of restrictions, rules and regulations. The following 
statements reflect the general level of autonomy that the share of individual contributions 
yields. 
We are happy that we have the flexibility that the sponsorship funding 
provides. (Board Chair)  
 
Unrestricted funding provides INGOs with the resources they need to 
accomplish what is near and dear to their hearts, (that is), to fully fulfill 
their missions and visions by implementing those objectives that are 
important to the INGO. (Program Director) 
 
 
While there is cognizance of the dangers of being heavily dependent on individual 
contributions, especially in light of the current economic crisis, the efficacy of this 
funding source in affording ALPHA its operational and managerial remains clear in the 
Program Director‟s mind; 
We are going to limit the influence of outside funding, outside funding 
besides sponsorship, so that the focus, the program decisions remain 
within the control of ALPHA which is supported by sponsorship because 
it is unrestricted (nature), we can use it as we, quote and quote, see fit, as 
long as we keep the sponsor in the loop of what we are doing. 
 
Therefore, while unrestricted dollars yield high levels of operational and 
managerial autonomy, it does however come with some ex post requirements, that is, 
ALPHA is expected to account for how it spends this money by “keeping the sponsor in 
the loop” of what ALPHA is doing. And while this view was also corroborated by 
ALPHA‟s CEO, Treasurer of the Board, Program Director and VP of International 
Programs; there was also agreement that the ex post demands attached to individual 
contributions are not nearly as onerous as those associated with USG funding.  
 148 
5.3.2 Resource Alternatives 
 
Hypothesis 3: INGOs maximize their autonomy or minimize their external 
dependence and control through revenue diversification.  
The analysis of the interview data and a review of ALPHA‟s strategic plan reveal 
evidence to suggest strong recognition and support for revenue diversification. As shown 
in Table 8 (in Chapter 4), 6 out of the 9 staff members (the VP of International Programs, 
CFO, CEO; Director of Institutional Funding, Program Director, and Treasurer of the 
Board) specifically addressed the issue of revenue diversification as a financial risk 
reduction strategy. The main objective for this strategy is to improve the INGO‟s 
financial stability by relying on more than one funding source. And this is in spite of the 
organization‟s high share of unrestricted funding coming through individual 
contributions. As ALPHA‟s CFO observed;  
We‟ve had some involvement with corporations but again, it is still limited 
probably to 5 percent of our total revenue per year. But there is certainly a 
heavy reliance upon private support from individual donors and sponsors. 
And although we are trying to grow that, it is still that group of people, as 
opposed to institutions of some kind – you know government, or 
corporations or foundations – all those people who are providing the 
primary support to ALPHA. And without a diversification of that into 
some areas… we may become too dependent on individuals – when you 
get into an economy like we are in now. So we have for FY2008, which 
we are just getting audited now, I would say probably 65 percent of our 
total revenue is coming from individuals. 
 
 
While recognizing the high level of autonomy unrestricted funds yield to ALPHA, 
the Board Chair also illuminates the INGO‟s need to diversify its revenue streams. 
We are happy that we have the flexibility that the sponsorship funding 
provides, we want management to raise more money from corporation, not 
(just) sponsorship… We want management to be raising more money from 
more sources; just general diversification. 
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The above demonstrates ALPHA‟s views towards the effectiveness of revenue 
diversification as a strategy for reducing the INGO‟s dependence on sponsorships. 
Clearly, this is a strategy that is inherent in the INGO‟s long-range planning.   
 
 
Hypothesis 4: Compared to other funding sources, government is more likely to 
minimize INGO autonomy by restricting access to alternative resources. 
This research finds that apart from self-censoring by INGOs, the USG imposes 
what could be described as “harmless” policy level restrictions on INGOs‟ access to 
alternative resources. This research considers these harmless since the alternative 
resources may not be of great significance to the organization. Examples of such 
restrictions provided by at least 5 participants from ALPHA include The Fly America 
Act, which restricts INGOs‟ access to perhaps cheaper non-U.S. carriers when traveling 
on program related business.  
Another explicit government restriction on INGOs‟ access to alternative resources 
is the prohibition of transactions with terrorist groups, under the Executive Order on 
Terrorism Financing of February 2002. According to the Special Contract Requirements 
issued by USG funding agencies and the Mandatory Standard Provisions for U.S. Non-
Governmental Recipients (attached to the grant, cooperative agreement and contract 
reviewed in this research) INGO recipients are “prohibited from transactions with, and 
the provision of resources and support to, individuals and organizations associated with 
terrorism.” However, a potential danger with this particular rule is that due to limitations 
imposed by information asymmetry and bounded rationality on the part of INGOs, it may 
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be difficult for them to ensure complete compliance with this rule given the difficulties of 
distinguishing terrorist-funded organization from those that are not.  
The findings show that ALPHA, similar to BETA, imposes self-censoring 
measure codified in corporate engagement guidelines as a strategy for discerning which 
corporate funders to solicit or accept funding from. For instance, given ALPHA‟s focus 
on children, the organization will not accept funding from corporate funders that have a 
reputation for practicing child labor. Other basic restrictions preclude accepting money 
for programs that lie outside the organization‟s expertise.  
To summarize, the findings shown above suggest that within ALPHA, 
government has substantial influence and control, but only over those activities funded by 
the 10 percent share of USG funding. As a result, USG influence and control may not 
necessarily extend beyond the USG-funded program.  
There is also indication to suggest that even though ALPHA is the smallest 
recipient of USG funding in this research, the INGO may face transaction costs that could 
have larger than anticipated spillover effects on the organization as a whole. This 
primarily stems from what participants have described as “arduous” USG accountability 
demands. For example, the USG audit and reporting requirements have compelled the 
INGO to establish a formal Grants and Contracts Compliance Unit just to cope with USG 
funding compliance and ex post requirements. It could therefore be argued that USG 
funding has reshaped ALPHA‟s organizational structure by compelling the INGO to add 
more units – potentially resulting in an increased bureaucratization of the INGO. 
Second, recipients of USG funding are required to demonstrate strong financial 
structures and that is before they can receive USG funding. In this regard, it could also be 
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argued that USG funding indirectly influences the organization as a whole given that the 
funding decisions USG make are made not only on the basis of an INGO‟s prior 
experience with USG funding, but on an evaluation of the INGO as a whole.  
According to the USAID‟s ADS Chapter 303: Grants and Cooperative 
Agreements to Non-governmental organizations document, while an organization‟s past 
performance on previous awards can be used as an indicator of the INGO‟s capacity to 
handle grants, this history does not guarantee or improve an INGO‟s chances of an 
award. Any “changes in personnel, accounting practices, or in an organization‟s financial 
status may affect its performance on a new award” (USAID 2009b). Bear in mind also 
that USG funding is incremental in that recipients do not receive the entire amount of the 
award all at once. As such, INGOs‟ decisions pertaining to the rest of its non-USG 
funded programs may influence how it is perceived by the USG funder. 
The above also gives indication of the presence of positive externalities 
emanating from an association with USG funding. The above suggest that INGOs 
receiving USG funding may actually be getting increasingly professionalized given that 
the organizations are required to maintain good business integrity in order to continue 
receiving USG funding. And while the compulsory A133 Audit may be arduous, it also 
provides INGOs with opportunities to improve their internal controls, as well as self-
evaluate. Eight out of the nine participants from ALPHA supported the above assertions. 
Table 8 (in Chapter 4) also shows that, all participants from BETA and from SIGMA 




5.4 CASE #2: BETA ASSISTANCE INTERNATIONAL (BETA) 
 
BETA is an INGO whose mission encompasses the implementation of relief and 
development programs in over 60 countries across the globe. BETA is the largest of the 
three INGOs in terms of total revenue, as well as the second oldest. Similar to ALPHA, 
BETA is also part of a federation; and the INGO also assist country offices in fundraising 
for their programs. BETA provides technical assistance and expertise, specifically in the 
area of water and sanitation, basic education, emergency response. The organization also 
has a Humanitarian Assistance Team that is activated in the event of emergencies. 
 
Table 12: BETA's Revenue Sources (FY1997 - 2006) 










USAID Freight $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  
P.L. 480 Freight $29,028,000  $27,409,000  $17,838,611  $14,428,000  $24,203,276 
P.L. 480 Donated Food $73,558,000  $51,823,000  $85,669,561  $35,813,000  $57,923,645 
USAID Grants $96,564,000  $135,167,000  $190,708,809  $151,777,000  $170,896,342 
USAID Contracts $228,000  $147,000  $367,385  ($11,000) $490,267 
Other USG Grants $3,383,000  $19,093,000  $18,680,696  $19,031,000  $13,640,264 
Other USG Contracts $233,000  $0  $0  ($11,000) $0 
Total USG Support $202,994,000  $233,639,000  $313,265,062  $221,027,000  $267,153,794 
      
By Mechanism, combined      
USG Grants 49.2% 
 
66.0% 66.8% 77.3% 69.1% 
USG Contracts 0.23% 0.06% 0.12% -0.01% 0.18% 
P.L. 480 Donated Food 





Other Gov't. & International 






In-Kind Contributions $7,760,000  $7,683,000  $1,074,000  $2,846,000  $4,263,000 
Private Contributions $52,486,000  $73,650,000  $97,637,560  $188,818,000  $139,651,759 
Private Revenue $7,517,000  $6,952,000  $30,547,000  $6,850,000  $8,855,000 






TOTAL SUPPORT & 
REVENUE $359,373,000  $427,778,000  $597,698,000  $624,356,000  $655,481,553 
% USG Support 56% 55% 52% 35% 41% 
% Other Gov't Support 25% 25% 26% 33% 36% 




Table12 above shows that BETA‟s largest share of revenue comes from the USG, 
and it comes largely through USAID Grants and other USG Grants (e.g., Departure of 
State and the Department of Agriculture). In total, USG funding consisted of 55 percent 
(in FY2002); 52 percent (in FY2004); dropped to 35 percent in (FY2005) and went up to 
41 percent (in FY2006). The table also shows that similar to ALPHA, the distribution of 
BETA‟s USG funding across funding tools suggests a strong preference for grants and 
cooperative agreements over contracts, with an average of almost 70 percent of its share 
of USG funding channeled through grants and cooperative agreements, compared to 0.09 
percent channeled through contracts.  
 
Staff Interviewed: 
As noted above, 8 participants were interviewed from BETA. These include the 
Director for Competitive Bids (a USG funding specialty staff member), Director of 
Humanitarian Assistance; the Acting Chief Financial Officer (CFO), an Internal Auditor, 
the Deputy Director of External Relations (a corporate, foundations and individual 
funding specialty staff member), the Vice President (VP) of Global Support, the Director 
of Food Programs, and the Secretary of the Board. 6 out of the 8 interviews were 
conducted through face-to-face interviews. 
Note that 7 out of the 8 participants interviewed from BETA had experience 
dealing with USG funding in some capacity. These include the Directors of Competitive 
Bids, Humanitarian Assistance, and Food Programs; the VP of Global Support, Acting 
CFO and the Secretary of the Board. As a result, these participants were able to speak on 
a number of issues surrounding USG funding. 
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5.5 FINDINGS 
5.5.1 Resource Importance  
 
Hypothesis 1: High dependence on government funding as the primary source of 
revenue and support is likely to result in less INGO autonomy 
The findings suggest that USG funding undermines BETA‟s autonomy with 
respect to operational and managerial autonomy. As shown in Table 10, all 7 participants 
from BETA experienced with USG funding agreed that it limits the INGO‟s operational 
autonomy. As with ALPHA, additional evidence to corroborate this is found in Section 
226.25 (b) of the CFR, which highlights that INGO “recipients are required to report 
deviations from budget and program plans, and request prior approval for budget and 
program plan revisions.” This suggests that for BETA‟s 50 percent of the programs that 
are funded through the USG, decisions pertaining to these have to be made in 
consultation with and the approval of the USG funding agencies. And according to its 
Secretary of the Board, BETA‟s share of USG funding suggests that the organization‟s 
financial budget (size) and programs would be reduced by almost half should the INGO 
decide to walk away from USG funding. Commenting on the criticality and importance 
of USG funding to BETA, she confessed that a loss of USG funding, 
would certainly cut our revenue in about half right now. And so instead of 
being a $600 million plus organization; we would be a $300 million dollar 
plus organization.  
 
 
This suggests that BETA is not financial autonomous as a result of this high 
dependence on the USG to provide almost 50 percent of the INGO‟s total revenue and 
support. Such dependence also threatens BETA‟s operational autonomy through 
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differences in policy objectives. The following statement from the VP of Global Support 
elucidates this threat – a view also shared by the Internal Auditor. 
The USG has started putting in some of their solicitations that if we win 
the bid, we have to be promoting the US foreign policy overseas and we 
will not go after those type of contracts because we don‟t want to be seen 
as an arm with the USG – so our independence and our impartiality are 
key to all that; we don‟t want to accept any money that jeopardizes our 
impartiality and our independence. 
 
 
And as long as differences in policy objectives and ideology exist between the 
USG and INGOs, owing to the power of the purse, BETA‟s operational autonomy, i.e., 
the INGO‟s ability to make independent decisions about programs, program theories, 
how to implement them, target groups and outcomes, remains under threat as illustrated 
in the following statement from the Secretary of the Board. 
We have some different point of views particularly in the best ways to 
prevent HIV/AIDS. And so it is important for us to have other funding 
sources and that the USG not have a dominant role in our funding, so that 
we can also do things that perhaps may be the administration doesn‟t favor 
but we would be allowed to do with other funding sources. 
 
 
Speaking on the same concern, the Director of Humanitarian Assistance added 
that, 
donors, in particular, governments have specific policy interests that they 
want to pursue and we need to be conscious about those. 
 
 
Portraying the types of compromises INGOs like BETA are having to confront, 
thus further weakening the INGO‟s operational autonomy, the Director elaborates, 
It‟s hard to some extent, at times we respond to solicitations that will 




There is also evidence to suggest that the USG influences and controls BETA‟s 
decision making through interventional controls. Similar to ALPHA, the decisions the 
INGO makes today can be controlled through accountability requirements that take place 
mid-course and post-program implementation. The relationship nodes (shown in Table 10 
in Chapter 4) show that 7 out of 8 participants from the INGO expressed their discomfort 
with the high ex post monitoring and reporting requirements associated with USG 
funding. Such ex post controls can be both financial and nonfinancial in nature (e.g., 
A133). Speaking on BETA‟s response to the high accountability demands, the following 
statements articulate some of the reasons behind the INGO‟s decision to hire more staff 
members and to formalize the Grants Compliance Unit.  
What we have realized is that we‟ve got to get (more) people – I think for 
a long time with the audits being so easy in the past, you didn‟t have to 
have very technical people in your accounting, you just needed to get it in 
there and get it right; but now it‟s got to be classified, (and) categorized. 
Reporting – now… is so technically complicated that we had to brush it up 
with the caliber of people doing it in-country and then brush it up with the 
caliber of people supporting that (to consolidate the INGO‟s financial 
reporting). So we are getting it in place and we are headed the right way, 
and hiring a Grants Compliance Unit is going to be huge, huge! Because 
all of the entities, private donors, government donors – they are all getting 
more difficult. (Acting CFO) 
 
The setting up of a new Compliance Unit is in response to the onerous 
government regulations and the stricter enforcement of the regulations; I 
don‟t think the regulations necessarily have changed that much over the 
years, but I think the enforcement has become stricter and therefore we‟ve 
been caught up. (VP of Global Support) 
 
 
These statements also suggest that USG funding has impacted the organization‟s 
managerial autonomy with respect to human resources by indirectly influencing the 
expertise the INGO needs to hire, in order to ensure accurate reporting and compliance 
with USG funding. This influence is also achieved through the USG‟s substantial 
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involvement in the selection of key personnel for the implementation of a funded 
government cooperative agreement and contracts.  
Well, usually the USG would prefer to hire someone who knows their 
system, at least one member of the team. And, usually that is the chief of 
party or the sub-grants manager… I mean it‟s a fairly complex 
bureaucracy and so they prefer someone who has been through it, who 
understands the ropes, rather than someone who doesn‟t. (Competitive 
Bids Director) 
 
They don‟t dictate who we hire – for key personnel, particularly for a 
contract, they do have approval over that; they do have to agree to that, so 
yeah – with any big award. It is usually – chief of party or something at 
that level needs to get the approval of the USG. (VP of Global Support) 
 
These statements reveal the nuances through which BETA‟s decision making is 
influences by way of ex ante rules, requirements and approvals. For instance, in order to 
receive USG funding, key program staff members have to meet USG approval. Any 
additional changes to the key personnel also require USG approval and consent; however 
this only pertains to the funded program. It is through these mechanisms that BETA‟s 
operational and managerial decisions are substantially influenced and controlled, that is, 
to the extent that they abide by government‟s rules and regulations and the reporting 
requirements attached to funding.  
While the above illustrates the mechanisms by which USG funding agencies exert 
influence and control on INGOs, it is important to highlight that similar to ALPHA, 
BETA can also exercise its operational autonomy during the proposal development stage. 
This influence is achieved through the designing of the programs in response to funding 
announcement, albeit along the stipulated confines of the funding guidelines of the award 
agreements, as well as other supporting documents like the ADS Chapter 303 governing 
Grants and Cooperative Agreements to INGOs, ADS Chapter 591, which contains 
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guidelines for Financial Audits of USAID Contractors, Recipients, and Host Government 
Entities, and the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR 22). These guidelines explain why 
INGOs like BETA and ALPHA have set up Compliance Units – just to be able to keep 
up with USG funding rules, regulations and requirements. 
For instance, INGOs including BETA are required to “relate financial data to 
performance data and develop unit cost information.” In addition, INGO recipients shall 
provide “written procedures for determining the reasonableness, allocability and 
allowability of costs in accordance with the provisions of the applicable Federal cost 
principles and the terms and conditions of the award” (CFR 226.21 (b) (6)). This shows 
that INGOs‟ decisions pertaining to resource allocation and use are highly controlled. 
However, as BETA‟s Director of Humanitarian Assistance pointed out, INGOs do 
have a choice in the funding announcements they respond to, and hence the projects they 
engage in. And according to the VP of Global support, the more restricted the grants are, 
the less interested they are. Furthermore, after an INGO has received a letter of award, 
that opens up yet another opportunity for the INGO to negotiate the terms of a funding 
agreement.  
And finally, according to the USAID‟s ADS Chapter 591, as a condition for 
receiving USG funding, INGOs are expected to demonstrate organization-level 
“reasonable” systems of internal controls, which include “segregation of duties, handling 
cash, contracting procedures, and personnel and travel personnel” (USAID 2009). This 
suggests that USG funding can positively influence INGOs‟ internal systems even before 
an award is received, suggesting increased levels of professionalism on the part of USG-
funded INGOs.  
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Based on the data analysis, 18 out of 19 participants interviewed across all three 
INGOs indicated that an exchange relationship with the USG can result in some positive 
externalities in the form of improved professionalism of INGOs (shown in Table 8 in 
Chapter 4). Participant partially attributed this improvement to the ex post monitoring 
and reporting requirements associated with USG funding. Of the 18 participants, all 8 
participants from BETA agreed that their interaction with USG funding has resulted in 
positive spillover effects on the INGO‟s professionalism.   
 
Hypothesis 2: High dependence on any one dominant funding source is likely to 
result in limited INGO autonomy  
With respect to BETA, there is no evidence to support this hypothesis. However 
BETA‟s financial profile shows a growing share of revenue support from other 
governments and international organizations. For example, Table 12 shows that in 
FY2002, other governments and international organizations provided 25 percent of 
BETA‟s revenue and support; this number increased to 26 percent in FY2004; 33 percent 
in FY2005 and 36 percent in FY2006. The literature suggests that compared to USG 
funding, Scandinavian governments for instance are viewed as being less exacting, thus 
granting more autonomy to INGOs. As a result, further research in needed to investigate 






5.5.2 Resource Alternatives 
 
Hypothesis 3: INGOs maximize their autonomy or minimize their external 
dependence and control through revenue diversification.  
The findings in this analysis support this hypothesis. Table 8 (shown in Chapter 4) 
shows that 5 out of the 8 participants interview expressed how BETA has been trying to 
improve the INGO‟s independence from any one funding source through the strategy of 
revenue diversification. And highlighted in the INGO‟s Strategic Plan, while USG 
government remains the largest single donor, its decline in the last few years is indicative 
of the INGO‟s steady progress towards the goal of diversifying its funding sources.  
Note that BETA‟s total revenues are the least concentrated of the three cases. In 
some ways, its diversification in terms of relying on other funding sources such as 
foundations, corporations, and other governments and international organizations may 
have resulted in improvements on BETA‟s operational autonomy. The Secretary of the 
Board and the Director of Competitive Bids highlight the benefits of BETA‟s aggressive 
revenue diversification strategy in the following statements.  
(Referring to USG funding), there has been more restrictions over the 
years and that‟s another reason for trying to diversify funding… we also 
saw that it was important for us to diversify our funding sources and 
primarily when you talk about independence and making sure that the 
organization stays autonomous – you know…. depending on the 
administration; we have some different point of views, particularly in the 
best ways to prevent HIV/AIDS. And so it is important for us to have 
other funding sources and that the USG not have a dominant role in our 
funding, so that we can also do things that perhaps may be the 
administration doesn‟t favor but we would be allowed to do with other 
funding sources. (Board Secretary) 
 
We have actually been trying to diversify away from the USG funding for 
probably the past 7 years and have been doing so successfully, because we 
felt it was too large. We didn‟t have a diversified portfolio and for risk 
management it just seemed not to be the wisest thing to do. So we have 
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reached out to U.S. professional foundations, like Lorner Dowen and 
Leasten foundations and we have reached out to other sources of revenue 
– just private individual fundraising and we are going to look to continue 
to do that, to continue to expand sources of funding other than the USG. 
(Director of Competitive Bids)  
 
Clearly, BETA draws a positive link between the operational autonomy necessary 
to fully achieve one‟s mission and vision and revenue diversification.  As a result, 
revenue diversification is not only regarded as a strategy for militating against donor 
influence, but also a way of raising less restricted or less exacting funding in order to be 
operationally autonomous. This is also reflected in the following statements.  
If you look at BETA‟s dependence on USG over the year, it is down from 
70 percent to about 45 percent nowadays. So we realized that to some 
extent we needed to diversify our portfolio of funding; that is a fact. In 
order to achieve our mission and vision we needed to diversify our 
funding, not because the donor influenced what we did so much, but the 
fact that there were restricted projects that they didn‟t allow us to achieve 
the full potential of our programs. (Director of Humanitarian Assistance) 
 
The less dictated those grants and contracts are the better – so that we can 
use our approaches. But certainly there has been more restrictions over the 




Although revenue diversification results in a reduced dependence on a single 
dominant funding source, the strategy also increases INGOs‟ extra-organizational 
influence and control by relying on multiple funding elements in the funding 
environment. Consequently, the accountability demands or interventional controls on 
BETA also increase as a result of having multiple funding sources. Instead of reporting to 
one funder, BETA now reports to multiple funding sources, all of which may ask 
different things. Overall, the findings suggest that revenue diversification is associated 
with high levels of operational autonomy.   
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Hypothesis 4: Compared to other funding sources, government is more likely to 
minimize INGO autonomy by restricting access to alternative resources. 
Similar to ALPHA, the findings suggest that the only explicit and largely 
harmless government restrictions on INGOs‟ access to alternative funding include the 
travel and transportation restrictions imposed by the Fly America Act; the USG‟s 
Executive Order on Terrorism Financing; and the Eligibility Rules for Goods and 
Services of 1998. A review of the interview data shows that 6 out of 7 participants with 
experience with USG funding expressed annoyance with these ex ante rules and 
regulations.  
According to the USG‟s Standard Provisions for U.S. Non-governmental 
Recipients, The Fly America Act restricts BETA from accessing cheaper travel and 
shipment alternatives for their personnel and the shipment of aid-related materials and 
supplies. However, this Act only applies when U.S. flagged options are available. As 
BETA‟s Internal Auditor pointed out, irrespective of cost, INGOs are required to travel in 
U.S. carriers if available, as well as transport aid-related goods using U.S. carriers, even 
if the carrier is twice the cost.  
In addition, unlike corporate and foundation funding, the Eligibility Rules for 
Goods and Services restrict INGOs‟ access to cheaper goods and services (e.g., motor 
vehicles, equipment, materials and supplies) if they are not of U.S. origin. According to 
these Eligibility Rules, unless the items to be purchased are of U.S. source or origin, and 
the items have been incorporated into the program description, prior procurement 
approval is required from the USG funding source. Yet another USG funding rule is the 
Executive Order on Terrorism Financing which “prohibits transactions with, and the 
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provision of resources and support to, individuals and organizations associated with 
terrorism.”  
The only other restrictions on access to alternative resources are those INGOs 
place upon themselves due to conflict of interest and ethical concerns. Similar to 
ALPHA, BETA‟s corporate fundraising strategy is governed by its corporate funding 
guidelines which clearly outline a number of red flags to watch out for when seeking 
after corporate funds. For instance, following a major natural disaster in Asia, BETA 
declined unsolicited funds provided by a weapons manufacturing company on the basis 
of conflicts of interest.  
The above demonstrates that USG funding comes with inherent restrictions 
attached and such restrictions create a highly controlled environment within which 
INGOs operate, that is, as long as they receive USG funding and want to continue to do 
so. However, as shown in the case of ALPHA, INGOs have the choice of responding to 
funding announcements in the full knowledge of these inherent restrictions. This 
indicates that INGOs like BETA can exercise their autonomy by strategically choosing 
less restrictive funding opportunities. This suggests that funding agreements vary in their 
level of control and influence, thus implying that INGO either resigns or retain some 
measure of operational and managerial autonomy just by choosing between different 
funding opportunities.  
As the VP of Global Support, and the Directors of Competitive Bids, Food 
Programs and Humanitarian Assistance pointed out, BETA is still able to exercise some 
of its operational autonomy and managerial autonomy especially with respect to financial 
management during the proposal response and program design phases. Note also that, 
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similar to ALPHA, once BETA as won the awarded, the INGO can exercise some 
influence or “flexibility” during the negotiation phase, that is, by negotiating the terms of 
an award before the final funding agreement is signed. As the Director of Food Programs 
noted,  
With Title II Programs… like any grantee, you can try and push the 
envelope a bit, but at some point, you can‟t go over the line. So I wouldn‟t 
call it necessarily autonomy as much as flexibility and I think we have had 
a fair amount of flexibility as programs have been evolving 
 
 
The Director of Competitive Bids explicates the process in the following 
statement. 
Normally what happens is, you submit your proposal, you win the award 
and then you go into the implementation phase, and with USAID, 
typically, within the first 3 months of the implementation, you have to 
have your detailed implementation plan – so that initial period is where 
you reach out, you really make sure that you have all your partners, 
beneficiary communities, and usually you have the initial 6 months – I 
think, to do your M&E framework. So then you can get everybody 
involved (on the grantee side), so you can have it in a very participatory 
process – these are the things we are going to track and that whole 
process. BETA pretty much acts independently during this phase and then 




Inherent in this statement, is that, while an INGO can exercise some autonomy in 
devising program plans, that autonomy can essentially be „veto‟ by the USG funding 
agency as it retains the right to approves or declines the INGO‟s operational decisions. 
This implies that, sometimes INGOs may get their way and at times they may not, 
suggesting some measure of randomness in the process. The Director of Competitive 
Bids expounds on this and some of the challenges that emanate from this negotiation 
phase in the following statement. 
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The USAID has a standard book of indicators, you have to have certain 
indicators that align with those indicators and then you are free to propose 
additional ones on your own. Usually the donor presses for more 
information and we resist because the information comes at a cost. The 
donor always wants you to track everything, from every possible 
perspective, you know – segregate by gender, segregate by age, segregate 
by status, this and that status. Well, all that information, you know, getting 
that information has a cost, so there is usually some kind of back and forth 
there about that process. But that‟s the good thing about USAID. The bad 
thing is, it is a very formal design process and so it‟s a completely 
different kind of relationship.  
 
Now with the Department of State, they issue these calls, they are pretty 
narrowly focused – like they will say, we want you to work with refugee 
populations and we want you to address their needs vis-à-vis education 
and sometimes we look and we say well, we have already surveyed and 
we have done an assessment of this refugee population and their primary 
need is for latrine, not for education and so sometimes there is a little bit 
of back and forth there with the Department of State. 
 
 
Perhaps an alternative way of framing the discussion presented here is that once 
an INGO agrees to the ex ante funding requirements inherent in a funding agreement 
(e.g., the adoption of the USAID‟s indicators and the various ex ante rules and 
regulations) and the agreement is signed, it becomes legally binding. The INGO therefore 
held accountable to the a priori ex ante expectations through mid-course and ex post 
mechanisms such as quarterly and annual reports, direct monitoring, field audits, and the 
A133 Audit. As in the case with ALPHA, BETA‟s funded program decisions are thus 
controlled by results and performance, as well as the threat of sanctions (as indicated by 
Section 226.60 – 226.62 of the Code of Federal Regulations), should the INGO fail to 
comply with funding requirements and a priori set and agreed-upon expectations.  
While these statements indicate that INGOs do have opportunity to exercise their 
autonomy by designing the programs to be implemented, a review of Requests for 
Proposals and Agreements (RFAs or RFPs) show that the announcements provide INGOs 
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with a description of the desired program, as well as, the intended objectives of the 
programs. INGOs therefore make “autonomous” decisions within the parameters set by 
the RFAs, including the program requirements they must consider in order to be 
considered for the award. For example, an RFA for an Iran-based program on Civil 
Society and the Rule of Law outlined three program objectives INGOs had to choose 
from. This suggests that INGOs‟ decision making could be characterized as “guided” as 
opposed to being entirely autonomous. Alternatively, one could argue that INGOs 
exercise their autonomy in program design and implementation in consultation with the 
USG funding agencies.  
  
 
5.6 CASE #3: SIGMA RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT (SIGMA) 
 
Established in 1983, SIGMA is the youngest of the three INGOs. This INGO 
provides food, funds and medicines to impoverished communities; with the objective of 
improving their nutrition, health care, and education. With a small staff in the United 
States, SIGMA also has COs in a number of Central African countries, and in Eastern 
Europe. Similar to the other two INGOs, SIGMA also plays a significant fundraising role 
for COs. The INGOs also partners with local INGOs in developing countries to 
implement funded programs.  
Shown in Table 13 below, SIGMA‟s financial profile shows that unlike ALPHA, 
in the last five years at least, the INGO received over 95 percent of its funding from the 
USG and this share has been largely transferred through other USG grants and contracts 
such as, grants from the Department of Agriculture (USDA) rather than grants and 
contracts from the USAID.  Compared to ALPHA and BETA, SIGMA has the highest 
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share of USG funding. For instance, 97 percent of the organization‟s total revenue came 
from the USG in FY2004 and FY2005. These figures dropped to 94 percent in FY2006, 
with only 6 percent coming from private support, that is, from in-kind contributions; 
private contributions, and private revenue. The data however fails to provide any 
description of what private revenue consists.  
 
Table 13: SIGMA's Revenue Sources (FY1997 - 2006) 









   
USAID Freight $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
P.L. 480 Freight $679,494 $0 $7,801,532 $2,431,932 $5,832,679 
P.L. 480 Donated Food $1,551,750 $5,239,906 $150,565 $450,000 $323,250 
USAID Grants $0 $0 $50,000 $241,561 $190,000 
USAID Contracts $0 $0 $0 $0 $12,854,915 
Other USG Grants $198,522 $4,114,501 $25,122,253 $5,676,444 $7,732,861 
Other USG Contracts $0 $15,415,585 $0 $0 $0 
Total USG Support $2,429,766 $24,769,992 $33,124,350 $8,799,937 $26,933,705 
      
By Mechanism, combined      
USG Grants 8.2% 16.6% 76% 67.3% 29.4% 
USG Contracts 0 62.2% 0% 0% 47.7% 
P.L. 480 Donated Food 





Other Gov't. & International 






In-Kind Contributions $0 $0 $0 $144,233 $1,478,137 
Private Contributions $31,491 $30,928 $20,131 -$9,276 $101,735 
Private Revenue $11,597 $11,355 $166,239 $100,160 $31,910 






TOTAL SUPPORT & 
REVENUE $2,472,854 24,812,275 $34,296,559 $9,035,054 $28,693,501 
% USG Support 98% 100% 97% 97% 94% 
% Other Gov't Support 0% 0% 3% 0% 1% 
% Private Support 2% 0% 1% 3% 6% 
 
Of the total share of USG funding, approximately 77 percent came in the form of 
grants in FY2004 and 67 percent in FY2005. Table 13 also shows that, roughly, 62 
percent in FY2002 and 48 percent in FY2006 of the total USG funding came in the form 
of contracts. In light of the erratic shifts in the funding tools used and in sharp contrast to 
ALPHA and BETA, SIGMA‟s funding profile does not suggest the existence of an 
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explicit strategy or preference for contracts over grants or vice-versa. This may be an 
indication of an organization that is merely “following the money.”  It is also possible 
that the drop in SIGMA‟s dependence on contracts was a direct result of a disagreement 
the INGO had with the USDA in 2002, which resulted in a year suspension of the INGO. 
 
Staff Interviewed: 
SIGMA has the smallest US-based staff among the three INGOs, with four people 
listed on the organization‟s website, plus an onsite lawyer. Due to issues of 
confidentiality and attorney-client privilege, I was unable to acquire an interview with the 
lawyer. I was however able to obtain telephone interviews from the Chief Executive 
Officer, who is also the Chairman of the Board and the Program Coordinator, who is also 
the Treasurer of the Board of Directors. The CEO and the Program Coordinator are also 
responsible for overseeing the finances of the organization, including writing and 
reviewing proposals. 
 
5.7 FINDINGS  
5.7.1 Resource Importance  
 
Hypothesis 1: High dependence on government funding as the primary source of 
revenue and support is likely to result in less INGO autonomy 
Evidence from this analysis suggests that SIGMA is the least autonomous of the 
three INGOs in this research. This can be attributed to the INGO‟s heavy dependence on 
a more exacting and restrictive funding source, that is, USG funding. This is with respect 
to its financial, operational and managerial autonomy.  Recognizing the INGO‟s high 
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dependence on USG funding, both participants from SIGMA acknowledged the poor 
state of the INGO‟s financial dependence as shown in the following statements. 
We probably have a problem, we‟ve been trying to cut back on it, but 
that‟s were a lot of the money is. (Program Coordinator) 
 
We went too much into getting money from the government and I 
would… it‟s very difficult at this time to survive the way we are or 
anywhere near without government support. (CEO) 
 
While there is recognition of the potency of the USG as a valuable funding 
source, there is also recognition of the influence USG funding can have on the INGO‟s 
operational autonomy. The following statements by SIGMA‟s CEO suggests that the 
INGO‟s priorities take second place to those of government, especially when the INGO‟s 
priorities are incongruent with those of government. The statements also suggest that 
SIGMA‟s operational autonomy is also undermined as a result of the power and resource 
asymmetry between the INGO and its USG funding sources.  
Well let‟s say Peru – if you ask people in Peru in the rural areas what do 
they need and they say they need a clinic as a priority, but for you it would 
be very difficult to fund a clinic at that time than an agriculture project or 
something else. So very often PVOs or NGOs have to kind of fit in with 
the priorities of the donors (that is), the interventions of the donors, which 
is unfortunate… 
 
We were approached by the USDA to do USDA a favor and the favor was 
– there was a rice company in the U.S. that needed an INGO or PVO to 
sign a contract because they were not a PVO. So I was approached and 
asked, would we do them a favor in order to help this American firm to 
undertake a program in Africa and after considering it and after 
considering very many aspects of it, it sounded like a good project, and we 
knew the top people in USDA were interested in this as this organization 
or firm also had support from Congress by helping the USDA. And also 
the fact that they had funding promised – actually very strongly promised 
funding which in part came through from one of the big corporations – 
another corporation in the States working in that country. We decided to 
undertake the program and then we ran into a lot of interference from the 
USDA in trying to implement the program such as, you know this group - 
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firm has been (in action) for a long time and they know what they are 
doing, you signed the agreement, but hands off, let them do this. And in 
the long run we got penalized, the project fell apart – by suspending us for 
a year; we had to fight the suspension.  
 
 
Yet another limitation of USG funding is that it is usually earmarked for 
particular countries that are considered a priority to the USG, places where an INGO may 
not have existing presence or are not priorities for the INGO. In addition to this, the 
Standard Provisions of U.S. Non-governmental Recipients also show that, “unless 
otherwise approved by the USAID Agreement Officer (or other USG funding agency), 
funds will only be expended for assistance in countries eligible for assistance under the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, or under the acts appropriating funds for 
foreign assistance.”  
In light of SIGMA‟s high dependence on USG funding, such incongruence in 
priorities has the potential of weakening the financial viability of the INGO especially if 
the USG does not earmark funds for countries that are a priority to SIGMA or countries 
where SIGMA is not currently operating. Again, we see the influence of such as a 
situation on SIGMA‟s operational autonomy in the following statement by the CEO. 
If you look at the priority countries of USAID and USDA, they do have 
their priority countries and priority countries are usually the countries that 
are not as needy may be. I will give you an example, if you look at Africa, 
the USDA program is focused on countries such as Senegal, Mali or some 
needy countries such as Niger. But then you have Kenya (a less needy 
country) – you find that there is no USDA priority country listed… 
Central African Republic or the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(former Zaire) is not listed; but then if you look at the USAID list, you 
will find that the USAID list (is) even more limited because usually they 
give preference to countries where they have their own Aid Missions. So 
if you have an aid mission in Senegal, then Guinea Bissau is not a priority 
country – that‟s true with the USDA. We have a program in Guinea 
Bissau, but we got that program years ago when Guinea Bissau was on the 
list – they are still on the list for food education but for nothing else. So 
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there is less chance that you are going to get an agriculture program 
approved or something similar in rural development for Guinea Bissau 
than you are for Senegal. 
 
As a result, SIGMA‟s high dependence on USG funding poses threats to the 
longevity and sustainability of its programs due to changes in USG funding priorities. 
And while government funding provides critical resources to SIGMA, the funding comes 
at a cost to the INGO‟s operational autonomy due to the coercive nature of the funding 
tools or funding in general as illustrated in the following statement.   
When you do get the money though, within the plan that the USG 
approves, there are sections in there on how the money is going to be 
used; so if it‟s going to be for the development of food banks in the 
country, it‟s going to give a description of the food banks and their 
location and it‟s going to give a budget for the food banks, if it‟s cash for 
work, then it‟s going to do the same thing – provide a budget and a 
description of how it‟s going to be used. 
 
 
The above not only speaks to how USG funding tends to steer, direct and control 
INGOs in particular directions by use of ex ante rules and regulations governing resource 
allocation and input use.  
The statement also speaks to the specificity inherent in some of the USG funding 
instruments such as contracts and monetization (discussed in detail in Chapter 6). Note 
that a significant share of SIGMA‟s USG funding also comes through food aid 
(monetization). It appears that monetization was the organization‟s bread and butter in 
1997, with 92 percent of its total USG revenue support being channeled through food aid 
and freighting (shown in Table 13). The share however dropped to 21 percent in FY2002, 
12 percent in FY2004 and went up to 33 percent in FY2005 and then dropped to 23 
percent in FY2006. 
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And while INGOs request approvals to make budget or other changes to an 
existing funding agreement, the length it takes to get the approvals is long enough to 
negatively affect SIGMA‟s operations and hence the INGO‟s responsiveness. Note that 
the CFR 22 does not indicate the length of time it takes to get approvals from USG 
funding agencies. However, as shown with ALPHA and BETA, we do know that 
according to Code of Federal Regulations‟ Section 226.25 on Revision of Budget and 
Program Plans, INGOs are required to seek prior written approval from USG funding 
agencies before deviations can be implemented. This suggests that INGOs make project-
related decisions in consultation with the USG funding agencies and therefore, are not 
entirely autonomous entities. As the CEO indicated, one is able to,  
One is able to… make changes but you have to request an amendment and 
that can be quite lengthy, I mean, there are very often changes, for 
instance, (when) we sell USDA commodities overseas (a process called 
monetization) and particularly in Africa, we very often get more money 
than we originally proposed. And if you get more money, you have to 
have an amendment approved, which will allow you to spend the money 
where you desire to put it…, and the amendments can take 6 months, 
sometimes longer; they are very, very slow, with the USDA, very slow. 
 
 
Such delays can render INGO work less timely and inflexible, suggesting losses 
in its operational autonomy. By extension, an INGO might not only encounter difficult 
and challenging questions about its operational autonomy, but also its effectiveness and 
credibility.  
The findings also suggest similar to ALPHA and BETA, SIGMA is also 
influenced and controlled through interventional controls; more so for SIGMA given its 
heavy dependence on USG funding. As the CEO noted, 
You have reporting – I mean, we get reports here on a monthly basis from 
overseas; we report to the USG on that every 6 months. 
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According to Section 226.51 (b) of the Code of Federal Regulations, 
“performance reports will not be required more frequently than quarterly or, less 
frequently than annually.”  
SIGMA‟s Program Coordinator speaks on the burdensome nature of USG funding 
compliance requirements in the following statement. 
Compliance issues… have become more onerous as time goes on; they 
require more every year, it‟s getting to be you spending more time 
complying with things than you do actually spend doing other things 
sometimes. USDA compliance has increased… 
 
 
Participants across all three organizations, that is, those with USG funding 
experience, agree that the USG‟s monitoring, evaluation, reporting and compliance 
requirements tends to be arduous and very demanding to any INGO receiving USG 
funding. This suggests that with regard to USG interventional controls, an INGO‟s level 
of dependence on USG funding may not matter much. Perhaps the only exception is if the 
INGO‟s share of USG funding is channeled through contracts. Participants across all 
three INGOs considered the ex post reporting requirements associated with the contract 
funding mechanism to be highly controlled and demanding.   
 
 
Hypothesis 2: High dependence on any one dominant funding source is likely to 
result in limited INGO autonomy  
Since USG funding is the only dominant funding source for this INGO, this 






5.7.2 Resource Alternatives 
 
Hypothesis 3: INGOs maximize their autonomy or minimize their external 
dependence and control through revenue diversification.  
When asked if the INGO had any plans for revenue diversification, both the CEO 
and the Program Coordinator pointed out that this decision was to be discussed in an up 
and coming strategic planning meeting that was to take place in late December of 2008. 
Attempts to obtain this information and document proved unsuccessful.  
Nonetheless, an analysis of the interview data reveals evidence to support 
SIGMA‟s recognition of the need to diversify its revenue streams. This evidence gives 
credence to the perceived efficacy of revenue diversification as a strategy for minimizing 
an organization‟s external dependence. The following statement by the CEO illustrates 
the financial dilemma SIGMA faces should the INGO experience a decline or a cessation 
of government funding.  
The organization would be able to survive, but it would have to change its 
strategy somewhat to do more fundraising from the private sector. It‟s not 
easy to get money from the public and we went too much into getting 
money from the government and I would say the government – yeah – it‟s 
very difficult at this time to survive the way we are or anywhere near 
without government support. 
 
The only way SIGMA would be able to remain operational without USG funding 
is if alternative funding sources are secured. 
Note that SIGMA‟s revenue streams are diversified along USG funding tools that 
is, across USG grants, contracts and monetization, rather than along funding sources. As 
Foster and Fine (2007) pointed out, some nonprofits have grown big, not by seeking after 
diverse sources of funding as conventional wisdom would have it, but by going after a 
single type of funder such as corporations or government as SIGMA seems to have done.  
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However, most of the nonprofits the authors studied reported having restricted 
programs or operations as a result of their high dependence on a single dominant funding 
source – a portrait that appears to describe SIGMA‟s current operational autonomy. As a 
result, any shifts and instabilities in the USG funding environment will most likely 
become a source of financial vulnerability for the SIGMA. In other words, SIGMA‟s 
high dependence on USG funding has become its Achilles‟ heel.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Compared to other funding sources, government is more likely to 
minimize INGO autonomy by restricting access to alternative resources. 
Again, as illustrated in the case of ALPHA and BETA, this research shows that 
the only explicit government restrictions on INGOs‟ access to alternative funding include 
the Fly America Act, the Eligibility Rules for Goods and Services of April 1998, and the 
Executive Order on Terrorism Financing. More potent restricts are those the INGOs place 
upon themselves to ensure that the organization does not enter into exchange 
relationships that present conflicts of interest for the organization. As SIGMA‟s CEO 
observed, some funding may be provided purely for marketing purpose and not based on 
need.  
If you use corporations, you find that some of the corporations and also 
corporate foundations… want to provide money as subsidiaries. In other 
words, if they don‟t have contacts or activities going on in the Congo 
Republic than they do in Nigeria (for example), they are going (to fund 
you only for programs in) Nigeria… I could give you an example of the 
Congo Republic – Petroco (pseudonym) has funded some projects, but 
Petroco likes to see their little name on each desk or water project so that 
people know they have a corporate responsibility to the country. It‟s a 
marketing strategy – the USG does that too; we always try to put U.S. 




Unlike ALPHA and BETA whose financial dependence on the USG is low, 
SIGMA‟s high dependence on USG funding provides this research with an opportunity to 
observe the full extent of the USG‟s influence and control on an organization rather than 
a funded-program.  First, the INGO cannot survive in the absence of USG funding, unless 
alternative funding sources are secured. Second, in light of the high ex post or 
interventional constraints associated with USG funding, essentially all of SIGMA‟s 
decisions pertaining to managerial and operational matters have to undergo government 
scrutiny, during program implementation – by way of mid-course monitoring and 
reporting, and after program implementation – through ex post reporting. This includes 
field audits, and direct monitoring by the USG funding agency. These mechanisms enable 
USG funding agencies to maintain a tight grip on SIGMA‟s decisions and activities, thus 
grossly undermining the INGO‟s decision making capacity i.e., undermining SIGMA‟s 
organizational autonomy as opposed to its programmatic autonomy as we have seen in 
the case of ALPHA and BETA.  
 
5.8  INGOs Autonomy: The Impact of Foundations and Corporate Funding 
 
The preceding discussion has demonstrated that while INGOs have the freedom to 
exercise some of their autonomy or actual decision making competencies, they do 
exercise this within very confined or controlled environments. The environment is 
confined by virtue of the ex ante rules, regulations, the interventional constraints, and the 
USG‟s ability to „veto‟ INGOs‟ decisions by way approving or disapproving them. 
Perhaps, an alternative way of looking at this is that INGOs make “autonomous” 
decisions in consultation with the USG funding agencies.  
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In order to understand the degree to which USG funding influences and controls 
INGOs, thus usurping their potential for actual use of their decision making 
competencies, this section compares the USG as a funding source to foundations and 
corporations.  The findings are arranged by autonomy dimension, and they include a 
section focusing on some of the ex ante and ex post mechanisms employed by 
foundations and corporate funders.  
This research finds evidence to suggest that in contrast to government; 
foundations and corporations yield relatively more autonomy to INGOs across all 
dimensions as shown in Figure 6 below. However, this research also finds that both 
foundations and corporations operate like government in some respects, thus negatively 
impacting INGOs‟ autonomy dimensions to some degree.  And similar to government 
funding, the influence on INGOs‟ autonomy takes place through ex ante and ex post 
controls, particularly through budget controls and preferences, in the case of both 
foundations and corporations; and high monitoring and evaluation requirements, in the 
case of foundations.  
 












Fig 2: Degree of Interventional Constraints, by Source 
 
 














Fig4: Threat to Managerial Autonomy: HR Management 
 
Figure 6: Relationship between Funding and Autonomy, by Source 
 

















Figure 6 therefore illustrates the perceived impact of funding on INGOs‟ 
autonomy dimensions, by funding source. These figures were constructed based on 
participants‟ expressed experiences with each of the funding sources. While the 
researcher‟s judgment plays a role in selecting the point of placement for each of the 
funding sources relative to the others; the general direction and magnitude of the 
relationship was guided by various statements from participants across all three INGOs. 
Additional information on the construction of Figure 6, Figure 7 and Table 15 is provided 
in Appendix 4. 
 
Operational Autonomy 
The findings indicate that government constrains INGOs‟ operational autonomy 
by way of ex ante rules, preferences and requirements, as well as through ex post 
monitoring and reporting requirements. As a result, USG funding yields less operational 
autonomy to INGOs compared to other funding sources, that is, next to larger newer 
foundations and older foundations, respectively.  
And while foundations may promote innovation among INGO grantees, their 
approach to grantmaking also poses threats to INGOs‟ long-term development plans. As 
the foundations experts from ALPHA and BETA pointed out, foundations prefer to fund 
innovative and pilot projects as opposed to ongoing programs. At the same time, one 
could argue that the advantage with foundation grants is that they create an environment 
that fosters INGO innovation and perhaps, high operational autonomy since the pilot 
projects would originate entirely with the INGOs.  
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Similar to government, foundations also have a tendency to allocate funding to 
particular programs areas. In the words of ALPHA‟s Foundations Expert, these priority 
program areas change with “the trends and fashions of what they want to support.” 
Similar to funding pilot projects, allocating money for particular programs also poses 
challenges on INGOs long-term operations or agendas, especially if they are highly 
dependent on foundation grants. Also similar to government, foundations require INGOs 
to submit any budget variances of over 10 percent for approval prior to implementing the 
changes, suggesting a loss of operational autonomy for INGOs.  
Considering that foundations will not pay for certain items like the vehicles 
INGOs may need to implement funded projects, INGOs‟ resource allocation and use 
decisions are also influenced and controlled through the requirement that INGOs 
maintain minimum overhead costs. This compels INGOs to make budget decisions that 
respect these budget rules. According to the foundation experts from both ALPHA and 
BETA, where an overhead of 25 percent would be more realistic for INGOs, the Melinda 
and Gates Foundation prefers to fund an INGO with an overhead of about 15 percent, 
while the Ford Foundation is even more stringent in expecting a 5 percent overhead cost. 
ALPHA‟s foundations expert further elaborates on this in the following statement, 
In micro-financing projects, foundations have been pushing INGOs to 
lower their costs such that they serve more people with very little budget. 
This questions the quality of our work. Sometimes we can‟t do much of 
quality with very little… The Lorner Dowen* Foundation is mostly 
interested in achieving impact and cost effectiveness and sometimes the 




Moreover, some foundations engage their own program experts into dialogues 
with INGOs during the grant solicitation phase. For instance, according to BETA‟s 
Deputy Director of External Relations, 
From a foundations side … you are also working across the table with 
other program experts. So when we work with the Lorner Dowen 
Foundation, or when we work with any of our large foundations, it‟s our 
health expert talking to their health expert about the programs.  
 
 
While this process could be viewed as a filtering for screening out unsound 
programs and implementation plans, the inclusion of program experts in the process can 
also be regarded as a type of ex ante control mechanism. In this regard, the foundation 
program experts act as a mechanism for communicating and emphasizing donor 
preferences and priorities, thus steering, controlling, and directing INGOs‟ program 
designs and implementation plans to ensure that they incorporate those priorities.  
On the other hand, the chance to meet with other experts may be to the advantage 
of INGOs as this provides them with a forum to negotiate with the funders directly, 
unlike with USG funding where direct, one-on-one negotiation is limited. However, there 
is always the chance that INGOs‟ operational autonomy will be undermined as INGOs 
can no longer make decisions about programs and how those programs are to be 
implemented without the donor‟s approval. Again, such approvals or disapprovals can 
make a difference for INGOs in terms of whether they get an award or not. As a result, 
that may create an environment that has the potential to compel some INGOs to 
compromise on their values in order to win a funding award, thus securing the financial 
viability of their organizations.  
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While larger older foundations demand low overhead costs, they appear to be a 
little more flexible and therefore allow more negotiation with their grantees. The 
following statement by BETA‟s Deputy Director of External Relations elaborates on this.  
(The negotiation is characterized by) a lot of back and forth and with 
foundations – they approach you, you never approach them. A lot of the 
bigger foundations …don‟t take unsolicited proposals. With some of our 
foundations, we put a proposal together and then we pitch it to them, but 
with big newer foundations, especially the Lorner Dowen Foundation, 
since it‟s one of the largest foundation, they come to BETA and say, we 
want to help you guys increase your presence in U.S. advocacy, put a 
proposal together.  
 
 
This statement also reveals how foundations are able to retain control over 
INGOs‟ decisions by not taking unsolicited proposals. By approaching INGOs, 
foundations establish both a power and resource asymmetry over INGOs thus setting the 
tone in terms of what they would like an INGO to do. In this sense, the foundations‟ 
funding preferences, objectives, programming ideas and program theories are more or 
less defined a priori and therefore do not necessarily originate with the INGOs. Thus 
resembling USG contracting relationships, INGOs become mere implementers of 
foundations‟ programs or “contractors” on behalf of foundations.  
Nonetheless, INGOs are likely to retain some operational autonomy as they get to 
design the programs and implementation plans, albeit, in consultation with the funders. 
Similar to government therefore, these program designs and implementation plans must 
endure the review and approval process. It is through this process that operational 
autonomy is likely to be undermined.  In light of this, one wonders whether INGOs are 
regarded as the direct relief and development expert that they are or as mere 
implementers of funders‟ projects, thus undermining INGOs‟ uniqueness and potential. 
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And in response to the question of the degree to which larger newer foundations 
influence INGOs operational autonomy, BETA‟s Deputy Director of External Relations 
responded with the following statement, a view also shared by ALPHA‟s Foundations 
Expert.  
I think it‟s a huge percentage (that is, the extent to which the INGO is 
influenced), but I think that‟s why having a relationship with them (is 
important) so that they understand what we are doing. With private 
individuals, it‟s not that much, really it‟s more of BETA saying, these are 
our priorities and you know I understand you are interested in education. 
 
 
The findings also suggest that corporate funding is associated with high ex ante 
and ex post controls, but not as arduous as with the USG or foundations. As a result, the 
likelihood of weakening INGOs‟ operational autonomy is relatively weak. According to 
BETA‟s Deputy Director of External Relations, unlike foundations, which usually have 
program expertise on staff, corporation funding decisions are usually made by the CEO, 
and for the most part, such decisions are primarily focused on a desire to be seen as being 
socially responsible.  
The high ex post requirements could be attributed to a venture philanthropy 
approach, were corporations view their gifts as some sort of “investment” which is 
expected to yield some rate of return. As a result of this approach, INGOs may retain a 
lot of their operational autonomy, as they are likely to be regarded as the experts at what 
they do under this approach. However, they may not be entirely unexposed to the 
constraints emanating from the high ex ante budget controls which governing how funds 
are utilized, and the ex post control that requires INGOs to demonstrate evidence of the 
impact of the gift. BETA‟s Deputy Director of External Relations articulates this point in 
the following statement.  
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With a corporation you might be working with a head of a foundation, but 
the corporation doesn‟t understand our work as. There is this huge 
educational background, just really educating them about the work that we 
do and… the impact factors – how they may or may not be difficult to get 
based on the outline within the agreement for the funding.... We could not 
take the JWS‟* (pseudonym) money and use it to program something JWS 
hasn‟t told us – that‟s part of the proposal. It has a dedicated fund and 
therefore we report on how we spend that fund – we always go back to 
what was the intent of the proposal. 
 
The 10 million dollar gift we just got from JWS obviously has huge 
significant section that talks about outcomes. But a $10,000 donation to a 
country office (CO) might not have as significant type reporting and we 
really try to balance, I mean if you think about it, for a CO to receive a 
$10,000 gift, that‟s a lot of work to put on someone for a $10,000 gift….. 
Most of their rules and regulations (are concerned with) how we spend 
that funding; So they came up with a mutual proposal and it was - a lot of 
times it‟s the expectation of how we spend down the grant…. It‟s 
spending and impact – it‟s very much spending and impact in areas in 
which we work.  
 
 
The source of INGOs‟ operational autonomy therefore, comes about in that, while 
corporate funding is usually restricted to specific objectives, the objectives usually 
originate with the INGO. INGOs therefore propose what is assumed to be the best 
solutions to societal problems and corporations make investments based on the promise 
of success, hence the requirement to show impact. This may suggest that compared to 
foundations, corporate funder are more likely to regard INGOs as the experts at what they 
do; hence the high levels of operational autonomy associated with corporate funding. 
Overall, it appears that even in the face of high ex ante budget controls and ex post 
constraints, corporate funding is associated with higher INGO operational autonomy 
compared to both government funding and foundation grants. This conclusion is further 




Also shown in Figure 6 above, this research finds that unlike government funding, 
corporations and foundations do not seek to influence INGOs‟ hiring decisions for the 
funded programs. However, the findings do suggest a relatively high influence and 
control on INGOs‟ managerial autonomy with respect to financial management. Similar 
to government, INGOs are expected to demonstrate good business integrity characterized 
by reasonable internal controls, accounting, recordkeeping, procurement and overall 
financial management systems (USAID 2009).  As a result of these requirements and 
expectations, both foundations and corporations also impose relatively high ex ante 
budget rules and regulations on INGOs. Given the overhead cost rules identified above, 
foundations seem to want to keep a tight grip on how INGOs allocate and utilize the 
donated resources, by requiring that they submit financial reports every quarter, as well 
as annually. In addition, comprehensive financial reports are required at the close of the 
programs.  
And according to ALPHA‟s Foundations Expert, similar to government, 
foundations require that INGOs seek approval for budget deviations of more than 10 
percent prior to implementing those changes. As a result, it appears that foundations in 
particular are starting manage their grantee relationships quite like government, thus 
influencing and controlling INGOs decisions and activities through similar types of ex 





Ex Ante and Ex Post Constraints 
A key finding from this research is the relationship between accountability and ex 
post constraints on INGOs‟ autonomy. This analysis establishes that INGOs are not free 
from ex post reporting requirements, evaluations and audit provisions with respect to 
their decisions and outcomes. As a result, the analysis concludes that all funding sources, 
i.e., government, corporations and foundations, influence and control INGOs through 
interventional controls, though in varying degrees as suggested by Figure 6 above. All 
this is done in the name holding INGOs accountable. Table 14 below lists some of the 
controls mechanism funding sources employ to establish control over INGOs‟ decisions 
and activities, thus undermining their ability to make autonomous decisions. Also 
included in this section is a discussion of how foundation and corporate donors influences 
INGOs‟ decision making and activities through ex ante budget controls. 
While red tape is mostly associated with government funding, this study also 
finds evidence to suggest a prevalence of red tape within larger and especially newer 
foundations. As a result, both government and foundations appear to be using red tape as 
a control mechanism to keep INGOs in check by monitoring the decisions they make. 
Comparing USG funding to corporate funding, SIGMA‟s CEO had this to say – a view 
also shared by BETA‟s Deputy Director of External Relations; 
I can tell you --- business --- corporate funding…., we have had in some 
cases, just an exchange of letters, we‟ve had in other cases, a one-page 
contract, and other times maybe a 3-page, maybe 4-page contract. It‟s 
mixed, but it‟s really interesting because you don‟t have all the paperwork 
usually that you do with the government. (SIGMA‟s CEO) 
 
The following statements depict how INGOs have experienced foundation grants 
compared to government funding. The statements illuminate some discomfort INGOs 
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have had with the monitoring and evaluation requirements of foundations. They also 
illustrate that similar to government, foundations like to retain control over INGOs‟ 
budget, that is, on how INGOs allocate and use the provided inputs by use of budget rules 
and regulations. As a result, ex ante controls manifest in budget approvals and 
amendments, as well as the requirement that INGOs to provide evidence of how the 
provided funding was allocated and utilized.  
From a foundations side … it is like the blend of working with 
government and working with the private individual or corporation. 
(BETA‟s External Relations Deputy Director) 
 
 Some foundations are better than others. I have to say Lorner Dowen 
Foundation is awful – they have grown pretty rapidly; their new program 
officers sometimes don‟t even understand (their) own budget process. ... 
And they have very complicated budgets and budget rules and some of 
their program officers – some of the new ones, they start making up new 
rules that aren‟t right, but because they are very stubborn about it, it‟s not 
consistent across the organization. Also Lorner Dowen Foundation tends 
to keeping coming back over and over and over for revisions and really, it 
takes a very large amount of an organization‟s time – depending on the 
program officer. Some of them really micro-manage, others are fine.  
 
At BETA we used to call it “Lorner Dowen Torture,” because they keep 
coming back and wanting more and more. And all this is before they 
approve the proposal – it goes on sometimes for a year and a half – it‟s a 
very long time – it‟s a lot of staff time. Whereas an older foundation like, 
the Hannah Foundation; their proposals are pretty simple. (The younger 
foundations) are disorganized. And the Lorner Dowen Foundation system 
is really complicated, I mean, everybody wants a timeline and their 
timeline is linked up to the budget and that‟s linked up to the logframe and 
if you change one line item in the budget, you have to go and change all 
the other documents. If you adjust, it‟s real difficult. (ALPHA‟s new 
Foundations Expert, also a former employee of BETA) 
 
 
Next to government therefore, larger newer foundations in contrast to older 
foundations and corporations, appear to weaken INGOs‟ operational autonomy through 
controlling resource allocation and use. This influence also appears to be achieved by 
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weakening INGOs managerial autonomy with respect to financial management through 
ex ante budget rules and approval requirements. While all this is achieved through ex 
ante controls, ex post constraints have also been utilized to ensure continued compliance. 
Perhaps the reason this approach may work is that similar to government, foundations 
and corporate funders also exercise incremental funding on their INGO grantees.  
This research also finds evidence to suggest that unlike foundations and 
government funding, the absence of red tape and tedious paper work associated with 
corporate funding promotes or facilitates increased INGO operational autonomy. As 
SIGMA‟s CEO highlights,  
Grants are a little easier and especially if they are from the private sector 
(because) … there is more understanding of what goes on. For example, if 
you have two organizations funding the same project in the private sector, 
(both of them would) say just extend the program, add to it or so, with 
government, this is not possible. 
 
 
This suggests that most of the corporate rules and regulations are concerned with 
how INGOs spend the funds they provide (including having solid financial accountability 
and management systems), as well as the impact their gift made, with the latter 
suggesting the use of ex post controls (though not as arduous as USG or corporate 
funding ex post controls). The following statement by BETA‟s External Relations Deputy 
Director further elucidates this point further. 
A lot of times, it is the expectation of how we spend down the grant…, we 
report on how we spent the gift and impact… corporations are more 
restricted (compared to some foundations) because they have a bottom line 
shareholder – you know, they have to be ready to report back why they 




Apparent from these statements is that, ex ante, mid-course and ex post controls 
are designed to ascertain whether INGOs are doing what they promised to do. Given the 
presence of mid-course monitoring, INGOs are compelled to maintain compliance with 
the ex ante and ex post rules and expectations since this information is used to support 
decisions for continued funding of the INGOs. In other words, decisions about INGOs‟ 
continued receipt of funding increments are contingent upon their compliance and mid-
course performance. Such constraints do not only ensure that the funding source‟s 
preferences, priorities and expectations are incorporated into the decision making; they 
also ascertain whether they were acted upon and eventually fulfilled. It is however 
essential to remember that it is INGOs‟ autonomy with respect to the funded program that 
is compromised and not autonomy as it relates to the rest of the organization, unless the 
funding from a particular source constitutes the lion‟s share of an INGO‟s total revenue 
as in the case of SIGMA.  
Table 14 below summarizes of some of the control mechanisms discussed in the 
research. The study concludes that different funding sources employ these control 
mechanisms in order to steer, direct and control INGOs‟ decision making and subsequent 
activities, with respect to the funded programs. Such constraints influence and restrict 
INGOs‟ decision making competencies pertaining to resource allocation and use, and 
programming. It is through these control mechanisms therefore that INGOs‟ autonomy is 
compromise and weakened, that is, INGOs‟ capacity to make unilateral decisions 




Table 14: Funding Sources’ Control Mechanism 
 
Funding Source or Tool Control Mechanisms 
Government  


























Budget Rules & Regulations (e.g., USG 
Procurement Rules codified in the Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR 22); Fly America Act; USAID 
Eligibility Rules for Goods and Services of April 
1998; the Executive Order on Terrorism Financing) 
Budget Approvals  
Key Personnel Approval 
Red Tape 
 




Evaluation Reporting (e.g., quarterly, 6 months, or 
annual) 
Financial Audits (e.g., A133) 
Field Audits (by Audit staff) 
Direct Ongoing Monitoring  
Red Tape 
Federal Conditionalities (e.g., Anti-Prostitution 
Clause; The Global Gag Rule) 
 
Threat of Sanctions (e.g., suspension; pay back 
funds) 
Foundations  




















Budget Approvals  
Budget Deviations (variances above 10%) 
Expert Screening  
Budget Rules (e.g., 15% overhead (Gates); 5% 





Ongoing Monitoring  
Evaluation Reporting (quarterly narrative reports) 
Annual Financial Reporting 
Red Tape 
 
Threat of Sanctions (pay back funds) 
Corporations 




Ex Post Controls: 
 
Budget Rules  




Monitoring & Evaluation Reporting  
Annual Financial Statements 
 
 190 
5.9 Summary of Findings 
 
To summarize, this research began with the central question of whether 
government funding, relative to other funding sources undercuts the autonomy of INGOs. 
This chapter compared the within-case findings to the derived hypotheses, with a special 
focus on the resource dependence framework utilized in this study. The findings suggests 
that in many respects, USG funding weakens INGOs‟ autonomy relatively more than 
other funding sources, and this impact varies by autonomy dimension as illustrated in 
Figure 6 above. These conclusions are inductively drawn from the participants‟ 
experiences with government, corporate and foundations funding. As such, the Figure 6 
is based on commonly shared agreements about the impact or influence of government 
funding on different autonomy dimensions, relative to alternative funding sources like 
foundations, corporations, and individuals contributions.  
This research also finds that relative to other funding sources, USG funding in 
general, is associated with strong ex ante and ex post controls in the form of strict rules 
and regulations. Coupled with this are the significant differences in ideology (compared 
to INGOs), which come in the form of funding conditionalities (e.g., The Global Gag 
Rule). This research concludes that it is through these constraints that the steering, 
directing, and controlling of INGOs‟ decision making occurs. In other words, it is 
through these mechanisms that INGOs‟ actual decision making competencies with 
respect to programmatic operational autonomy for the funded programs are weakened or 
confined.  
This is not to say that foundation grants and corporate gifts do not undermine 
INGOs‟ autonomy. The findings articulated in this research suggest that similar to 
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government funding, foundations in particular, might increasingly be operating more and 
more like government with respect to their use of ex ante and ex post control mechanisms 
to direct and control INGOs‟ decision making pertaining to resource allocation and use. 
This may be attributed to the “venture philanthropy” approach which perceives 
foundation grants and corporate gifts as “investments” as opposed to “donations.” This 
increased interest in seeing a rate of return on donors‟ investments may be a function of 
the stricter ex post compliance requirements INGOs are increasingly facing, all in the 
name of accountability.  
As a result, similar to USG funding, though not at the same level of influence, 
corporations and foundations influence INGOs‟ operational autonomy by controlling and 
constricting the environment within which INGOs make decisions pertaining to resource 
allocation and use. This is achieved through a number of control mechanisms as shown in 
Table 15. These include ex ante budget rules, regulations and controls such as placing a 
ceiling on overhead costs, and requiring INGOs to seek prior approval for their 
purchasing and procurement decisions.  
In addition, information from mid-course monitoring also appears to be used to 
ensure INGOs‟ compliance. By so doing, failure to demonstrate compliance and/or 
impact could result in a cessation of an INGO‟s continued funding. In other words, 
donors‟ incremental approach to financing INGOs provides donors with the discretionary 
room to discontinue or terminate the provision of remaining installments or obligations to 
an INGO. All this suggests that INGOs receiving USG funding, as well as foundation 
grants are increasingly operating in tightly controlled funding environments, suggesting a 
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milieu in which such conditions potentially stifle INGOs‟ innovation in decision making 
and by extension, their overall responsiveness and effectiveness. 
With regards to USG funding, the findings in this research suggest that an 
INGO‟s share of USG may not matter much when it to comes to the influence of 
interventional constraints. As such, regardless of the proportion of USG funding an 
INGO receives, it still faces equally onerous ex post monitoring and reporting 
requirements. This is exemplified by the fact that, in response to only 10 percent share of 
USG funding, ALPHA set up an entire unit with a staff of 4 people to deal solely with 
compliance issues associated with USG funding.  
The share of USG funding an INGO receives however makes a difference when it 
comes to the level of influence the USG is able to exert on an INGO‟s operational 
decisions and managerial decisions, especially with respect to financial management. The 
findings suggest that while government may be able to exercise influence on INGOs 
decision making through various mechanisms, for an INGO receiving the least share of 
USG funding like ALPHA, USG influence only extends as far as the funded programs.  
In contrast to ALPHA therefore, the findings suggest that SIGMA as an 
organization faces strong government influence and control given its high dependence on 
USG funding. The same is true for BETA, though to a limited extent – given that almost 
50 percent of the INGO‟s programs are funded by the USG. In addition, should the USG 
support of INGOs cease for any reason, BETA‟s organizational size and programs would 
therefore be reduced by almost half, while SIGMA would cease to exist altogether – 
assuming that no replacement funding is secured.  
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There are however, positive spillover effects that can derive from an exchange 
relationship with government and with corporate and foundation funders. The findings 
suggest that the high accountability demands placed upon INGOs can compel them to 
improve their capacity to self-examine. This has been accomplished through the demand 
for INGOs to create and maintain good business integrity through establishing strong 
recordkeeping measures, as a condition for establishing one‟s eligibility to receive USG 
funding. In addition, INGOs internal controls may have been strengthened especially, in 
light of the required annual A133 Audit.   
It could therefore be argued that these accountability demands have improved the 
professionalism of INGOs as they are increasingly compelled to formally consider the 
efficiency and effectiveness of their programs through accounting for their spending and 
the impact of their funded programs. In a sense, ex post monitoring and evaluation 
requirements may have fostered a formalization of the process of evaluation within 
INGOs. These externalities therefore are applicable to all three INGOs and perhaps to 
USG-funded direct relief and development INGOs. As shown in Table 8 (in Chapter 4) 
18 of the 19 participants from all three INGOs drew a positive link between USG funding 
and INGOs‟ professionalism. 
Finally, the findings in this research also suggest that INGOs are not without 
avenues to exercise some of their autonomy. After all, INGOs choose which funded 
relationship to enter into; they also design the programs to be implemented, and they can 
also suggest deviations from those plans. However, this exercise of “autonomy” is done 
in consideration of program guidelines and objectives, and in consultation with the 
funding agencies.  
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CHAPTER 6  
 
CROSS-CASE FINDINGS: A TOOL CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the cross-case findings based on an analysis of data pooled 
from all three cases. Designed to expound on the influence of funding tools on the 
INGOs‟ behavior with respect to operational and managerial autonomy, this chapter 
compares the cross-case findings to the tool choice hypotheses presented in Chapter 3. 
Demonstrated in this section is that different funding tools exert varying degrees of 
control on INGOs‟ decision making capacity, thus weakening the organizations‟ capacity 
for making independent decisions about programs and their operations.  
Viewing the government funding-INGO autonomy discourse from the tool choice 
perspective therefore helps explicate some of the nuances inherent in this relationship. As 
a result, this perspective is instrumental in bringing clarity to the influence USG funding 
can have on INGOs‟ decision making competencies and activities. This is especially 
essential since grants, cooperative agreements and contracts represent key funding 
mechanisms employed by government to finance INGO activities (Kerlin 2006a). 
  
6.2  Do Funding Tools Matter? 
 
Figure 7 demonstrates the perceived impact of each funding tool on INGOs‟ 
autonomy dimensions. The decision to place each tool on a particular position on the 
continuum was also informed by information gathered from participants‟ experiences 
with each of the tools. As such, while the researcher judgment played a role in the 
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construction of these continuums, this was largely informed by the data. Additional 
evidence to support these illustrations was gathered from the different funding tools 
examined for this research, as well as from the descriptions of funding tools provided by 
documents such as the Automated Directives System, Acquisition and Assistance 
Chapter 303 from the USAID. Examples of the statements instrumental in the 
construction of these continuums are provided in Appendix 4.  
This research finds that all participants who contributed to the discussion on 
funding tools recognized the signals each tool sends to the INGO, as well as how each 
funding tool is designed to operate. Consequently, the participants were able to provide 
insight into how each funding tool influences their operational and managerial decisions. 
 





























Fig4: Influence of INGOs‟ Managerial Autonomy: HR 
Management 
 
Figure 7: Relationship between Funding Tools and INGO Autonomy, by Dimension 
 
This analysis concludes that different funding tools do indeed transmit different 
signals to INGOs about the funder‟s policy position, objectives, requirements and 
expectations. At the same time, and also consistent with Salamon (2002a; 2002b), each 
tool defines the operating environment INGOs work in and hence constricts INGOs‟ 
















ability to make independent decisions. As a result, funding tools weaken INGO‟s 
autonomy dimensions in distinctive ways as exemplified by statements like the following.   
Different tools are subject to different kinds of regulations. (BETA‟s 
Internal Auditor) 
 
…the grants are a little easier and especially if they are from the private 
sector and from the private sector, there is more understanding of what 
goes on… Contracts are more kind of more controlled – you need more…. 
monitoring on a contract for compliance; both (grants and contracts) need 
certain controls and compliance but it‟s a little more –under a contract I 
would say. (CEO, SIGMA) 
 
Contracts are the difficult ones because, contracts are almost business 
documents and everything is set out very clearly and we have very little 




And as pointed out by ALPHA‟s Director of Grants and Compliance and also 
consistent across all three INGOs is the understanding that contracts simply signal that,  
 We want to hire you for your expertise to do this thing that we want 
done…. In this case, the USG knows what they want done and the INGO 
is simply the contractor or “the hired gun.”  
 
 
ALPHA‟s Program Director echoed the same observation as he contrasted 
contracts to cooperative agreements; 
… the USG has several ways of allocating money, one is contracts, they 
know what they want and they want you to just do what they want (So the 
NGO is a contractor)… They want you to do this, they give the money and 
they pay you for what they want you to do. The other one is (a cooperative 
agreement); they have an idea about the ultimate goal they want to 
achieve… were they know what they want, but they leave it up to you the 




Similar to an observation by ALPHA‟s Director of Grants and Compliance, 
BETA‟s Director of Competitive Bids pointed out that grants and cooperative agreements 
indicate that,  
…we (USG) have an idea of this thing we want done and we are not sure 
of the best way to accomplish it, so why don‟t you tell us how best to do it 
and whether that is all we need to be doing…. Well, (with contracts)… 
you have to be willing to pretty much take whatever direction that they are 
going to give you; whereas with a cooperative agreement, it is understood 
that you have your own mission, you have your own way of seeing the 
world, you have your own commitment and dedication to the communities 
you are working in and the USG is asking for your thoughts on how it‟s to 
spend money and then approving it and giving you that money but it 
remains more your money to embark on your program. When you have a 
contract, you don‟t own the program, they still own the program – you are 
the service provider, you know if they say jump you say, how high? 
 
In light of the above, I compare the cross-case findings to three tool choice-based 
hypotheses in the next section. 
 
6.2.1     Coercive Funding Tools  
 
Hypothesis 5: Greater dependence on highly coercive funding instruments 
surrenders less autonomy to INGOs. 
This research supports this hypothesis given that contracts, unlike unrestricted 
funding and grants and to a lesser extent, cooperative agreements, constrain INGOs‟ 
autonomy by spelling out the scope of work that INGOs must undertake. In contrast to 
cooperative agreements and grants, contracts clearly yield less operational autonomy. As 
shown in Table 10 (in Chapter 4), 9 participants across all three INGOs, expressed 
discomfort with contracts. The following statements outline how contracts operate, 
relative to other tools. 
 198 
A cooperative agreement is much easier to work through, contracts are the 
difficult ones because, contracts are almost business documents and 
everything is set out very clearly and we have very little leeway in terms 
of how we can influence that. I mean, the steps are there, you just have to 
follow them 1, 2 and 3; while a cooperative agreement is much looser, and 
we have a chance to influence it and modify it a bit if needed. Grants and 
cooperative agreements are very similar. BETA prefers cooperative 
agreements or grants; unfortunately the USG is going much more towards 
contracts and it is much harder for us because it doesn‟t give us the leeway 
that we would prefer to have. (BETA‟s VP of Global Support) 
 
Contracts are more controlled; you need more monitoring on a contract for 
compliance; both (grants and contracts) need certain controls and 
compliance but it‟s a little more under a contract. (SIGMA‟s CEO) 
 
We are not government, we are non-sectarian and we are non-political, we 
are not supporting any political cause or any specific special interests. For 
instance, the USG has started putting in some of their solicitations that if 
we win the bid, we have to be promoting the U.S. foreign policy overseas 
and we will not go for those types of contracts because we don‟t want to 
be seen as an arm with the USG. So our independence and our impartiality 
are key to all that; we don‟t want accept any money that jeopardizes our 
impartiality and our independence… Unfortunately, the USG is going 
much more towards contracts and it is much harder for us because it 




Consequently, SIGMA may be surrendering most of its organizational autonomy 
not only because the INGO is almost 100 percent-USG funded, but also because a 
significant share of that funding is and has been channeled through contracts in the past 
(62 percent in FY2002 and 48 percent in FY2006 as shown in Table 13). This suggests 
that 62 percent of SIGMA‟s total revenue came with high use and output specifications 
and controls in 2002 alone and 48 percent of that in 2006. As such, SIGMA could be 
described as “contractor” of government, one that is implementing USG programs 62 or 
48 percent of the time. And since nearly half of its funding has come through the contract 
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mechanism, one can draw the conclusion that the INGO is increasingly “subject to 
government‟s direct instruction and control” (Shaikh and Casablanca 2008).  
In contrast, cooperative agreements allow room for INGOs to exercise their 
autonomy as they design the programs and implementation plans, albeit in direct 
consultation with the USG given the “substantial involvement and participation” 
specified in the funding tool. As a result, cooperative agreements do yield some 
operational autonomy to INGOs; however, the environment within which INGOs make 
those decisions remains highly controlled in light of the USG‟s substantial involvement 
and participation in all major program decisions. The statements also suggest that INGOs 
are able to incorporate some of their own preferences, interests, and priorities into the 
design of the programs.  
ALPHA‟s Program Director confirms that a major constraint inherent in 
cooperative agreements is that the USG expects to be involved in all major decisions 
INGOs make. In particular, the USG expects to be involved in determining the nature of 
the programs to be implemented, how they are implemented, and in approving INGOs‟ 
choice of key personnel for those funded programs. Such involvement can constrain 
INGOs‟ capacity to make independent operational and managerial decisions pertaining to 
the funded program.  
Similar to an observation by ALPHA‟s Director of Grants and Compliance, 
BETA‟s Government Grants Expert points out that grants and cooperative agreements 
indicate that,  
…we (USG) have an idea of this thing we want done and we are not sure 
of the best way to accomplish it, so why don‟t you tell us how best to do it 
and whether that is all we need to be doing…. Well, (with contracts)… 
you have to be willing to pretty much take whatever direction that they are 
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going to give you; whereas with a cooperative agreement, it is understood 
that you have your own mission, you have your own way of seeing the 
world, you have your own commitment and dedication to the communities 
you are working in and the USG is asking for your thoughts on how it‟s to 
spend money and then approving it and giving you that money but it 
remains more your money to embark on your program. When you have a 
contract, you don‟t own the program, they still own the program – you are 
the service provider, you know if they say jump you say, how high? 
 
This statement gives the impression that the money transferred through grants and 
cooperative agreements essentially becomes the INGOs‟ money to embark on their own 
programs. However, as noted above in the case of cooperative agreements, the USG 
remains substantially involved in how the provided resources are allocated and utilized 
and they do so by approving the grantees‟ program designs, annual implementation, 
monitoring, and evaluation plans; and by reviewing INGOs‟ budgets, workplans, and key 
personnel.  
In actuality, the existence of these ex ante approval requirements weaken INGOs‟ 
independent decision making capacity by requiring that their implementation plans, 
workplans, and budget allocations and changes undergo government scrutiny and 
approval. It is here that INGOs‟ operational autonomy and managerial autonomy with 
respect to both financial and human resources management are weakened. This paradox 
is evident in the following statement by ALPHA‟s Program Director – a view shared by 
BETA‟s Directors of Food Programs, Competitive Bids, and Humanitarian Assistance;  
First of all, one of the things cooperative agreements state clearly is that 
there will be USAID substantial involvement – it is clearly spelled out. So 
in that process, there are deliverables that we have to meet … For 
example, the first thing we have to do is what is called a “Detailed 
Implementation Plan,” (it details) how are we going to do it. We submit it 
to them and they approve it. And during the course of the project 
implementation, there are deliverables in terms of the reporting we have to 
do and the detailed implementation plan will spell out in detail step by 
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step what we are going to do. And they are very, very demanding in terms 
of details. Then there is somebody at the USAID office who is the 
Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO), who… oversee(s) the implementation 
of that project, so… we have to feed him with information on a regular 
basis (about) how we are doing. They will come to see the project, we 
send them the quarterly reports, we send in the financial reports and they 
will give us money in installments, they call it “obligation.”  
 
 
Cooperative agreements are therefore associated with a high degree of ex ante, 
mid-course and ex post controls, and monitoring and reporting.  
Though an INGO may respond to a grant announcement, in an effort to retain 
some measure of operation autonomy; should the USG agency decide to remain 
substantially and engaged in the program implementation process, the award would 
therefore be funded through a cooperative agreement. Perhaps this explains why the 
participants seemed to regard grants and cooperative agreements as being quite similar 
with the difference in the degree of substantial involvement.  
It is also possible therefore that the lines between the two have become blurred 
and that they are equally subject to the same amount ex ante, mid-course and ex post 
control, monitoring and reporting. Perhaps this blurring of funding tools is symbolized by 
the following statement from a RFA announced by the USAID on July 29, 2008, for a 
project intended to support civil society and the rule of law in Iran issued. 
“Under this 2008 Annual Program Statement (APS), the term “Grant” is 




This announcement seems to suggest that indeed compared to contracts, grants 
and cooperative agreements seem to allow some room for INGOs to exercise their 
autonomy. While the RFA emphasized that USG funds could not be used for activities 
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involving the Iranian government, it allowed sufficient room for INGOs to design 
programs around one or all three outlined program objectives. The RFA also provided 
illustrative examples of activities to be included in the proposals without necessarily 
limiting the INGOs to the activities.  
Although INGOs have the “liberty” to design programs as they see fit, the 
embedded “general” program summary, objectives, and examples of activities, provide 
INGOs with key clues about the USG preferences. Such preferences and indicators could 
potentially influence and channel INGOs‟ decision making in directions that will likely 
improve their propensity to win the award. However, it is probable that INGOs are able 
to exercise high levels of operational autonomy when they are designing the detailed 
monthly implementation plans, given the detail required in showing the proposed 
activities and timelines for the first year of the program. 
However, as illustrated about, it is important to remember RFAs may be quite 
vague about the nature of the funding tool that is eventually used to channel funding to 
INGOs in support of the funded programs. As a result, should the USG decide to be 
substantially involved in the program design and implementation, this award would thus 
be provided as a cooperative agreement rather than a grant, thus undermining the very 
autonomy that an INGO may have hoped to retain had the award been channeled through 
a grant.  
As a result, in contrast to unrestricted funding, grants and cooperative agreements; 
contracts constrain INGOs‟ autonomy disproportionately more due to their coercive 
nature. And because highly coercive tools are associated with high degrees of ex ante, 
mid-course and ex post controls; this translates into more control from the funder, thus 
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restricting INGOs‟ operational and managerial autonomy. Grants and cooperative 
agreements however, provide INGOs with some degree of operational autonomy or “say” 
in defining and designing how a desired output is produced. However, the ultimate 
degree of “say” undeniably comes through unrestricted funding.  
 
6.2.2     Restrictive Funding Tools  
 
Hypothesis 6: Greater dependence on highly restrictive sources of funding is likely to 
limit the autonomy of INGOs.  
This analysis also finds that government funding in general, due to its restrictive 
nature, constrains INGOs‟ operational autonomy.  Out of the 19 participants interviewed, 
13 participants expressed discomfort with the presence of conditionalities attached to 
USG funding (shown in Table 10 in Chapter 4).  
In addition, all three funding tools obtained from BETA included an attachment 
of various USG rules and regulations codified in the Mandatory Standard Provisions for 
U.S. Non-governmental Recipients. Included in this attachment are regulations pertaining 
International Air Travel and Transportation (e.g., The Fly America Act), and USAID 
Eligibility Rules for Goods and Services, a section that outlines ineligible goods and 
services and restricted goods that INGOs cannot procure with USG funding. As noted, 
other USG funding conditionalities include regulations such as, the Anti-Prostitution 
Pledge, Branding, and the Mexico City Policy. Some conditions preclude the use of USG 
funding in particular countries (e.g., the ineligible countries clause). As BETA‟s Director 
of Competitive Bids pointed out, 
There are certainly examples of countries were we do not get USG 
funding – Myanmar is one; we were in Myanmar when the USG was not. 
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In light of the USG‟s stipulation of where INGOs can and cannot operate using 
USG funding for instance may pose challenges on INGOs‟ credibility. In addition, these 
rules, and regulations confine also INGOs‟ scope of work by establishing what INGOs 
can and cannot do. These funding restrictions therefore constrain INGOs‟ operations, 
innovation, and to some extent, the effectiveness of their programming by diminishing 
INGOs‟ responsiveness.  
Notice that these conditions are attached to USG federal funding in general, the 
tool of choice simply appends additional ex ante and ex post controls, over and above 
these policy conditions. Recognizing the influence restrictive funding tools may have on 
BETA‟s operational autonomy, BETA‟s Director of Humanitarian Assistance pointed out 
that what INGOs do and do not do is spelt out exactly in the funding tools. The a priori 
set parameters therefore compel INGOs to deliver immediate relief in accordance with 
the stipulations of agreements. The director pointed out that, 
emergent issues and needs cannot be met within the confines of those very 
closed projects….we lose the opportunity and perhaps the appropriateness 
of the intervention by not being as timely as we would want.  
 
This suggests that by imposing contractual conditions or parameters, USG 
funding tools impose limitations upon INGOs‟ activities by confining their scope of work 
and program operations, thus oppressing INGOs‟ innovation, flexibility and 
responsiveness. As a result, USG funding appears to be restrictive in light of the presence 
of explicit conditionalities attached to it, and the degree of specificity and narrowness of 
the scope of the funding tools.  
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6.2.3    Direct Funding Tools  
 
Hypothesis 7: Greater dependence on highly direct funding instruments is likely to 
result in lower levels of INGO autonomy  
Evidence from the interview data and funding tools supports this hypothesis in 
that government agencies do get involved in the implementation process of INGOs‟ 
funded programs. For instance, 3 out of 7 participants with USG funding experience 
found USG funding to be highly direct, especially with contracts, and through the 
substantial involvement associated with cooperative agreements. The direct involvement 
and influence is also accomplished through ex ante and ex post controls by requiring 
INGOs to submit detailed implementation plans and workplans for approval, as well as, 
field audits, and direct program monitoring as illustrated in Table 14 (in Chapter 5).  
Also noted earlier, government directly influences INGOs decisions through the 
specificity engraved in contracts. Government therefore controls and provides direction 
as to exactly how INGOs are to implement the funded programs, including the provision 
of technical direction by the Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO) or Contracting Officer 
of the funding source (e.g., resolving logistical problems or performing technical 
inspection where changes would affect the scope of the funded work). And because 
contracts spell out that INGOs are implementing USG programs and would be subject to 
the direct instruction and control of the funding government, this suggests the likelihood 
of SIGMA losing its autonomy through this direct influence. Aside from occasional field 
visits, and the direct ongoing monitoring, the direction and controlling at times is actually 
done remotely, through the ex ante, and ex post rules and requirements.   
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As BETA‟s VP of Global Support elucidated, unlike cooperative agreements, 
contracts are almost like business documents, where everything is precisely set out 
leaving very little latitude in terms of how INGOs can influence their contents. In 
contrast, cooperative agreements are “much looser,” as a result; INGOs have a better 
chance of influencing what goes into agreements, as well as modify them if needed.  
This research has also indicated that, unless implementation and workplans are 
approved by the USG, program implementation will not take place, suggesting strong 
influence, control and direction on the part of government. INGOs are thus bound by 
these agreements such that they are required to implement the funded program in 
accordance with approved detailed implementation and workplans. Additional approval is 
required prior to the incorporation of any amendments or deviations to the 
implementation plans even if there is no cost associated with the deviations (Section 
226.25 (b) of the Code of Federal Regulations). The requirement for prior approvals for 
changes is illustrated in the following statement by BETA‟s VP of Global Support. This 
view was also shared by ALPHA‟s Program Director, Director of Government Grants 
and Compliance, and the VP of International Programs; BETA‟s Director of Competitive 
Bids and the SIGMA‟s CEO and Program Coordinator. 
With the cooperative agreement(s) or grant(s), you can go back to them 
and say, well, we didn‟t actually do it this way, we had to do it this way – 
if you have a good reason and particularly if you let them know ahead of 
time and not afterwards, they are ok with that.  
 
 
And also noted in preceding discussions, when a program is funded through a 
cooperative agreement, the USAID reserve the right to be substantially involved in 
identified elements of an INGO‟s program, that is “during the performance of the award” 
 207 
(USAID‟s ADS Chapter 303; Cooperative Agreement from BETA) Substantial 
involvement entails the USAID‟s direct involvement in the approval of BETA‟s 
implementation plans and key personnel – that is, “only those positions that are essential 
to the successful implementation of the award.  
Under the substantial involvement and participation proviso, the USAID would 
also approves an INGO‟s decisions to collaborate, should the INGO decide to jointly 
implement the award with another agency. The USAID approves this decision only 
“when satisfied that there is sufficient reason” for collaboration. In addition, should a 
collaborative effort form an advisory committee, the USAID may also participate as a 
member of such a committee, especially since advisory committees of this nature “must 
only deal with technical or programmatic issues and not routine administrative matters” 
(USAID‟s ADS Chapter 303). Clearly, cooperative agreements do undermine INGOs‟ 
operational autonomy. 
And also pointed out in earlier discussions, while INGOs can make changes to 
their program implementation plans and budgets with the approval of the USG funding 
agency, the arrangement poses potential operational delays in program implementation as 
INGOs await government‟s decision. 
You can make a change but you have to request an amendment and that 
can be quite lengthy, I mean, there are very often changes, for instance, we 
sell USDA commodities overseas and particularly in Africa, we very often 
get more money than we originally proposed. And if you get more money, 
you have to have an amendment approved, which will allow you to spend 
the money where you desire to put it. So yes, and the amendments can 
take 6 months, sometimes longer; they are very, very slow, with the 




This arrangement also suggests the existence of red tape, which can be regarded 
as a type of ex ante control on INGOs‟ decision making. As a result, such ex ante and 
mid-course approvals seem to be put in place as checks to ensure INGO compliance.  
In summary, those familiar with cooperative agreements and grants from all three 
INGOs agree that these tools essentially operate the same way, with the exception of the 
substantial involvement of the USG in INGOs‟ decision making process through ex ante 
and mid-course approvals of INGOs‟ implementation plans, workplans, monitoring, and 
evaluation plans, as well as their key personnel. Therefore, as a way of steering, directing 
and controlling INGOs‟ decisions and activities, the USG approves these plans prior to 
implementation within cooperative agreements, and to a very limited extent with grants.  
And since substantial government involvement is not anticipated in grant 
agreements, government would prefer to transfer funds through far less coercive 
instruments, especially in situations where the objectives of government strongly overlap 
with the existing programs or objectives of the implementing partners (Shaikh and 
Casablanca 2008), suggesting less control and more operational autonomy to INGOs. 
Such an approach indicates that government is strategic in its tool choice. This also 
explains why the USG can unilaterally opt not to finance INGOs activities through 
grants, and channel funding through cooperative agreements and contracts instead. By so 
doing, government retains more control over INGOs‟ decisions and activities while 
allowing itself sufficient room to make its preferences, interests and priorities known, 
especially within contracts and cooperative agreements. 
Based on the preceding discussions, the sentiments attached to the liberty and 
freedom that unrestricted funding provides to INGOs cannot be understated. The findings 
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suggest that compared to other funding tools, unrestricted funding is without too many 
restrictions, rules, direction and control; therefore it culminates into more autonomy to 
INGOs, across all autonomy dimensions. A fundamental practical task INGOs may need 
to undertake therefore is to assess and evaluate the degree to which the funding tools 
differentially impact their autonomy dimensions. By so doing, INGOs empower 
themselves to make informed decisions about the types of INGO-government 




CHAPTER 7  
 





The second research question addressed in this research is concerned with the 
strategies INGOs employ to militate against adverse autonomy loss. This study implicitly 
assumes that INGOs are losing their autonomy as a result of the conditions embedded in 
the exchange relationships they enter into with different funding sources. Since this 
research did not posit any hypotheses with respect to this research question, the findings 
presented below were inductively generated from the pooled data analysis conducted. 
Therefore the findings in this section represent common themes emerging from all three 
INGOs recruited for this study. Table 8 (shown in Chapter 4) shows the counts related to 
these common themes.      
 
7.2 Autonomy Retention: Some Practical Considerations 
 
When asked if autonomy was a concern for their organizations, a significant 
number of the participants (5 out of 9 participants) reported that it autonomy loss was 
certainly not a concern to the organization. The following statements highlight some of 
these views.  
No absolutely not. We are not dependent on any one funder. We are 
influenced in terms of program decisions by any one funder – by direction, 
or strategy…. We pick things that fit our programming; we don‟t organize 
the work of ALPHA around any one funder. (ALPHA‟s Board Chair) 
 
Well, nobody is trying to takes us over, I mean, we just follow the rules 
and regulations, I mean when you go into an agreement with the USG, you 
have to agree to do it the way they want it done, as far as the projects, the 
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staff and everything else, but we are an independent organization… a lot 
of INGOs… are all independent, they all do their own thing and none of 
them do it exactly the same. No, we have no problem with autonomy. 
(SIGMA‟s Program Coordinator) 
 
 
These statements however illuminate a paradox that exists in the relationship 
between funding and INGOs‟ autonomy. While INGOs are able to choose the funded 
relationships to enter into, this does not necessarily purge the constraints and controls 
inherent in those exchanges, nor does it reduce the likely impact such constraints have on 
INGOs‟ decision making competencies pertaining to budgets, aid recipients, outputs and 
program implementation. As BETA‟s Competitive Bids Director pointed out,  
An organization is always going to face some loss of autonomy when 
getting funding from donors, and so it is a matter of managing that risk. 
 
 
When asked to talk about some of the measures they were taking to retain their 
autonomy however, participants including the 5 noted above indicated the following 
strategies articulated below. These strategies range from revenue diversification to 
INGOs simply choosing to walk away from particular funding sources in order to re-
establish their autonomy. This section of the report therefore outlines some practical 
considerations INGOs can employ to shield their organizations from too much influence 
and direction from funders.  
 
7.2.1 Revenue Diversification 
 
Table 8 (in Chapter 4) shows that 13 out of 19 participants (6 participants from 
ALPHA; 5 from BETA and 2 from SIGMA), identified revenue diversification as an 
effective strategy for autonomy retention. This suggests that there is a general consensus 
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among all three cases that revenue diversification helps minimize INGOs‟ external 
dependence and control by any one funder. It was also clear from this analysis that all 
three INGOs were very much aware that their revenue streams are highly concentrated. 
Based on a calculation of the revenue concentration indices, BETA‟s funding streams are 
the least concentrated, with a revenue concentration index of .272 compared to SIGMA‟s 
.494. Perhaps BETA is one INGO that is showing success in its plans to minimize its 
external dependence on USG funding given the degree to which the organization has cut 
back on its dependence on USG funding as shown in the following statements.  
We have actually been trying to diversify away from the USG funding for 
past probably 7 years…. because we felt it was too large, we didn‟t have a 
diversified portfolio and for risk management, it just seemed not to be the 
wisest thing to do. So we have reached out to US professional foundations, 
like Lorner Dowen and Leasten foundations and we have reached out to 
other sources of revenue – just private individual fundraising and we are 
going to look to continue to do that, to continue to expand sources of 
funding other than the USG. (BETA‟s Competitive Bids Director) 
 
If you look at BETA‟s dependence on USG over the year, it is down from 
70 percent to about 45 percent nowadays. So we realized that to some 
extent we needed to diversify our portfolio of funding; that is a fact. In 
order to achieve our mission and vision we needed to diversify our 
funding, not because the donor influenced what we did so much, but the 
fact that there were restricted projects that didn‟t allow us to achieve the 
full potential of our programs. (BETA‟s Director of Humanitarian 
Assistance) 
 
While the USG remains BETA‟s largest single donor, its decline is an 
indication of steady progress towards the goal of diversifying the INGO‟s 
funding sources. (BETA‟s Current Strategic Plan) 
 
 
These indicators suggest that the more diverse an INGO‟s funding portfolio is, the 
greater the likelihood that the INGO will have the capacity and freedom to fulfill its total 
mission. This is attributed to an INGO‟s ability to make holistic policy or operational 
decisions. The statement made by BETA‟s Director of Humanitarian Assistance 
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highlights the limitations funding tools can have on INGOs‟ programming decisions by 
essentially restricting the scope within which funding is to be utilized. For instance, a 
grant or funding agreement spells out the INGO‟s scope of work to the extent that it 
prevent the organization from doing anything else other than that which is spelt out in the 
agreement. As a result, INGOs lose windows of opportunity to respond to emergent 
needs, which in turn weakens the appropriateness of their interventions due to a lack of 
timeliness on the part of the INGOs. 
In view of this observation, revenue diversification is therefore regarded as a 
remedy for the program theory or ideological differences that may exist between donors 
and grantees. The findings suggest that such differences undermine INGOs‟ operational 
autonomy. For example, given the restrictions imposed by the Anti-Prostitution Clause 
associated with HIV/AIDS USG funding, INGOs have had to soliciting funding from 
sources that are not opposed to the work they do among the at-risk population of 
prostitutes, thus allowing them the liberty to implement program strategies that they 
believe in, as shown in the following statement. 
We have some different point of views particularly in the best ways to 
prevent HIV/AIDS. And so it is important for us to have other funding 
sources and that the USG not have a dominant role in our funding, so that 
we can also do things that perhaps may be the administration doesn‟t favor 
but we would be allowed to do with other funding sources… (With) the 
USG requiring us to (have) any partners that we use sign that (they) didn‟t 
support prostitution; certainly BETA does not promote prostitution but we 
recognize that that is an important group that we must work with in order 
to curb HIV/AIDS. And so while on the one hand, the USG provided 
funds for a lot of our HVI/AIDS programming, we had to stand on the 
principle to say, you know, we still must work – so that‟s another place 
where private funding comes in. (BETA‟s Secretary of the Board) 
  
And in the words of the ALPHA‟s Board Chair, 
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We believe it is healthier to have a diversified base of funding. 
 
 
While commenting on the importance of individual contributions, ALPHA‟s CEO 
announced the INGO‟s plans for reducing its high dependence on individual 
contributions through revenue diversification.  Note that based on a calculation of the 
revenue concentration index, ALPHA‟s revenue streams are the least diversified, with a 
revenue concentration index of .853. ALPHA has thus taken steps to diversify its revenue 
streams by hiring a Foundations Expert to engage the foundations grantmaking 
community. At the time of the interviews, the foundations expert had only been with 
ALPHA for three weeks.  
We are deliberately diversifying our resources; our core resource base is 
ordinary Americans through sponsorship, which means we have a 
constituency within the U.S. and then we are looking at government, we 
are looking major gifts, corporations and foundations. (ALPHA‟s CEO) 
 
ALPHA also expressed a desire to increase its share of USG funding, but only to 
a “reasonable” level in order to preserve its autonomy. While the INGO would prefer not 
to have more than 50 percent of its total revenue coming from USG, according to 
ALPHA‟s CFO, the INGO “would still like to have at least 50 percent coming from 
individuals” thus continuing to capitalize on the high level of autonomy unrestricted 
funding provides. The CFO elaborates on this in the following statement.  
We may have become too dependent on individuals (especially) when you 
get into an economy like we are in now…. So we have for FY2008 which 
we are just getting audited now, I would say probably 65 percent of our 





Given its confederated structure, ALPHA could be considered highly diversified 
at the international or country office (CO) level since each CO receives funding from all 
16 of ALPHA‟s National Offices around the globe. These national offices solicit funding 
from a varied pool of funding sources across the globe.  
Perhaps the efficacy of revenue diversification in granting INGOs with significant 
operational autonomy is exemplified more clearly in ineligible countries where INGOs 
are not allowed to use USG funding. ALPHA‟s CEO like BETA‟s Competitive Bids 
Director and the Director of Humanitarian recounted a situation where USG funding 
could not be used in response to the cyclone that occurred in Myanmar in 2008, as well 
as, a natural disaster in Laos. According to these participants, INGOs could not use USG 
funding to respond to the disaster due to the “absence of democratic governance” in the 
country. As a result, the INGOs could only use funding from sources that were not 
opposed to responding in these countries. As such, how diversified INGOs‟ revenue 
streams are can be a saving grace for the organizations by way of providing alternative 
funding sources that allow them to exercise their cherished values of impartiality, 
neutrality and independence.  
 
7.2.2 Due Diligence 
 
The preceding chapters have established that a loss in INGOs‟ operational 
autonomy is largely achieved through ex ante and ex post controls funding sources 
impose on their INGO grantees; controls which constrain the actual use of the decision 
making competencies an organization actually possesses (Verhoest, Peters et al. 2004). 
This suggests that, while an INGO may possess some operational autonomy over how a 
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program is implemented, in actuality, that autonomy is undermined by the extent to 
which the organization is controlled by the results of the implemented programs, that is, 
by the burden of reporting. More and more, INGOs find themselves making decisions 
that take into consideration the expectations and missions of their funding partners, 
especially if they are going to be required to report on them. This research finds that 8 out 
of the 19 participants interviewed, highlighted a need for INGOs to know what each 
funding source is about and the expectations associated with them – a process they called 
due diligence. Out of these 8 participants, 4 participants were from BETA and 3 from 
ALPHA (shown in Table 8, in Chapter 4).   
In light of the fact that the portrait of nonprofit financing has been shifting over 
the years, some INGOs lament over the good old days where funders approached them 
with handouts, literally begging INGOs to take their money and do something good with 
it, in pursuit of INGO missions. The following statement by BETA‟s Director of Food 
Programs illustrates recognition of this shift.  
The budget levels have been reduced over the years. I mean, I started with 
BETA in 1991 and there was a period where Food for Peace would say, 
„oh please we would give you money, please take this money, take more,‟ 
but that‟s all changed since the late 1990s – 2000s, because the budget 
levels are just dramatically low. 
 
 
Today, in light of the inherent ex ante rules and regulations, funding conditions, 
and ex post requirements, the funding environment demands that INGOs do their due 
diligence by conducting rigorous researches of their donors. INGO participants strongly 
recommend that INGOs ensure that they learn everything they need to know about their 
funders, especially with respect to the spending rules and regulations, monitoring and 
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evaluation reporting requirements. Rules and regulations therefore influence the types of 
decisions INGOs make and the actions they take, thus constraining their autonomy.  
In the case of USG funding, there is also a need to stay abreast of federal 
spending regulations, and policies since these are subject to change. Learning one‟s 
funding environment in an attempt to understand the nature and implications of the 
“strings” attached to funding, as well as the reporting and other requirements and their 
impact on the different dimensions of INGO decisions has thus become vital. This is also 
crucial given that failure to abide by the budget and evaluation rules and regulations 
could lead to a suspension of an INGO or a complete loss of funding support. Speaking 
on the necessity of paying close attention to technicalities of the rules and regulations, 
ALPHA‟s CFO pointed out the following. 
There is a lot of technical things that some people prefer not to pay 
attention to, as a result, our compliance people are the ones that are paid to 
pay attention to that staff, and that‟s why part of the perception is that 
there is red tape and that‟s why some of the countries don‟t want to work 
with USG money. It could be from the ignorance of the rules…. (Why) 
would we want to take on that burden when we can get money from some 
other government who doesn‟t have as much red tape? But the 
government does have so many strict rules and regulations that they are 
asking auditors to audit (us) against 
 
 
Ignorance of funding rules and regulations is not necessarily bliss when it comes 
to USG funding.  ALPHA‟s VP of International Program explains why it pays to pay due 
diligence to each RFA or RFP before and during responding to one in the following 
statement.  
The more restrictions and requirements, the less interested we become. We 
will take contracts, and but we watch and look at those contracts and the 
specifications in them very carefully and we have turned down and we 
will turn down contracts…. that are either ill-defined in terms of the 
actions that you are going to bring forward or it states that the USG 
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official…. will tell you what to do with these monies. We usually say, no, 
thanks, but no thanks on those because they are defined in a way that we 
are not comfortable with to move forward. 
 
 
As noted earlier, BETA and ALPHA have also responded to the need for due 
diligence by setting up formal Grants and Compliance Units whose primary function is to 
comb through grants and contracts to ensure that their organizations enter into financial 
arrangements with the full understanding of the roles they are expected to play. These 
units are also designed to ensure that INGOs are in full compliance with USG funding 
rules and regulations, that is, during the application process, the implementation phase 
and after the implementation phase. As suggested in this research, while rules and 
regulations inhibit INGOs from taking actions that funders deem undesirable, they can 
also hinder desirable actions on the part of INGOs. Reminiscing on having been 
suspended for a year, the following statement by SIGMA‟s CEO illustrates the need for 
due diligence on the part of INGOs.  
That‟s why we pay a lawyer more and more. We have a lawyer that is 
looking at all these contracts now… the onsite lawyer does most of that. 
 
 
7.2.3 Goal Congruence and Fit 
 
There is also strong recognition of the need for due diligence among INGOs 
especially to ensure strong goal congruence of the funders‟ and those of the INGOs. 
Table 8 shows that 15 participants talked about this strategy, with the majority of the 
participants coming from ALPHA (N=8). Shaikh and Casablanca (2008) observed that, 
the closer one ties development assistance to U.S. foreign policy, the more desirable it 
becomes for the USG to establish or retain control over how the money is spent. It is 
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therefore incumbent upon INGOs to be cognizant of the funding environments they find 
themselves in and the implications therein.  Failure to consciously and strategically seek 
after goal congruence and fit is likely to result in INGOs implementing funders‟ projects, 
thus positioning INGOs as mere appendages of their funding partners.  
A statement by BETA‟s Director of Humanitarian Assistance draws our attention 
to not only the proactive exercise of due diligence, but also to the need for an INGO to 
have clarity, with each funding opportunity, about what it is the INGO is trying to 
achieve. This allows the INGO to verify the congruency and fit of funding opportunities 
with its own priorities and overall mission. This strategy calls for a process where INGOs 
are brutally honest with themselves in their assessments of whether each funding 
opportunity is aligned with their strategic intent and overall mission. 
We have been a little bit more proactive in understanding what the 
regulations are; in going out to trainings… We have clear strategies, again, 
I think that the main thing is whether we have a clear understanding of 
what we want to achieve and if, through any of those three mechanisms 
(grants, cooperative agreements and contracts), we will be able to achieve 
those strategic goals in terms of emergency, in food security, (and in other 
units) we have clarity on what we want to achieve…. (We are at) least 
strict on our part because we want to achieve certain things and not be 
destructed by implementing objectives that donors would like to meet, that 
have no bearing on what BETA would like to do. So at least I think that 
we are being a lot more thoughtful on that. I think that other units…. and 
operations are doing the same thing. So across the board, I think that 
BETA is a lot more conscious of meeting its mandate. (BETA‟s Director 
of Humanitarian Assistance) 
 
 
And reflecting on a recent decision that led to the organization turning down some 
USG funding, BETA‟s Food Programs Director raised some critical questions; 
The difference is we made a decision on how we were going to use their 
resource or not and that was our decision. Ultimately, it sort of came down 
to “What is an INGO looking at in terms of looking for resource support 
from any donor? Are you looking for resource support to basically fill 
 220 
your cash pipelines and even though it may not be optimally what you 
would like to do? I‟m still going to do it because I need the cash to run my 
program? Or if the organization says we are going to program this way, 
and you know, if some of that resource support doesn‟t match the way we 




The strategy of verifying the goal congruence and fit for every funding 
opportunity demands that as INGOs evaluate the funders‟ goals against their own, that 
they also evaluate their own capacity to meet the funders‟ requirements and expectations. 
The following statement by ALPHA‟s VP of International Programs illustrates how the 
INGO utilizes both due diligence and the goal congruence checks as strategies for 
maximizing their operational autonomy; 
Clearly ALPHA has its own vision of what and how development should 
move forward and we are strident and arduous in protecting that vision. 
(There are checks and balances) to ensure that, number one, we don‟t take 
money (just) because it is available from a contract or grant…. We have 
the management checks and balances as any organization, when very large 
grants are put in place; they have to be signed by CEO of ALPHA (at the 
International level)…. The larger the grant, the more scrutiny it receives. 
And we develop strategic plans within our COs with the specific purposes 
that we are not going to do knee-jerk reactions to funding opportunities; 
we will base our development strategies on what people (COs) tell us are 
their primary needs and what we believe we are most capable of 
delivering…. So there is everything – from policies and practices to 
management of those systems – all are there to ensure that the wants and 
needs are those communities we serve are well met. 
 
 
As pointed out in the literature, the presence or absence of goal or project overlap 
with those of INGOs‟ may determine the funding tool government employs. And given 
that grants are specifically designed for situations were substantial government 
involvement is not anticipated; it would make good sense to issue grants “when a public 
purpose strongly coincides with a grantee‟s existing program or objectives” (Shaikh and 
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Casablanca 2008). This suggests that, in as much as tool choice decisions are strategically 
made by government, INGOs should equally enter into contractual and grants agreements 
with similar prudence and savoir-faire. 
 
7.2.4  INGO Collaborations and Partnerships 
 
As indicated above, autonomy maximization can be achieved through INGOs‟ 
ability to conduct honest assessments of their own capacity and expertise before 
embarking on a quest for funding. Such self-evaluation may lead INGOs to consider 
taking on a different role within funding arrangements, such as, subcontracting with a 
larger INGO or forming a consortium with peer-INGOs that possess complementary 
comparative advantages. For example, an INGO could maximize it operational autonomy 
by subcontracting with a prime that is, another larger INGO that is in a direct contract 
relationship with the USG. Within this type of arrangement, an INGO would assume a 
much smaller role within the larger contract and would be thus be accountable to the 
prime and not directly to the USG.  
However, while this increases the distance between an INGO and USG, the USG 
still reserves the right to approve the prime‟s choice of subcontractors, including the sub-
grantees‟ key personnel and implementations plan, though not directly. Unfortunately, 
the subcontractor remains subject to whatever conditions may be embedded in the 
contract or in USG funding. Perhaps the silver lining here is that, subcontracting 
increases the distance between the INGO and government. The following statement by 
BETA‟s Humanitarian Assistance Director illustrates this reservation and its impact on 
BETA‟s operational autonomy. 
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Indefinite Quantity Contracts are a mechanism were we have not seen a lot 
of benefit from because again, it‟s a prime that is actually controlling how 
you access task quotas and whether BETA is aggressive enough in 
designing those task quotas at the country level goes a long way to 
determine whether we will get involved in that task quota or not. So, to 
me, it also doesn‟t play well to our strengths. Grants – we understand them 
better, we feel a lot more comfortable with them. 
 
 
 From a financial autonomy perspective however, ALPHA‟s VP of International 
Programs regards such partnerships as funding opportunities that can boost the financial 
viability of an INGO. 
We also build strong relationships with… peer organizations within the 
US so that we are seen as a good partner and as technically capable of 
delivering the services that we bring forward. So we want good partners in 
technical fields and would be a contractual partner who may win a large 
proposal…. It is a large contractual organization that does health projects 
and it‟s really good, so they will often be the winner of a prime and we 
seek to be their partner (as a sub-contractor). 
 
 
Perhaps a more effective strategy for autonomy retention for an INGO is to enter 
into funding exchanges with the USG, but within the collaborative confines of a 
consortium. This strategy has the potential of changing the dynamics of the funding 
relationship in that, an INGO responds to an RFA or RFP as part of a consortium of 
INGOs with complementary comparative advantages, thus taking advantage of the 
concept of “power in numbers.” In a sense, this allows the INGO to seek after funding 
within the folds and perhaps, security and bargaining power of the group, thus improving 
its operational autonomy.  
While being a part of consortia may improve the operational autonomy and 
financial viability of INGOs, it also allows INGOs to share the risk associated with 
increased accountability demands. However, a secondary autonomy loss may occur in 
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that, the INGOs would have to resign some of their own autonomy to the members of the 
consortium. Speaking on the efficacy of this strategy, ALPHA Program Directors stated; 
First of all, there is a realization that no one can do it all. And we also 
realized that to be strong, we need to work together – we need to 
complement each other. In a given country, we usually have geographic 
complementarity, sometimes we have technical expertise complementarity 
– we have different things we bring together, so when there is an 
opportunity like this, we try to seek like-minded orgs which can work 
together….  
 
(For instance we are in a consortium with BETA). We know they have the 
expertise of education in the country – they are recognized for that and 
BETA has expertise in the country and geographically, we are in 
differently areas and this program is covering certain regions, we made 
sure of that in forming this consortium. We are (therefore) representing the 
region in which we will have a presence in the place; we are already 
operating there so that we can demonstrate to the donor that we know 
what we are talking about…. Often we take money only for the area where 
we are already present, in a way when the donor money ends, we can 
continue supporting that community; so that‟s another way we shield 
ourselves from the influence of the donor (trying to influence) how we 
implement our programs. 
 
 
This statement also speaks to a couple of things, one being the operational 
autonomy that comes out of a consortium since each INGO operates as the expert in a 
particular field of expertise. It also speaks to the power a consortium may be able to 
acquire in preserving or even increasing INGOs‟ operational autonomy by using the 
geographical presence of its members, to not only demonstrate the consortium‟s presence 
in a region of interest to the donor, but also to demonstrate the INGOs‟ operational 
experience in a geographical region. Such demonstration of experience and expertise may 
translate into donors giving INGOs a free hand in the development, design and 
implementation of funded programs with little influence from the funders. In other words, 
having experience and unique expertise can be utilized as a bargaining chip with 
 224 
government or any funder, in order to negotiate favorable contractual conditions for the 
group, thus maximizing INGOs‟ autonomy. As BETA‟s Competitive Bids Director 
highlighted,  
Having an area of unique expertise could help shield an organization from 
needing to bend to its donor‟s whims. 
 
 
At the same time, INGOs get to work with peers that share similar values.  
 
7.2.5  Contract Negotiation: The Art of Pushing the Envelope 
 
Another practical consideration at INGOs‟ disposal could be described as “the art 
of pushing the envelope,” that is, the art of contract negotiation. This strategy has the 
potential of allowing INGOs to make inroads in fulfilling their missions in full. Evident 
from the interview data, is that, there is room for negotiation between INGOs and the 
USG (as well as other funding sources), thus improving INGOs‟ autonomy. As noted by 
BETA‟s Competitive Bids Director, her unit helps country offices negotiate proposals 
with the USG. Negotiations thus hold potential for maximizing INGOs‟ operational 
autonomy given some donors‟ willingness to enter into dialogues with INGOs.  
As a donor (Department of State), they tend to be a tiny bit more flexible 
in some respects, and less flexible in others. They are more flexible in the 
process because they will talk to us throughout the process. So when they 
issue a call for proposals, they actually encourage you to talk to them. So 
after they have issued their call for proposals, you can call them up with 
your idea and they will say, yes that sounds good, or no, that doesn‟t 
sound good and if they don‟t like what you are proposing, they will tell 
you what they think they would like you to do; that‟s actually very 
refreshing. But the USAID does not operate that way at all! USAID is 
much more formal; so once they issue a proposal, the process of asking 
questions and answering those questions is very formal. They will give 
you a deadline, you have to submit in writing, they publish all the 
answers; they will not talk to anyone outside of that framework.  
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The efficacy of such an approach however, rests in INGOs‟ cognizance of their 
individual comparative advantage and uniqueness. Funders do not have the operational 
capacity to implement their own programs, which is why they need INGOs as 
implementing partners. Pushing the envelope however, involves investing in negotiation 
and collaborative skills on the part of INGOs, as well as understanding the nature of the 
symbiotic relationship between INGOs and funders, especially if the INGOs have clear 
comparative advantages in some particular area. Such an approach can counteract the 
power and resource asymmetry between INGOs and funding sources. The following 
statement by the Director of Food Programs at BETA illustrates this point.  
With Title II Programs… like any grantee, you can try and push the 
envelope a bit, but at some point, you can‟t go over the line. So I wouldn‟t 
call it necessarily autonomy as much as flexibility and I think we have had 
a fair amount of flexibility as programs have been evolving. 
 
 
7.2.6  INGO Advocacy 
 
Yet another proactive strategy INGOs could use to retain their autonomy lies in 
the INGOs‟ advocacy role that is, when an INGO joins other INGOs in advocating for 
effective ways to provide aid and development assistance. This strategy includes simply 
challenging those funding arrangements (e.g., monetization and funding conditionalities) 
that undermine INGOs‟ autonomy and the effectiveness of their work, preferably, within 
the folds of workgroups such as InterAction‟s Humanitarian Policy and Practice 
Committee and USAID‟s Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid (ACVFA)
7
. 




 According to the USAID website, The Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid (ACVFA) was 
established as part of a post-WWII Presidential directive to serve as a link between the USG and the 
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Such workgroups provide INGOs with a safe medium to influence government‟s relief 
and development-related policies. As BETA‟s Competitive Bids Director elaborated,  
There are different stakeholder-working groups, USAID has something 
called the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Assistance and they 
have 5 different working groups and some of those provide feedback on 
the type of issues that implementing partners encounter including the 
regulatory environment. In addition, USAID has an outreach, what they 
call Partners‟ Day that they offer to key implementing partner 
representatives and that happens every 6 sometimes every 3 months, but 
usually every 6 months. And at that point the partners and USAID – 
USAID talks about their challenges and some of their major new 
initiatives and we provide feedback on any issues that we see or any things 
that we would like to request. And there is usually some positive outcomes 
from that. In addition, there is a formal process that‟s managed by the US 
OMB – Office of Management and Budgeting for the regulatory 
environment. So when USAID wants to propose a major new rule, they 
usually have to publish it in the Federal Register and there is a formal 
period of comment and so that process also allows for feedback.  
 
 
INGOs therefore have several avenues to voice their concerns, as well as 
influence USG‟s policy decisions pertaining to relief assistance and development. It is 
important to recognize a dilemma associated with this strategy, as highlighted in the 
following statement from BETA‟s Secretary of the Board.  
On the one hand, you are fighting them over some policies and principles; 
(on the other), you are also receiving funding from them. 
 
 
7.2.7  “Walk Away” 
 
And finally and perhaps a highly potent strategy for INGOs‟ autonomy retention 
is to simply walk away from funding sources that weaken one‟s autonomy as CARE, 
                                                                                                                                     
 
 
humanitarian assistance and development private voluntary organizations (PVOs). The Advisory 
Committee is mandated with the task of consulting with, providing information to, and advising the USAID 
and other USG agencies on development issues related to foreign assistance, inter alias. 
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Counterpart International and OXFAM have done. Of the 19 participants interviewed for 
this study, only 9 participants identified this as a strategy that INGOs could take. 
According to BETA‟s Secretary of the Board, 
We have had explicit discussions about… the importance for BETA to 
maintain its independence and be willing to walk away from funding if 
that‟s necessarily and we have walked away from funding when you 
know, something with the USG would have wanted us to do was not in 
line with our values and principles. So an explicit strategy, certainly the 
board will encourage us and support us in holding aligned against any 
funder and we are not afraid to walk away from that funding if we need to.  
 
 
However, in order for an INGO to undertake such a decision, it is imperative that 
alternative funding sources be identified and secured.  
This chapter has therefore articulated some of the strategies INGOs are currently 
employing or intend to exploit in order to shield their organizations from autonomy loss 
or at least minimize the risk of autonomy loss. The strategies however seem to be geared 
toward the preservation of financial and operational autonomy to the exclusion of 
managerial autonomy with respect to both financial and human resource management. 
This confirms that the concept of autonomy has been regarded in a myopic, one-
dimensional fashion not only by researchers, but also by the nonprofit community. As a 
result, there is a clear need for INGOs to recognize the multi-faceted nature of autonomy 









Organizational autonomy is a complex concept, a complexity that is confounded 
by the multi-faceted nature of the concept. In the context of this research, the complexity 
of the concept of organizational autonomy is further complicated by the nature of INGO 
funding. INGOs not only have multiple funding sources, they are also funded through 
different funding tools, all of which constitute unique funding environments for INGOs. 
As a result, approaching this analysis from resource dependence and tool choice 
perspectives provide insight into the nature of the funding environment INGOs operate 
in. The findings from this study indicate that different funding sources and mechanisms 
influence INGOs‟ actual decision making competencies in variant degrees. This influence 
and control is largely limited to the donor-funded programs.  
However, INGOs also have various opportunities to make “autonomous” 
decisions, albeit, in “consultation” with the USG funding agencies. This chapter therefore 
summarizes and discusses the main findings emanating from this research.  The chapter 
then concludes with a discussion of the implications for policy, practice and research.  
 
8.2 Summary of the Main Findings 
 
 The complexity of the concept of organizational autonomy has been completely 
overshadowed by INGOs‟ one-dimensional reference and approach to autonomy. For the 
most part, organizational autonomy has been referred to in terms of independence, 
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flexibility or being donor-driven. This research concludes that this concept is indeed 
multi-dimensional and it is crucial that both INGOs and nonprofit scholars view and treat 
it as such.  
Table 15 summarizes the findings in this report by illustrating the impact different 
funding sources and mechanisms are perceived to have on INGOs‟ autonomy 
dimensions. The construction of this cross-tabulation was largely informed by an analysis 
of the data, based on participants‟ experiences. In a sense, the table demonstrates the 
overall impact of funding, based on a cross-case summary of the key findings. Examples 
of statements instrumental in the construction this table (as well as Figures 6 and 7 
presented in Chapter 5 and 6), are shown in Appendix 4.  
 
Table 15: Perceived INGO Autonomy, by Funding Source & Tool Choice 




      (HRM)                              (FM) 
Operational 
 
GOVERNMENT (USG) Low Very Low Low-to-Medium 
    
FUNDING MECHANISMS   
Contracts Very Low Very Low Very Low 
Grants Medium Low Medium-to-High 
Cooperative Agreements Low Low Low-to-Medium 
    
CORPORATIONS None Medium High 
    
FOUNDATIONS    
Newer and Larger  None Very Low Medium 
Older and Larger None Medium Medium-to-High 
 
Overall, the findings from this research indicate that different funding sources and 
tools influence INGOs‟ autonomy dimensions in varying degrees. Government funding in 
general, yield very low managerial autonomy with respect to financial management, 
suggesting high control on INGOs‟ decisions pertaining to resource allocation and use. 
Table 15 also demonstrates that newer larger foundations and to a lesser extent, corporate 
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funders, demonstrate similar patterns. Therefore, due to the ex ante and ex post controls 
different funders employ, as well as the different USG funding tools, INGOs are mostly 
likely to retain varying levels of operational and managerial autonomy.  
However, these findings need to be interpreted in context – that funder or donor 
influence and control are largely limited to the funded programs. Therefore, the donor-
INGO autonomy discourse presented in this research needs to be referenced in the 
context of the funded programs and not the organization as whole, unless an INGO is 100 
percent funded by a particular as is almost the case with SIGMA. 
 
The key findings from this research are as follows: 
 Government funding is associated with much lower levels of autonomy for 
INGOs, more so than foundation grants and corporate funding, and this is with 
respect to INGOs‟ operational autonomy and managerial autonomy with respect 
to financial and human resources management.  
As a result, a high dependence on USG funding – as in the case of SIGMA; has 
the likelihood of yielding low operational autonomy, as well as some measure of 
managerial autonomy with respect to human resources management. This is in contrast to 
an INGO like ALPHA whose dependence on USG funding is low. This loss in autonomy 
is likely to occur through various ex ante rules and regulations and the performance-
based controls codified in the Code of Federal Regulations.  
For instance, as expressed in Section 266.25 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 
INGOs “are required to report deviations from budget and program plans, and request 
prior approval for budget and program plan revisions.” Such rules and regulations have 
the power to constrain INGOs‟ capacity to make independent decisions about funded 
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programs, by controlling and directing INGOs‟ decisions and actions. As a result, 
attaching rules, regulations and conditions to funding, establish the confines in which 
INGOs‟ decision making takes place.  
And consistent with Kerlin (2002a), INGOs encounter several factors that weaken 
their autonomy. These include the imposition of government‟s ideologies, direction, and 
control as conditions of funding (e.g., the Anti-Prostitution Pledge or Fly America Act) 
and government‟s pursuit of foreign policy agendas that are usually misaligned with the 
relief assistance and development agendas and values that INGOs carry. 
   
 Larger newer foundations like the Google Foundation or the Melinda and Bill 
Gates Foundation appear to act like government by constraining INGOs‟ 
operational autonomy through rigid ex ante budget and performance controls. It is 
these controls that weaken INGOs‟ operational and managerial autonomy with 
respect to financial management, as INGOs seek donors‟ approval for their 
resource allocation and inputs use decisions  
The above can also be attributed to the adoption of a venture capital model of 
philanthropy by newer foundations and corporations which treats philanthropy as some 
type of “investment” with an expected social rate of return (Brainerd 1999; Herman 
2004; Grobman 2007). As such, foundations ask that INGOs follow strict budget rules, as 
well as show evidence of impact, something they share with corporate funders, though at 
a much greater impact compared to corporate funders. 
 
 A third finding is that, all funding sources, i.e., government, foundations, and 
corporations, greatly influence and control INGOs through interventional 
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constraints or ex post controls. These are largely used to hold INGOs accountable 
for the promises they would have made during the contract negotiation phase.  
This is influence on INGOs is therefore accomplished through various levels of 
reporting requirements, and the monitoring, evaluation and audit provisions attached to 
funding. Reporting requirements and audit provisions are largely attributed to the 
increasing demand for INGO accountability by the donor community. However, the 
impact each of the funders‟ requirements may have on an INGO‟s behavior largely rests 
on the degree to which the funders‟ requirements are deemed onerous by INGOs, as well 
as the degree to which such requirements are attached to a threat of sanctions or some 
penalty system. With government funding for instance, an award to an INGO can be 
suspended or terminated for failure “to comply with the terms and conditions of an 
award” (Sections 226.60 – 226.62 of the Code of Federal Regulations).  
Overall, participants expressed that USG funding is more arduous compared to 
corporate funding and foundations grants. And this is attributed to participants‟ 
experience with government‟s expanded reporting and audit obligations (e.g., the 
extensive A133 audit; direct monitoring and field audits where possible). 
 
 Pertaining to government funding, this analysis finds that over and above the 
restrictive nature of USG funding in general, INGOs‟ autonomy also varies by 
funding mechanism or tool choice.  
This is consistent with Salamon‟s (2002b) assertion that government‟s use of 
funding tools is strategic and political given the characteristics of each funding tools. As 
a result, this study finds that government‟s funding tools also confine and constrain 
INGOs‟ decisions and activities, by constricting the environments within which those 
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decisions are made and by stipulating the conditions under which the activities are 
implemented.  As illustrated in Table 15, the findings suggest that in light of their 
coercive character, contracts constrain INGO‟s operational autonomy more than 
cooperative agreements and grants, respectively. Since contracts imply that INGOs are 
essentially implementing the USG‟s programs, they are subject to more government 
instruction and control and therefore do not only negatively impacting INGOs‟ 
operational autonomy, but also exhibit high interventional controls given the high degree 
of control, scrutiny and reporting obligations.  
Consistent with Schneider and Ingram (1990) and Salamon (2002b) therefore, this 
analysis finds that funding tools signal strong messages to INGOs in terms of the type of 
relationships that will emerge from each instrument. In a contract relationship, an INGO 
is simply regarded as a “contractor” of government and thus enters into a very controlled 
relationship requiring specified outputs. On the other hand, a cooperative agreement, 
owing to the substantial government involvement is also quite controlled, given the 
USG‟s desire to be involved in all major decisions INGOs make. This translates into 
lower levels of operational and managerial autonomy with respect to human resources 
and financial management.  
However, grants outside of a cooperative agreement yield more operational 
autonomy and managerial autonomy compared to contracts and cooperative agreements. 
Grants allow INGOs room to design and implement funded programs in a way they see 
fit, with limited involvement from the USG. Although implementation plans are 
submitted to the USG, there is no expectation to await government approvals (USAID‟s 
ADS 303).  
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However, the grant funding mechanism does not necessarily reduce the impact of 
government control of INGOs‟ resource allocation and use. Such tight control on how the 
provided resources are used has the power to diminish INGOs‟ operational autonomy and 
their managerial autonomy with respect to financial autonomy. This may be attributed to 
the observation that INGOs are expected to comply with the federal budget rules and 
regulations in spite of the funding tool utilized. In additional, grants do not necessarily 
provide INGOs with an escape from complying with the reporting requirements either, 
though the degree of enforcement may be milder, compared to cooperative agreements 
and contracts, given government‟s stake in these.  
That being said, it is important to point out another crucial observation emerging 
from this research, 
 INGOs have various opportunities to exercise their operational autonomy and 
managerial autonomy, especially with respect to financial management.  
First of all, INGOs choose which government projects they want to engage in, 
based not only on the degree of goal alignment, but also based on their own assessments 
of their own capacity to respond to the rules, regulations and compliance requirements 
associated with each funding opportunity.  
INGOs can also exercise their influence as they design programs in response to 
funding announcements, however specific they are. In other words, the actual specifics of 
a funded program, including the implementation plans, usually originate with the INGOs, 
especially with respect to cooperative agreements and grants. However, the USG 
provides INGOs with guidelines describing the program to be implemented and the 
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objectives that have to be focus of the designed program. In essence, INGOs make these 
“autonomous” decisions in “consultation” with the USG funding agencies. 
A third avenue available to INGOs to exercise their influence is by suggesting 
deviations from the original plans mid-course. However, there is always the probability 
that the program designs and implementation plans, as well as the suggested deviations 
can be vetoed by the funding agencies by way of approving or rejecting them. As such, 
the requirement for prior approvals, highlight the degree to which USG in particular, has 
been referred to as a more exacting funding source. This suggests that INGOs operate in 
highly controlled environments. And such conditions can stifle INGOs‟ innovation and 
flexibility, thus affecting the quality of their work and the timeliness of their responses. 
Overall, the findings in this research suggest that, all funding sources i.e., 
government, corporations, and foundations, steer, direct, and control INGOs, 
 by providing them with guidelines to guide their proposal designs,  
 by regulating their resource allocation decisions and inputs use, and  
 through ex post constraints such as reporting, evaluation requirements and audit 
provisions with respect to INGOs‟ a priori set program decisions and outcomes. 
Such controls compel INGOs to include the funders‟ a priori set goals and norms 
and in some instances, as with government, adopt whole strategies altogether, resulting in 






Autonomy Retention Strategies 
While it is clear that INGOs‟ autonomy is compromised in some way, this 
research illuminates some strategies INGOs have at their disposal to protect or at least 
minimize the risk of autonomy. These strategies include; 
 Revenue Diversification: While participants from all three INGOs felt positive 
about the strategy‟s potential for improving the operational autonomy of INGOs, 
especially when they rely on less exacting funding sources; the findings suggest 
that the strategy is also likely to result in an increase in the extra-organizational 
control and influence of INGOs through interventional constraints emanating 
from multiple funding sources, who may ask for different things. 
 Due Diligence: The findings also reveal a need for INGOs to do their due 
diligence in researching and learning about each grantor, their rules, regulations 
and monitoring and evaluation requirements and controls. This is critical given 
that INGOs are expected to comply with the different rules and regulations, as 
well as conditionalities attached to funding, mechanisms that can have powerful 
effect on INGOs‟ decisions and action, thus undermining their autonomy.   
 Assessments of INGOs’ Capacity: While appreciating that funding sources help 
improve INGOs‟ capacity to fulfill their missions, it is important for INGOs to 
assess their own internal capacities (e.g., financial systems, staff, expertise, and 
experience) to verify that they have the necessary competence and capacity to 
comply and fulfill the funders‟ expectations, rules and regulations.  
 Congruence and Fit: It is also necessary for INGOs to assess and evaluate 
whether there is strong congruence and fit between their goals and objectives and 
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those of each funding opportunity. Failure to do so may result in INGOs 
implementing their funding sources‟ priorities and programs at the expense of 
their own. 
 INGOs’ Collaborations and Partnerships: The findings also show that seeking 
after funding opportunities within the protection and confines of partnerships and 
collaborations with other INGOs may improve the bargaining and negotiation 
power of INGOs, thereby shielding INGOs from high autonomy loss. 
 
The findings also suggest that INGOs can always seek after less directed and 
controlled funding sources. And finally, INGOs can also choose to walk away from 
funding sources and tools that have a high propensity to weaken their autonomy across all 
dimensions. Overall, INGOs may need to seek solutions that help them retain some 
measure of distance between them and their funding sources. 
 
8.3 Implications & Recommendations for Policy, Practice and Research 
 
From a policy perspective, it is evident that INGOs‟ humanitarian mandate of 
neutrality, impartiality and independence exemplify the critical values INGOs continue to 
espouse. These values also stand to be lost as a result of a loss of INGOs‟ operational 
autonomy, especially when funding is too exacting or too restrictive in nature. From this 
analysis, we find that revenue diversification becomes critical to INGOs‟ operational 
autonomy, especially in cases where government prohibits INGOs to operate or respond 
in certain “ineligible countries” using USG funding, as exemplified by ALPHA and 
BETA‟s the inability to utilize federal funds to response to the cyclone in Myanmar in 
2008.  
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Other conditionalities include the anti-prostitution ideologies embedded in 
HIV/AIDS funds, some of which ran contrary to scientific evidence on condom use as a 
method for reducing HIV transmission. Such conditions simply tie the hands of INGOs 
by constraining their innovation and responsiveness – a situation that does nothing to 
inspire confidence in INGOs as experts at what they do.  
In terms of policy implications, this study emphasizes the need for policymakers 
to appreciate the values, passions and views that we cherish about the third sector, 
especially, in order to help establish and maintain the sectors‟ uniqueness, role, function, 
and impact in the political economy. While government is an important source of funding 
for INGOs; that funding need not come at the cost of their independence, neutrality and 
impartiality and above, all, their flexibility, innovation and responsiveness. After all, it is 
these very qualities that attracted policymakers to INGOs in the first place (Nikolic and 
Koontz 2007). Therefore, while subsuming INGOs under the U.S. foreign policy 
objectives positions INGOs to produce services that meet government expectations; such 
a strategy occurs at the expense of INGOs‟ identity and credibility.  
In light of INGOs‟ role as the official implementing partners of government, a 
decline in INGOs‟ autonomy, innovation and responsiveness  also raises critical 
questions as to whether such a state would be in the best interest of the USG in the long-
run. And while different funding tools, as well as the presence of ex ante and ex post 
controls are being utilized to increase INGO accountability, a choke-hold approach to 
accountability stands to further weaken INGOs‟ innovation and effectiveness overall.  
At a practical level, especially, in light of the presence of rules and regulations 
attached to government funding, the significance of unrestricted funding to an INGO 
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cannot be understated. Clearly, INGOs cannot escape the high interventional controls 
associated with increased accountability demands. However, there is a financial cost 
associated with meeting the ex post requirements of INGO funders. As BETA‟s acting 
CFO observed with respect to government funding, “anybody is cheaper than 
government,” given that “financial statements audits (such as the A133 Audit)… cost 
about a million dollars and that comes out of unrestricted dollars.” This statement 
emphasizes the importance of generating unrestricted funding to maximize INGOs‟ 
autonomy by allowing them sufficient room to undertake activities that are near and dear 
to their missions, as well as finance activities restricted funding will not.  
A positive externality emanating from the high ex post controls (accountability 
demands) associated with funding include the increased professionalization of INGOs. 
For istance, the A133 audit has helped INGOs improve their internal controls. 18 out of 
the 19 participants in this study viewed INGO professionalism as a direct result of the 
INGO interactions with USG funding, as well as other funding sources.  
In addition, it is plausible that the high accountability demands donors have 
placed on INGOs have helped formalize INGOs‟ evaluation processes, especially when 
INGOs are required to adopt common indicators or measures of success. Such an 
approach will help establish some degree of consistency in establishing common 
measurable indicators of impact or effectiveness, thus improving the capacity to trace the 
effectiveness of INGOs‟ programs over time. 
This research has also shown that, different funding sources impact INGOs‟ 
autonomy dimensions in varying degrees. This calls for a need for INGOs to be cognizant 
of the multi-dimensions nature of organizational autonomy. An understanding of this 
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would help INGOs consider which autonomy dimensions are vital to their organizations, 
as they ponder over which funding sources and funding tools to seek after and the impact 
each one has on the autonomy dimensions. In as much as, the USG is strategic in its tool 
choice based on the kinds of relationships it wants to have with INGOs, it is incumbent 
upon INGOs to become equally savvy and prudent in their approach to funding choices 
and contract negotiation. 
From a research perspective, Kerlin (2002a) observed that the real impact of 
government funding on autonomy remains elusive. While this research does not provide a 
quantitative measure of impact, it does provide insights as to the degree to which 
government funding influences INGO autonomy, relative to other funding sources, by 
confirming the direction of the relationship and by suggesting the general magnitude of 
the impact. A utility of these continuums is that, they provide future quantitative research 
with potentially testable hypotheses about the influence of USG funding, relative to other 
funding sources, and the influence of funding tools on INGOs‟ autonomy dimensions. 
The findings also provide insights as to the mechanism responsible for weakening 
INGOs‟ autonomy, i.e., the ex ante and ex post controls, funding conditionalities, as well 
as differences in ideological approaches to development work between funding sources 
and INGOs. However, quantitative research is needed to supply sufficient evidence in 
order to be able to speak to the impact of government funding on INGOs‟ autonomy 
dimensions, relative to other funding sources, in quantitative terms. Adopting an 
alternative methodology beyond the qualitative multiple-case study approach adopted in 
this study would help confirm the findings in this study. Hence, we would understand the 
exchange relationships between INGOs and their funders in a new light. 
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The findings have shown that autonomy need not be treated as a one-dimensional 
concept; instead researchers need to incorporate and approach autonomy from a multi-
dimensional level in order to fully capture and understand the influence funding sources 
have on nonprofit organizations‟ autonomy, across different dimensions. This analysis 
also recommends that future research recognize that, not only is organizational autonomy 
a multi-dimensional concept, it is also a latent variable, one that is unobservable.  The 
variable is observed through other observable indicators such as the existence of ex ante 
and ex post controls and conditionalities attached to funding, among other indicators. 
That being said, this research encountered tautological challenges while applying 
Verhoest, Peters et al.‟s (2004) dual characterization of autonomy as the possession of 
actual decision making competencies and also as the presence of autonomy constraints. 
Arising from these challenges however, was an opportunity to advance alternative ways 
of conceptualizing autonomy. The findings from this research suggest that the present 
characterization of autonomy as both the decision making competencies and constraints 
may create model specification problems. As a result, if we are to understand the nuances 
of organizational autonomy, it may be pre-emptive to be very clear about the separation 
between organizational autonomy as the possession of actual decision making 
competencies, and the mechanisms that constrain those decision making competencies. In 
other words, we need to explicitly establishing the premise that one leads to the other. 
Given the exclusion of INGOs country offices in this study, future qualitative and 
quantitative research might extend the government-INGO autonomy discourse to include 
INGOs‟ country offices since these are the official implementing arms of U.S.-based 
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INGOs. Extending research to focus in this implementation environment or context 
would provide further insight on how funding and tools impacts INGOs‟ autonomy.  
This analysis also finds some evidence to suggest a negative link between 
funding, INGO autonomy, and the effectiveness of their programming operations. In 
other words, INGOs‟ autonomy could be regarded as intervening variables between 
funding and INGOs‟ effectiveness. Future research therefore might need to extend the 
question of INGO autonomy to include questions about INGO effectiveness, as a 
function of their funded relationships.  
 
8.4 Conclusions  
 
What do these findings mean for understanding INGO-government exchange 
relations, as well as for understanding INGO autonomy?  
First, the findings suggest that funding can be used as a conduit to transmit 
preferences, priorities and values that are of importance to a donor. As such, INGO 
grantees need to be cognizant of the controls and signals inherent in different funding 
sources and funding tools, as well as understand what that means for their work. As the 
relief and development experts, INGOs need to be cognizant of the extent to which 
different funding sources and tools yield or undermine their actual decision making 
powers pertaining to program designs and implementation. Such awareness would help 
INGOs assess the value of their exchange relationships, vis-à-vis, the degree to which 
they remain innovative, responsive and are able to maintain their credibility in the 
political economy; or the degree to which each unique funding environment embodies 
and promotes these values. 
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Given the strong foreign policy orientation of USG funding, the findings also 
suggest a need to maintain some “distance” between funders, in particular, government 
and INGOs. As long as INGOs continue to be recognized as the official implementing 
partners of USG policy objectives, a careful assessment of the “development” integrity of 
the policy objectives INGOs implement is therefore necessary. Failure to do so on the 
part of INGOs might seal their fate as mere appendages of government, thus undermining 
their credibility as entities that are separate from government.  
In the words of Carol Lancaster as she commented on the USAID‟s 
reorganization under the Department of State, “distance is important to retain some 
degree of autonomy for development mission,” as well as for the credibility of that 
mission. From resource dependence perspective, a high dependence on government 
funding or any one funder may indicate a reduction in this distance as INGOs adapt 
themselves to the providers of the particular resources they seek. 
The findings also suggest a need for INGOs to be savvy and prudent in their 
choice of funding tools and contract negotiations. Each funding mechanism utilized by 
government influences INGOs‟ autonomy dimensions in some way. As a result, the 
debate can no longer be about who should implement foreign assistance programs, but 
about understanding the types of implementing instruments INGOs should be accepting 
(Shaikh and Casablanca 2008) and the implications of each of these instruments on 
INGOs‟ capacity to make autonomous decisions.   
To emphasize the purposiveness of tool choices, a 2007 HELP Commission (a 
bipartisan collaboration of foreign assistance experts appointed by President Bush and 
Congress), found that the use of grants where contracts would have been appropriate, 
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actually weakened program effectiveness (Shaikh and Casablanca 2008). This suggests 
that the tool of choice employed by the USG also has major implications for the 
effectiveness of INGO operations and programs. However, it is important to know how 
“effectiveness” is being defined and assessed in this case, lest this argument is used to 
support government‟s adoption of contracts as the key funding mechanism, in place of far 
less coercive tools like grants.  
In conclusion, in the words of BETA‟s VP of Global Support,  
Organizational autonomy should be a concern for any organization 
because what allows us to do our work; to go into communities where we 
work, particularly in difficult situations where there is conflict… it is our 
autonomy and… our impartiality (that allow us access). And if we are 
seen to be too closely aligned with any government or any faction, then we 
are going to be targeted, we are going to be seen as political or having an 
agenda outside of poverty reduction, helping the poor, which we don‟t 
want. Our agenda is poverty alleviation and therefore our autonomy is 
essential for us to achieve that. 
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APPENDIX 1  





U.S. FOREIGN AID POLICY EVENTS & CHANGES 
 
Before the 19th 
Century 
 Congress viewed foreign aid as inappropriate & unconstitutional 
End of the 19th 
Century 
 Assistance to improve public health, public works, education to U.S. military occupied 
countries (e.g., Cuba – after the Spanish-American War; Haiti; Dominican Republic; 
Nicaragua); 
Public aid for relief widely accepted & provided 
Prior to WWII  Small amounts of Technical Assistance to Latin American countries 
Post-1945 Pres. Truman & 
Marshall (Sec. of 
State) 
1947: Foreign aid as a diplomatic tool – initiated in response to the nascent Cold War in 
Europe 
U.S. offered aid to Greece & Turkey to resist the Soviet Union 
Result: (1) $400 million for Greece & Turkey; (2) Marshall Plan - $13 billion, 4-yr 
program to heal spur economic stabilization & recovery in Europe 
Motivation: Diplomatic concerns vs. the threat of Communism & humanitarian and 
commercial concerns – latter would have been insufficient to convince Congress 
1949: Truman‟s “Point Four” program of technical assistance (small, temporary, justified 
by diplomatic reasons – to stop the spread of communism 
Two Events: Communist revolution in China (1949) & North Korea invasion of S. Korea 
(1950) – led to prolongation & geographical spread of U.S. Foreign Aid 
1950s – 1960s  1950s: A Reorientation of U.S. Aid 
1953: Pres. Dwight Eisenhower‟s agenda to curtail foreign aid BUT aid too useful to 
eliminate 
Other trends: the efficacy of aid to “buy” Cold War alliance questioned by Congress (both 
sides) 
1954: new initiatives added to a Food Aid Program (Public Law 480 or PL480) – transfer 
of US agricultural surplus abroad – these proved uncontroversial; INGOs managed food aid 
programs 
1957: separation of economic from military assistance – creation of Development Loan 
Fund (DLF) – provides concessional credit to development countries (those in proximity to 
Soviet influence); 1958: International Development Association (IDA) created - a World 
Bank soft loan window; InterAmerican Development Bank – for Central & S. American 
Influential Trends:  
(1) Increasing importance of developing countries; (2) growing view among US policy 
makers – support economic & social programs to shape outcome of Cold war vs. aid to 
stabilize their economies; (3) Growing Soviet‟s positive view of the importance of poor 
countries – offer aid and technical assistance to Afghanistan, Burma, the  1957 successful 
launch of the Sputnik  –caused alarm in Washington 
Walter Rostow’s (MIT) Theory of Development & Modernization: like Senator 
Fulbright promoted the use of aid for LT development to prevent the support of radical 
doctrines such as communism (Rostow‟s access to senior officials in the Eisenhower 
administration – enabled him to influence aid policies) 
Post-1960 John F. Kennedy  1961: JF Kennedy– vision for economic assistance to less-developed nations; launch a 
“Decade of Development” 
Motivation:  Development as Diplomacy - promotion of development as an establish US 
Foreign priority 
Outcomes: (1) Alliance for Progress for Latin America (a product of fear of the Marxist 
regime of Fidel Castro & communism into the Western Hemisphere) – to promote 
modernization, development, democracy; 1960: $157 million (5% of US aid), 1964: $989 
million (25% of US aid);  
(2) Initiatives in Africa (much of Sub-Saharan Africa gained independence – 1960: $38 m, 
1964: $220 m); pressured W. Europe and Japan to promote aid development abroad; 
Creation of Peace Corps – to send to developing countries to help with technical assistance, 
training and management of small projects; active role in Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC); proposed that the UN proclaim the 1960s as first Decade of 
Development; Unification of the Development Loan Fund & the International Cooperation 
Agency into a single new agency: Agency for International Development (USAID) 
1963 – 1975 Johnson, Nixon, & 
Ford 
1963-67: Johnson – continued criticism of foreign aid; decline of threat of communism & 
Soviet Influence to L. America & Sub-Saharan Africa; a rise in aid to Cambodia, Vietnam, 
Laos as a result of war; Owing to criticisms of aid, “Perkins Committee” formed – as the 
General Advisory Committee on Foreign Aid to study foreign aid; Recommendation – to 
channel funds through multilateral development banks, as a means of reducing the 
diplomatic element in aid allocations 
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1970: Nixon – (per Congress‟ request) requested the “Peterson Report” – 
Recommendation: US multilateral institutions become the major channel for development 
assistance. Nixon‟s plan to increase distance between development and diplomatic purposes 
of aid – proposed the elimination of USAID, the formation of 3 separate agencies (an 
International Development (ID) Bank to manage aid loans; ID Institute for research and 
technical assistance; ID Council to coordinate trade, finance, and investment policies) – 
Congress decline proposal as too radical; “emphasized the humanitarian aspect of foreign 
aid” in 1969 – thus elevating the development purpose of aid as an important end; increase 
in amount of aid to multilateral aid agencies – such as the WB 
1974: Ford (1) Sahelian Drought- suffering in Ethiopia, floods in Bangladesh widely 
reported in US media – 1974-75 US food aid doubled & tripled in Bangladesh. Several 
INGOs e.g. Bread for the World became advocates for aid to help the hungry;  
(2) 1973: Yom Kippur War – Egypt & Syria‟s attack of Israel, threat of Soviet to aid Egypt, 
aid for “peacemaking” diplomacy 
1977 – 1980s Carter–to–Regan 1970s: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations-sponsored Polls – 1974: 8% viewed world 
hunger as an important issue, 18% thought cutting foreign aid was a high priority, 1978: 
59% thought combating hunger should be among US foreign policy goals; 1979: 16% 
thought hunger an important issue, 1% viewed cutting foreign aid as a priority 
1977: Carter – brought 2 things: (1) emphasis on human rights & (2) negotiation of the 
Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt – formalized peace agreement; Human 
Rights – a fundamental tenet of U.S. Foreign policy- aid through international financial 
institutions – WB – conditioned on Human rights performance. Approx. $2 billion/year in 
aid for Israel & Egypt; US dualistic aid program had strong diplomatic orientation (evident 
in major US aid recipients) combined with significant development purposes (esp. Sub-
Saharan Africa). Development purposes: played the key role in decisions on the use of aid 
in both diplomatically and developmentally important countries 
1981: Reagan – most ideologically conservative regimes – expected to reduce US aid; 
Director of new Office of Management & Budget, proposed to terminate US contributions 
to IDA; (1) Ethiopian Famine 1984-5 met with public outcry for US to act – increase in aid 
to Sub-Saharan Africa; (2) Marxist-oriented Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua & civil war 
in El Salvador – aid used to fortify existing government 
Result: increase in the volume of US aid in Africa, C. America in the 1980s (1989: US aid 
= $10 billion, 30% higher than it was in 1980) 
1990s Bush & Clinton 1990s: End of Cold War & hence end of rationale for foreign aid; development purpose 
also weakened as a result of the erosion of the confidence of the effectiveness of aid in 
furthering development; the emergent of new purposes for aid 
1989: G.H.W. Bush: Aid for Political & Economic Transitions in response to new 
noncommunist governments forming in Poland, constitutional changes in Hungary, Fall of 
the Berlin Wall, Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia & the execution of Rumanian 
Communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu & his wife. Aid to help nations in transition for new 
countries emerging from the former Soviet Union  
Early 1990s: Aid for Democracy Promotion as demand for multiparty elections and 
greater democracy spread in Sub-Saharan Africa – Dept of State & USAID developed 
democratic centers/bureaus; Aid to Address Global Problems – USAID‟s Global Affairs 
Bureau – attention on environment, international health – esp. impact of HIV/AIDS – US 
funding prevention and research programs; Civil Conflicts – resulted in post-recovery 
support (Balkans, Haiti, Cambodia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Angola, 
East Timor) 
Clinton Administration: efforts to cut the federal budget & republicans‟ efforts to cut the 
size of government; reaction from the development-oriented INGOs, some business groups 
& elements in the Foreign policy community – led to an ease in the budget cuts; Mrs. 
Clinton supported development purpose. 1997: InterAction “Just 1%” campaign to inform 
the American public & persuade Congress 
2000s W. Bush 21st Century Aid: Several dramatic changes to the US foreign aid: -  
March 2002: Pres. Bush announced a $5B annual increase in aid for development to be 
achieved by 2006 Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) – specifically for development, 
aid linked to greater accountability demands & funds managed by new aid agency: 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) & were provided to democratic governments;  
Sept 2002: White House published a National Security Strategy for the United States of 
America: - asserted that the US would use force to counter threats to its security & also 
elevation of development as one of 3 priorities of US foreign policy (along with defense & 
promotion of democracy);  
Early 2003: additional $15B boost in aid over 3 years announced to fight HIV/AIDS;  
Bush Administration – US aid risen as one of the fastest rates in the history of US aid-
giving (40% (01-05)), not counting aid for emergencies to Iraq & Afghanistan; This driven 
by 9/11 events; increased pressure from Christian groups to increase aid for humanitarian 




INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
 
Georgia State University 
Department of Public Administration and Urban Studies 
Informed Consent 
 
Title: Government Funding and NGO Autonomy: From Resource Dependence and Tool Choice 
Perspectives 
 
Principal Investigator(s):  Professor. Dennis R. Young (Principal Investigator) 





You are invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of this study is to investigate the 
relationship between government funding and NGO autonomy, in hope to understand the extent 
to which a funder can influence the ways in which NGOs behave. The study also hopes to 
understand the strategies NGOs use to retain their autonomy. You are invited to participate in this 
study because of your experience in and knowledge of the NGO environment. A total of 30 
participants will be recruited for this study. Participation will require approximately 45 to 60 
minutes of your time for a one-time, in-person interview, unless a follow-up telephone interview 




If you decide to participate, you will be interviewed in-person. The interviews will be taped and 
listened to later by the interviewer. The tape however will not be shared with anyone outside of 
the study and will be destroyed at the end of the study. In the case that some of the information 
we gather from you during the in-person interviews turns out not be clear, there is a possibility 
that we may follow up with a telephone interview in order to clarify some information with you.  
Please be advised that by signing this consent form, you are agreeing to have us ask you for a 








Participation in this study may not benefit you personally. Overall, we hope to gain information 
about the nature of the relationship between funding and the autonomy of NGOs, as well as, the 






V. Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal: 
 
Participation in this research is voluntary.  You do not have to be in this study.  If you decide to be 
in the study and change your mind, you have the right to drop out at any time.  You may skip 





We will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law. We will also use pseudonyms 
rather than your name on study records.   Only Dr Dennis Young and Grace Chikoto will have 
access to the information you provide. The tapes will be stored at Grace Chikoto‟s home 
office in a locked cabinet and will be destroyed at the end of the study. The transcribed 
information will be stored on a Georgia State University-assigned private drive, on a secure, 
password and firewall-protected computer. Your name and other facts that might point to you 
will not appear when we present this study or publish its results. The findings will be 
summarized and reported in group form.  
 
VII. Contact Persons: 
 
Call Professor. Dennis Young at (404) 413-0126 or paddry@langate.gsu.edu and Grace L. Chikoto 
at 404-918-2420 or padglcx@langate.gsu.edu, if you have any questions about this study: If you have 
questions or concerns about your rights as a participant in this research study, you may contact Susan 
Vogtner in the Office of Research Integrity at 404-413-3513 or svogtner1@gsu.edu. 
 
VIII. Copy of Consent Form to Subject: 
 
We will give you a copy of this consent form to keep. 
 
If you are willing to volunteer for this research and be audio taped, please sign below.  
 
__________________________________________________                 _______________ 
Participant                                       Date  
 
________________________    ________________________                ________________ 














The dynamic between funding and how non-governmental organizations (INGOs) behave 
is not fully understood, especially as it relates to the autonomy of INGOs. I am investigating the 
complex relationship between government funding and the autonomy of U.S. based relief INGOs 
operating outside of the U.S. In particular, the questions asked in this interview hope to flesh out 
the multi-dimensional concept of “autonomy,” (BY THIS I MEAN INDEPENDENCE TO 
PURSUE THE SERVICE MISSION OF THE ORGANIZATION) as well as understand the link 
between different autonomy dimensions and funding. Overall, this interview will help understand 
the extent to which government funding influences what INGOs do and how they operate?  
While your responses are crucial to the understanding of this funded relationship, your 
responses are entirely confidential, and as such, no individuals will be identified and any 
organizational identifiers will be deleted at the close of the study. Note that, any comments 
generated from this interview will not be associated to you personally unless you so choose. 
Participation in this interview is voluntary and you may choose not to respond, or choose to skip 
questions you are not comfortable with. I will also share the findings emanating from this 




1. Could you tell me a little about your position and role with this organization?  
2. Tell me a little about the history of your program/organization?  
3. What are your organization‟s (or program‟s) sources of funding? PROBE  Meaning of 
“Other Sources” 
 
I.     RESOURCE DEPENDENCE 
 
1. Which of your funding sources do you consider to be important to the organization?  
2. How would your organization (or program) survive without this funding source 
(SPECIFY: USG; Corporations; Foundations; Other Sources)? 
3. What kinds of government funding does your organization/program get? 
4. How is important is government funding to your organization?  
5. To what extent would your organization survive without government funding? 
6. Do you have any new funding sources your organization is currently looking to access? 
7. Are there factors that limit you from soliciting funding from particular sources?  
8. To what extent do you compete for funding with other INGOs? (How would you 
characterize the degree of competition?) 







II.    AUTONOMY OF THE ORGANIZATION 
 
A.   Strategic and Operational Personnel Management Autonomy: 
 
1. To what extent does the funding source (SPECIFY: USG; Corporations; Foundations; 
Other Sources) influence who you hire for a particular funded project?  
2. PROBE In what ways do funding sources try to influence your hiring choices?  (E.g., 
influencing the appointment; the salaries of personnel implementing funded program; and how 
they are evaluated)  
 
[The above questions were not to Executive Staff] 
 
B.   Financial Management Autonomy: 
 
3. How does each of the following funding sources (SPECIFY: USG; Corporations; 
Foundations; Other Sources) try to influence your organization‟s allocation and use of 
funds? 
 
PROBE  In what ways do they try to influence resource allocation and utilizations? 
   
OPTIONAL FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS  
4. To what extent does your organization or funded program influence how funds are 
allocated and used? (E.g., the organization/program makes the determination without 
interference from funding source; or the funding source makes the determination and you have no 
say; or the funding source and your agency jointly makes the determination) 
5. To what extent can your organization or funded program make changes to the budget or 
reallocate funds once the contract agreement is made? (SPECIFY: USG, Corporations, 
Foundations, Other sources) (E.g., shift budget or decide how funds are to be allocated or make 
alterations to the budget allocation after decisions about how funds are to spent or allocated have 
been made) 
 
C.   Policy Autonomy: 
 
Involvement of funders in the decision making about how programs are implemented  
 
6. How do funders try to influence how your organization operates? (SPECIFY: USG; 
Corporations; Foundations; Other Sources) 
7. In what ways do funders try to exert that influence?  
PROBES  To what extent does your organization (or you): -  
8. make independent decisions about the type of programs and program activities  (policy 
instruments) to be implemented and used (i.e., the way in which a policy is implemented – 
e.g., provide free HIV mobile testing)? 
9. make independent decisions about how many people to serve or reach (desired outputs) 
for funded programs (i.e., the number of people to be served by the program; the number of 
services provided; or „units of service‟)? 
10. make independent decisions about who you serve (desired target groups) (i.e., those 
groups for whom the policy is intended to address – e.g., HIV-positive women)? 
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11. To what extent does the funding source make these decisions in collaboration with you? 
(E.g., the agency makes the decisions with no involvement from the funding source; or slight 
involvement; or after having explicitly consulted the funding source; does so under explicit 
conditions or under restrictions set by the funding source; or the funding source makes the 
decisions after having consulted the organization or makes decisions independent of the 
organization or funded program?) 
 
 
III.    STEERING AND CONTROL OF THE ORGANIZATION BY DONOR 
 
A.   Ex post Control:  
 
Document in which goals of the organization are specified [CONDITION OF RD]  
 
1. In what ways do funders/donors influence the goals of your organization/programs? 
2. How are these goals for the funded program communicated? (e.g., through specific 
documentation or through the grants, contracts or cooperative agreement or via a budget 
allocation or letter of allocation from the funding source?)  
 
Involvement of the organization in the setting of goals (other than purely financial) 
 
3. Who determines the goals that your organization or funded programs pursue?  
(e.g., Your organization or program determines the goals after consulting the funding source, or the 
funding source sets the goals by a process of negotiation or cooperation, or the funding source sets the 
goals after consulting the organization or program or that the funding source sets the goals independent of 
your organization?) 
4. What part do you or your organization play in determining the goals of funded programs? 
5. Once a contract is drawn, how much say do you have in changing the set goals? 
 
 
IV.   PERCEPTIONS OF GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE RED TAPE  
 
Administrative burden resulting from complying with evaluation or performance 
requirements: 
 
1. Is there any Red Tape (“Rules, regulations, and procedures that remain in force and entail a 
compliance burden for the organization but have no efficacy for the rules’ functional object” 
(Bozeman 1993) or burdensome administrative rules and procedures that have negative effects on 
your organization’s effectiveness (Rainey, Pandey & Bozeman 1995)) associated with the 
funding your organization receives from any of your funding sources? If yes, would you 
describe it? 
2. PROBE  To what extent do you feel that the resources available for implementation 
are constrained by the assessment and reporting requirements of the funder? (SPECIFY: 
USG, Corporations, Foundations, Other sources) 
3. To what extent do you feel that your organization is being watched or the organization‟s 
contractual compliance is being monitored by any of your funding sources (SPECIFY: 
USG, Corporations, Foundations, Other sources) 
4. What limitations do you face when trying to comply with the rules and regulations of 
your different funding agreements? 
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V.    INFLUENCE OF GRANTS, CONTRACTS, & COOPERATIVE 
AGREEMENTS 
 
1. Does the tool or mechanism through which funding is provided influence how a funded 
program is implemented? If yes, in what ways? (SPECIFY: Grants, Contracts, 
Cooperative Agreements) 
2. How do corporations and foundations transfer funding to your organization or program? 
(e.g., through contracts, cooperative agreements, or grants?). If through contracts or grants, 
how different are these tools from those used by government? 
3. Which of these tools do you find most restricting? If so, in what ways? 
4. Does the degree of restrictiveness vary with different funding sources? 
5. Which of the following funding tools/mechanisms do your prefer and why? (SPECIFY: 
Grants, Contracts, Cooperative Agreements) 
 
[Questions in Section V above were not asked to Executive Staff; with the exception of 
Question 5.] 
 
VI.     STRATEGIES FOR RETAINING AUTONOMY 
 
1. What factors do you consider when deciding to solicit funding from different sources? 
(How do you determine which RTF to respond to? Walk me through the process?) 
2. Can you walk me through the process of soliciting funding from (1) USG; (2) 
CORPORATIONS; (3) FOUNDATIONS; (4) OTHER SOURCES? 
3. How many RTFs have you turned down and why? 
4. What strategies do you employ to retain autonomy within the organization/program? 
(SPECIFY: USG; CORPORATIONS; FOUNDATIONS) PROBE 
 
VII.   ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR HIGH LEVEL STAFF 
 
A.   Structural Control  
 
[Qs on Presence of governing board; Who appoints board members; Composition of board; Appointment 
of CEO; Type of contract of CEO; Who evaluates the CEO; Basis of accountability for CEO]  
 
1. How would you characterize the BOD‟s relationship with the different funding sources? 




2. Does the BOD influence which funding sources you solicit? PROBE How much 
influence does the board have in selecting the funding sources the organization solicits? 
3. Does the BOD have any influence when it comes to the organization‟s relationship with 
each funder?  
4. Is the BOD engaged in the evaluation of funded programs in any way? 
5. Do any of the funding sources exert any influence through the decision-making bodies 
(e.g., Board of Directors, CEO). If so, in what ways? 




CONSTRUCTION OF IMPACT CONTINUUMS 
 
 
In order to illustrate the perceived impact of funding on INGOs‟ autonomy, by 
funding source and tool, this research constructed different continuums (shown in Figures 
6 and 7) and a cross-tabulation of the perceived influence of different funding sources 
and tools on INGOs‟ operational and managerial autonomy dimensions (shown in Table 
15). The general idea here was to provide a visual illustration of the magnitude and 
direction of the influence of USG funding on INGOs‟ autonomy relative to other funding 
sources, as well as the influence of funding tools. While the continuums and cross-
tabulations provide a visual for the reader, it is important to articulate how these were 
constructed.  
Since this study is framed within the resource dependence and tool choice 
approaches; the interview questions used were generated with these theoretical 
frameworks in mind. As shown in Appendix 3, the interview guide included questions on 
INGOs‟ autonomy steering and control of the INGO by donors and the influence of 
grants, contracts, and cooperative agreements. The responses to these questions helped to 
gauge INGO‟s experiences with different funding sources and tools, thus providing the 
information used to construct these continuums and cross-tabulation.  
While the researcher‟s judgment plays a role in selecting points of placement for 
each of the funding sources relative to others, the general direction and magnitude of the 
relationships were guided by various statements from participants across all three INGOs. 
For example, in trying to confirm the relationship between funding tools and INGO 
autonomy, I conducted a text search for the word “contracts.” NVIVO highlighted every 
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time the word “contracts” was used. By so doing, I was able to understand under what 
contexts and conditions the term was used and what was uttered pertaining to contracts. 
 I was also able to identify when comparisons were made between contracts and 
other tools. I conducted similar searches for grants and cooperative agreements in order 
to fully understand their relationships with one another and their link to the autonomy 
dimensions, as well as text searches for each of the funding sources. As a result, the 
graphical illustrations and cross-tabulation were constructed based on participants‟ 
experiences with each of the funding sources and funding tools.  The following are 
examples of statements that were instrumental in the construction of Figure 6, Figure 7 
and Table 15. The statements typically expressed participants‟ experience with either 
USG funding relative to other funding sources or contracts, relative to other funding 
tools. 
 
COMPARISON OF FUNDING SOURCES COMPARISON OF FUNDING TOOLS 
 
The USG tries to influence, sure they do, and other donors may – 
(but) mainly the USG. More and more, there is a great deal of 
bureaucracy in the government. Years ago, it used to be you 
address the needs of the people and if you can show that the food 
or the cash went to the people or this looks very good – it was 
considered a success, if you achieved your goal. Today it‟s a lot 
of paperwork, it‟s more and more paperwork instead of the 20-
page, it‟s a 100-pages in proposal; it‟s just become onerous and a 
lot of people don‟t want to touch food aid anymore, they don‟t 
want to touch some of the other kinds of aid that the government 
gives. (CEO, SIGMA) 
 
I think that donors, in particular, governments have specific 
policies interests that they want to pursue and we need to be 
conscious about those. (Dir. Humanitarian Assistance, BETA) 
 
Foundations are the highest (more restrictive); I would say the 
government is the highest, then Foundations, then Corporations, 
and then private individuals…. I can tell you that from a 
foundations side, it really is to me, like the blend of working 
with government and working with the private individual or 
corporation because you have – foundations have to give their 
money away, but you also working across the table with other 
program experts. (VP External Relations, BETA) 
 
Compare(d)… to a corporation where with a corporation you 
might be working with a head of a foundation, but the 
corporation doesn‟t understand our work as much – there is this 
huge educational background, just really educating them about 
the work that we do… With an individual, it‟s a private thing; 
 
But contracts are more kind of more controlled – you need 
more probably more monitoring on a contract for compliance; 
both need certain controls and compliance but it‟s a little more 
– necessarily under a contract I would say. (CEO, ALPHA) 
 
Probably the contracts (are more restrictive), the grants are a 
little easier and especially if they are from the private sector 
and from the private sector, there is more understanding of 
what goes on. For example, if you have two organizations 
funding the same project in the private sector (of an) 
organization, (both of them would) say just extend the 
program, add to it or so, with government, this is not possible 
– (it‟s just the one) source basically. I don‟t know, I would say 
that contracts are a little more difficult. (CEO, SIGMA) 
 
If it‟s a contract, it‟s no different than you hiring a plumber to 
put a sink in your house. The plumber may come to you and 
say, well here is the kind of sink – here is the model that you 
should use and you go well, ok or you go – no I want that sink. 
But the contract is basically saying that you do it this way no 
matter what so that is certainly the difference. (Dir. of Food 
Programs, BETA) 
 
A grant is an instrument that denotes it is given to an 
implementing partner to support a program for a public 
purpose. A contract is an acquisition instrument where the 
USG purchases goods or services and when you sign a 
contract with the USG, you enter a client-service provider 
relationship. So we have to take the USG as our client and our 
number one responsibility is to provide service to them. A 
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people are inspired personally to give to CARE; it‟s not like a 
foundation were they have to give it away or like a Corporation 
were they kind of what to be socially responsible. (VP External 
Relations, BETA) 
 
(With corporate funding), most of their rules and regulations is 
how we spend that funding… a lot of times it‟s the expectation 
of how we spend down the grant. It‟s spending and impact. (VP 
External Relations, BETA) 
 
Corporate funding… I can tell you that, we have had in some 
cases, just an exchange of letters, we‟ve had in other cases, a 
one-page contract, and other times maybe a 3-page, maybe 4-
page contract. It‟s mixed, but it‟s really interesting because you 
don‟t have all the paperwork usually that you do with the 
government. (CEO, SIGMA) 
 
The former director of USAID… said to the NGOs that if you 
are going to get USAID funds and get government money, then 
increasingly your objectives are going to have to be consistent 
with the objectives of US Foreign Policy – and I think it was less 
so in the past – so it‟s kind of looking at USG funding as an 
instrument of US foreign policy. (Internal Auditor, BETA) 
 
More and more the government is issuing RFP (contracts) 
saying, “this is what we want done, do you want to do it? 
(Secretary of the Board, BETA) 
 
The ABC concept of HIV/AIDS – you can‟t use PEPFAR money 
to buy condoms…. we went to the country director for Uganda 
and said that we know there is money for Uganda for 
HIV/AIDS… and the country director said, frankly, I cannot 
promote the no use of condom, I just cannot do it. (Program 
Director, ALPHA) 
contract is a different type of relationship – BETA is not 
completely comfortable with that relationship so we are very 
careful about the types of circumstances under which we will 
get into that. (Dir. of Competitive Bids, BETA) 
 
We will take contracts, and but we watch and look at those 
contracts and the specifications in them very carefully and we 
have turned and we will turn down contracts that say, you 
must do – that are either ill-defined in terms of the actions that 
you are going to bring forward or it states that the USG 
official at the level will tell you what to do with these monies 
and we usually say, no, thanks, but no thanks on those because 
they define in a way that we are not comfortable with the 
actions to  move forward. (VP of International Programs, 
ALPHA) 
 
Right now Plan does not do any government contracts, only 
grants and cooperative agreements… you have Contracts – 
when the government contracts someone to do something, 
they are essentially given them a task – for a certain 
price…(Dir. of Grants and Compliance, ALPHA) 
 
Also contracts tend to be larger; and sometime we feel we 
don‟t have the capacity to handle $200 million project in a 
little country. And there are a lot of stricter requirements such 
as the way you pay people and all sort of staff. 
 Then you have… grants – whereas grants really are just 
“conditional gifts” – we want to give you some money, yeah 
of course, we want you to tell us what you are going to do 
with it but we are not really going to have any oversight or 




Figure 6, 7 and Table 15, are therefore designed to showcase of the presumed 
impact of USG funding on INGOs‟ autonomy, relative to other funding sources, and the 
presumed impact of contracts, relative to cooperative agreements and grants. Aside from 
the visual aesthetics of these figures and table, an additional utility to the continuums is 
that they provide future quantitative research with potentially testable hypotheses about 
the influence of USG funding relative to other funding sources and the influence of 
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